- By Thomas E. RicksThomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008. He can be reached at email@example.com.
I think Gen. Martin Dempsey really hit it out of the park in Tuesday’s hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Here is his meditation on two of the big lessons he learned in Iraq.
So I would — I would — looking back on it, at least my own personal view about Iraq in 2003 was that Iraq had a particular problem, and it was a regime that was destabilizing in the region and that we should take action, that — it was my recommendation that we should take action to change the dynamic inside of Iraq and that the region itself would become more stable. I’m not sure it turned out that way. I mean, it probably — it is, but it didn’t happen exactly as we intended it, and that’s because I don’t think we understood — let me put it differently. I didn’t understand the dynamic inside that country, particularly with regard to the various sects of Islam that fundamentally, on occasion, compete with each other for dominance in Islam, and so — Shia, the Shia sect of Islam, the Sunni sect of Islam — when we took the lid off of that, I think we learned some things that — and I’m not sure we could have learned them any other way.
I don’t know, I’ve reflected about that a lot, but I’ve learned that issues don’t exist in isolation. They’re always complex. And I’ve been scarred by rereading a quote from Einstein, who said if you have an hour to save the world, spend 55 minutes of it understanding the problem and five minutes of it trying to solve it. And I think sometimes, in particular as a military culture, we don’t have that ratio right. We tend to spend 55 minutes trying to — how to solve the problem and five minutes understanding it. That’s one of the big lessons for me in developing leaders for the future, not only in the Army but, if confirmed, in the joint force.
Another one is the degree to which military operations in particular, but probably all of them, have been decentralized. You know, you’ll hear it called various things: decentralized, distributed operations, empowering the edge. Whatever we call it, we have pushed enormous capability, responsibility and authority to the edge, to captains and sergeants of all services. And yet our leader development paradigms really haven’t changed very much. They are beginning to change, but I think that second lesson on the enormous responsibility that we put on our subordinates’ shoulders has to be followed with a change in the way we prepare them to accept that responsibility.
I think those would be the two big lessons for me."
He also referred to H.R. McMaster as "probably our best brigadier general." Good for him.