Missing the Wesley Clark boat

I’ve had no time to write anything substantial about Wesley Clark’s decision to run for president. Ryan Booth has done an excellent job collecting reactions here and here. He did miss one important take — Josh Marshall’s mixed assessment of Clark’s post-announcement performance on CNN. One random thought I do have — there was a ...

By Daniel W. Drezner, a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast.

September 18, 2003, 7:21 PM

I've had no time to write anything substantial about Wesley Clark's decision to run for president. Ryan Booth has done an excellent job collecting reactions here and here. He did miss one important take -- Josh Marshall's mixed assessment of Clark's post-announcement performance on CNN. One random thought I do have -- there was a lot of noise during Operation Iraqi Freedom about whether Clark was doing a good job as a military analyst for CNN. Some of the criticism of his criticism was absurd, but there is one line of argument that would not be absurd. (Caveat: my recall of the substance of Clark's critique is not perfect, so I'll be happy to be corrected in the comments section.) I'm pretty sure Clark argued that the U.S. had not deployed enough troops to decisively win the war. In retrospect, this was flat-out wrong. Before critics get bent all out of shape, let me be perfectly clear what Clark got wrong. It is true that the administration has delpoyed too few troops for the occupation of Iraq. That's different from what I'm saying Clark screwed up in his analysis. He thought the U.S. did not have enough troops to defeat the Iraqi military while still being able to maintain logistical supply chains and control over captured territory. On this point, I'm pretty sure Clark was wrong. Given that security matters are his strong suit, isn't this a big vulnerability if he gets nominated? In part, this depends on what Iraq looks like a year from now. If it's still a mess, then it won't matter. But if things have improved significantly, then Bush can look at Clark and say, "We both screwed up. You were wrong on how to fight the war, and my administration was wrong in it's initial postwar planning." Just a thought. UPDATE: David Adesnik, Matthew Yglesias and Glenn Reynolds weigh in on Clark as well. For more on Clark, go check out this Joshua Green profile in The Atlantic Monthly. There's a priceless anecdote:

I’ve had no time to write anything substantial about Wesley Clark’s decision to run for president. Ryan Booth has done an excellent job collecting reactions here and here. He did miss one important take — Josh Marshall’s mixed assessment of Clark’s post-announcement performance on CNN. One random thought I do have — there was a lot of noise during Operation Iraqi Freedom about whether Clark was doing a good job as a military analyst for CNN. Some of the criticism of his criticism was absurd, but there is one line of argument that would not be absurd. (Caveat: my recall of the substance of Clark’s critique is not perfect, so I’ll be happy to be corrected in the comments section.) I’m pretty sure Clark argued that the U.S. had not deployed enough troops to decisively win the war. In retrospect, this was flat-out wrong. Before critics get bent all out of shape, let me be perfectly clear what Clark got wrong. It is true that the administration has delpoyed too few troops for the occupation of Iraq. That’s different from what I’m saying Clark screwed up in his analysis. He thought the U.S. did not have enough troops to defeat the Iraqi military while still being able to maintain logistical supply chains and control over captured territory. On this point, I’m pretty sure Clark was wrong. Given that security matters are his strong suit, isn’t this a big vulnerability if he gets nominated? In part, this depends on what Iraq looks like a year from now. If it’s still a mess, then it won’t matter. But if things have improved significantly, then Bush can look at Clark and say, “We both screwed up. You were wrong on how to fight the war, and my administration was wrong in it’s initial postwar planning.” Just a thought. UPDATE: David Adesnik, Matthew Yglesias and Glenn Reynolds weigh in on Clark as well. For more on Clark, go check out this Joshua Green profile in The Atlantic Monthly. There’s a priceless anecdote:

When we returned from CNN, an aide stood waiting beside a rental car to ferry us to another appointment. Clark, who still runs his life as though he were conducting a military campaign, grabbed the keys, nodded for the aide and me to climb in, and shot out into rush-hour traffic. The aide took a halfhearted stab at briefing his boss while Clark—slouched low, cell phone cradled to ear—tore across Independence Avenue in view of the White House, weaving in and out of lanes. As we approached the Old Executive Office Building, Clark, seeing nowhere to park, glanced at his watch and then at me. “Listen, I’m late,” he said. “Do you have plans?” I shook my head. Without another word he pulled over, tossed me the keys, and disappeared into the building, his aide scrambling to keep up. I found a parking space. A few hours later Clark called to get the keys.

Link via Milt Rosenberg.

Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner

Tag: Politics