Questions about the DoD memo
Beyond the loonier e-mails I’ve received regarding the Slate essay, the criticism that crops up most frequently attacks what I said about the DoD memo regarding reconstruction contracts from last week. Basically, they have two points: Why reward countries like Germany, France, and Russia for how they behaved prior to the war? Given the relative ...
Beyond the loonier e-mails I've received regarding the Slate essay, the criticism that crops up most frequently attacks what I said about the DoD memo regarding reconstruction contracts from last week. Basically, they have two points: Why reward countries like Germany, France, and Russia for how they behaved prior to the war? Given the relative success of Baker's mission to Europe, isn't this an example of successful hard-nosed bargaining? I wrote about the DoD memo at more length last week, but to expand a little: 1) When White House officials tell the New York Times that they were surprised by the timing and wording of the memo, you know there was a screw-up. 2) For those who feel these countries should not be rewarded for their behavior, I'm certainly sympathetic. A question, then: why are Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the list of countries that can receive contracts? Can a case be made that these countries were more cooperative than France, Germany or Russia prior to the war? 3) This also goes to the bargaining question as well. According to press reports, of the approximately $120 billion in Iraqi foreign debt, only $40 billion is owed to Paris Club members. The rest is owed primarily to the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia in particular. If the DoD memo is supposed to be an example of bare-knuckles bargaining, why wasn't Saudi Arabia -- which owns a much larger portion of the debt than any European country -- excluded from the approved countries as well? 4) As for Baker's mission, he has achieved some nice joint statements. But as this Chicago Tribune story points out, at this point they are merely words, because of how the Paris Club operates:
Beyond the loonier e-mails I’ve received regarding the Slate essay, the criticism that crops up most frequently attacks what I said about the DoD memo regarding reconstruction contracts from last week. Basically, they have two points:
[D]ebt relief for Iraq is by no means a done deal. The Paris Club always has made its debt decisions by the unanimous consent of its 19 permanent members, raising a high hurdle for a controversial subject. One member is cash-strapped Russia. It is owed more than $3.5 billion in country-to-country debt by Iraq and $52 billion in pending contract obligations — and has expressed no willingness to forgive any of it.
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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