- By Elizabeth DickinsonElizabeth Dickinson is author of the Kindle Single Who Shot Ahmed? A Mystery Unravels in Bahrain's Botched Arab Spring, from which this excerpt was adapted. She is a former FP assistant managing editor.
Air Force personnel who read WikiLeaks could be in for some harsh consequences, according to a memo reported by Security New Daily today. The U.S. government has already banned federal employees from reading WikiLeaks (it also banned FP‘s coverage of WikiLeaks). But now, according to the Daily:
The AFMC memo takes its anti-WikiLeaks stance a step further, declaring that Air Force members – and their family members – who view the WikiLeaks cables may be prosecuted for espionage."
This is something of an interesting twist in the larger WikiLeaks espionage debate, which is proceeding apace. Today in Alexandra, Virginia, WikiLeaks supporters are in court to try to prevent the U.S. government’s request to Twitter to reveal their private information. Ostensibly, tweeters who helped disseminate the leaked cables could be implicated in any eventual espionage case against the whistle-blower organization.
I am no lawyer, but both these cases strike me as a bit intense — if indeed they both do move forward. First, presumably some Air Force officers with clearances could already read the cables (though it’s probably true that intelligence siloing would have limited the scope of access for any one person). Beyond that, however, there are real questions here about where you draw the line between facilitating the cables’ dissemination and just being a natural consumer of information. If reading WikiLeaks is a crime, I’m in serious trouble!
Uri Friedman is deputy managing editor at Foreign Policy. Before joining FP, he reported for the Christian Science Monitor, worked on corporate strategy for Atlantic Media, helped launch the Atlantic Wire, and covered international affairs for the site. A proud native of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, he studied European history at the University of Pennsylvania and has lived in Barcelona, Spain and Geneva, Switzerland.| The List |
Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. She is also a faculty affiliate at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a professor of political economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business (by courtesy), where she co-teaches a course on managing political risk with Condoleezza Rice. Previously, Zegart taught at UCLA, worked at McKinsey & Company, and served on the NSC staff. Her academic writing includes two award-winning books: Spying Blind (Princeton University Press, 2007), which examines intelligence adaptation failures before 9/11, and Flawed by Design (Stanford University Press, 1999), which chronicles the evolution of America’s national security architecture. She recently finished a book on congressional intelligence oversight, Eyes on Spies (Hoover Institution Press, 2011), and is currently working on a popular book about intelligence in the post-9/11 world. Zegart has also written about national security in the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Slate. A former Fulbright Scholar, she received an A.B. in East Asian Studies from Harvard and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford. A native Kentuckian, she lives in California with her husband and three children.| Amy Zegart |