Whither the Democratic establishment?

Josh Marshall offers an explanation for why Wesley Clark would be a viable candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, even if he enters the race this late in the day:

[B]y the normal laws of political gravitation, Dean’s sustained surge should have forced a coalescence around one of the several more-centrist-minded establishment candidates — Kerry, Gephardt, Edwards, Lieberman. With Dean catching fire, those who aren’t comfortable with his candidacy should be getting behind one candidate in order to beat him. But that clearly has not happened. In some ways this is a more striking development than Dean’s rise itself. Now, why hasn’t that coalescence taken place? I think the answer is elementary. None of the current candidates has passed the audition for the job. Lieberman’s campaign is generally believed to be moribund (and I like the guy). Edwards has gone absolutely nowhere. Gephardt has bet everything on getting the support of organized labor. But if he gets it, it’ll basically be a mercy … well, I don’t want to be off-color. But, you know what I mean. Kerry is basically the establishment front-runner at the moment. But it’s an extremely anemic frontrunnerdom. He’s basically the front-runner by default because all the other potential frontrunners who haven’t caught fire are doing even worse than he is. What this all tells me is that there is a vacuum with a lot of political forces pushing to fill it. And yet none of the current candidates has been capable of becoming the vehicle for those forces. I know these are some convoluted metaphors. But I trust my meaning is relatively clear. Now, there are all sorts of reasons why late-entering, draft-so-and-so type candidacies never end up winning. But the vacuum I’ve just described is one Clark could potentially fill. At least he could get in the game and give it his best shot.

Marshall is probably correct in his assessment, but there is one other possibility — the Democratic establishment is too fractured/decentralized to coalesce around anyone. The union kowtowing that Marshall mentions is but one example of this. Don’t forget the wooing of public school teachers, trial lawyers, African-Americans, and environmentalists. The contrast with the Republicans is quite striking. While the Dems are busy trying to please key interest groups, the GOP is trying to augment their control over key interest groups, as this Washington Monthly story makes clear:

If today’s GOP leaders put as much energy into shaping K Street as their predecessors did into selecting judges and executive-branch nominees, it’s because lobbying jobs have become the foundation of a powerful new force in Washington politics: a Republican political machine. Like the urban Democratic machines of yore, this one is built upon patronage, contracts, and one-party rule. But unlike legendary Chicago mayor Richard J. Daley, who rewarded party functionaries with jobs in the municipal bureaucracy, the GOP is building its machine outside government, among Washington’s thousands of trade associations and corporate offices, their tens of thousands of employees, and the hundreds of millions of dollars in political money at their disposal. At first blush, K Street might not seem like the best place to build a well-oiled political operation. For most of its existence, after all, the influence industry has usually been the primary obstacle to aggressive, ambitious policy-making in Washington. But over the last few years, Republicans have brought about a revolutionary change: They’ve begun to capture and, consequently, discipline K Street…. The corporate lobbyists who once ran the show, loyal only to the parochial interests of their employer, are being replaced by party activists who are loyal first and foremost to the GOP. Through them, Republican leaders can now marshal armies of lobbyists, lawyers, and public relations experts–not to mention enormous amounts of money–to meet the party’s goals.

I actually hope I’m wrong in this assessment and Marshall is right. As I’ve said before, I want two viable parties out there. And much of this is attributable to the contrast in party control over tthe executive and legislative branches. Consider this an alternate hypothesis. But let me close with a hypothetical question: if I’m wrong, then what explains Terry MacAuliffe’s continuing reign as the Democratic Party chairman following the 2002 midterm elections?