Foreign Policy: Do you think China’s presence in Africa will be permanent?

Serge Michel: Yes. I think the recent and massive move is only the beginning, though that might all slow down a bit, because of the problems I mention in my article. Still, all evidence points to China’s interest in Africa as a long-term one. The Chinese are trying to facilitate its access to resources by financing and constructing major infrastructure development. They will only begin to reap the fruits of this effort in a few years.

FP: How is China reacting to some of the other countries that are beginning to invest in Africa, such as India?

SM: China still has a head start on other countries, and massive means compared to India. Most of the time, in places like Nigeria and Angola, China has simply overbid Indians to win contracts. No other country has as much cash in reserve (about $1,500 billion). No other country can deploy thousands of workers anywhere in Africa. The “Africa-China Cooperation Forum” that gathered 48 heads of state in Beijing in November 2006, is also much more powerful than all the other summits (Africa-India, Africa-Korea, etc.). The Africa-Japan summit that opened in Tokyo on May 28 had some success, with 43 African countries represented and an announcement of $6.5 billion in investments and credit for agriculture and infrastructure projects in Africa. But the Chinese Export-Import Bank alone plans to spend $20 billion in the next 3 years. There are 227 Japanese companies in Africa, compared with 900 Chinese companies.

FP: How do young Africans’ opinions of China compare to those of the United States?

SM: It changes very much from one country to another. In some places, like Mali and Niger, the United States has embarked on military operations against al Qaeda, and that has provoked bitter reactions from young Africans, who think that America is mostly interested in its own security, not in economic development of their countries. It’s quite different in the Republic of the Congo. American diplomats I met there were organizing lectures, workshops, and live concerts with young Congolese to build up long-term support for the United States. But today, a young African businessperson could obtain a Chinese visa pretty easily, whereas an American one is becoming increasingly difficult.

FP: Do you think the Western diplomats—and by extension, their governments—recognize how powerful China has become on the continent? The quotes you described seemed to indicate some denial on their part.

SM: The Western diplomats I met in Angola are happy that China is meeting all kinds of unexpected obstacles there. In other countries, I found diplomats following every Chinese move very closely. On the Web site of the U.S. State Department, there is a special restricted section dedicated exclusively to the presence of China in Africa. The level of alarm regarding the Chinese on the continent has gone down a bit. It was at its highest in 2005 and 2006. But, in general, I would say that the denial is only a façade; the West is concerned about the growing Chinese influence everywhere.

FP: How does China’s investment in Africa differ from the powers who came before it?

SM: There are five major differences: One, China has no colonial past. Two, it has a pan-African approach, unlike Europeans who only worked in their former territories. Three, China sets no political conditions on its cooperation (such as democracy and transparency). The only requirement is that the African country must sever its ties with Taiwan. Fourth, China finances infrastructure, such as dams, roads, and railroads, and it constructs them with its own labor. Fifth, China is the last centralized system and can easily offer “package” deals that include, to use Guinea as an example, a bauxite mine, a dam, a power station, a refinery, and a railway—all financed by the Exim Bank of China. Its North American competitors always refused to embark on refining, because they said there was not enough electricity in the country, even though 122 sites have been identified as ideal for constructing dams.

FP: In the West, when people hear the term “China in Africa,” they think Darfur. On the ground in other parts of Africa, though, does the crisis in Darfur and China’s relationship with the Sudanese government dominate the public imagination? Are people talking about China in those terms throughout the continent?

SM: Very few of my interlocutors in Africa actually mention Darfur. Surprisingly, the fact that the victims in Darfur are mostly “black Africans” and the perpetrators are Arab tribes did not trigger a broad solidarity movement throughout Africa. Africa is a vast continent that is not very united, and in each country people react mainly to what the Chinese are doing there.

FP: In light of some of the backlash against China in Africa, whom do you see filling the void when Africans reject investment dollars and influence from their Chinese patrons?

SM: Again, it depends on the country. In Angola, I witnessed the return of traditional partners, such as the United States, Portugal, and France. French President Nicolas Sarkozy was in Luanda last week to end an eight-year dispute over an arms scandal from the 1990s. Brazil and Israel were also on the top of the list of new investors. Many other Asian countries, from India to Malaysia, are focusing on what Africa can offer. In Brazzaville, South Korean companies recently got a very large railway contract that will be paid with the timber of the Congo Forest. In Kinshasa, China’s biggest competitors for the mines are South African.

FP: How do you think China’s operations in areas that are freer than it is back home will change policies on the mainland, if at all?

SM: The change, if any, will come from the people on the ground, the Chinese managers, and diplomats, who witness different realities. It will not come from the press and it will not come from Beijing. I’ve been reading the Chinese papers about the places where China had problems in Africa, like Zambia, and there was no mention of strikes there against the Chinese, or interviews with opposition candidates.

FP: Do you think Africa will benefit, in the long run, from China’s presence on the continent?

SM: Yes, I think so. Africa will get some of the infrastructure it badly needs. And if there is only one benefit, it would be that China is breaking the monopoly of the former colonial powers. Africans now have choices. Let’s hope they use them wisely.

Serge Michel is the West Africa correspondent for Le Monde and coauthor, with Michel Beuret and Paolo Woods, of La Chinafrique: Pékin à la conquête du continent noir (ChinAfrica: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion on the Dark Continent) (Paris: Grasset, 2008).