More on Madrid

The Associated Press reports that arrests have been made in the Madrid bombings (link via Glenn Reynolds):

Spain’s interior minister Saturday announced the arrest of five suspects in the Madrid bombings, including three Moroccans. The other two suspects had Indian passports, a ministry spokesman said. The five were arrested in connection with a cell phone inside an explosives-packed gym bag found on one of the bombed commuter trains. The suspects “could be related to Moroccan extremist groups,” the minister said. “But we should not rule out anything. Police are still investigating all avenues. This opens an important avenue.”

Newsday reports that a videotape has been found:

The Spanish government announced early today it had found a videotape in which the al-Qaida network claims responsibility for Thursday’s bombings in Madrid. The news, eight hours before polls opened in a general election, raised a possibility that Thursday’s attacks will tip a close vote into defeat for a government that has been a staunch ally of the Bush administration in its global war on terror. Interior Minister Angel Acebes announced the discovery of the tape not long after issuing news of five arrests — of three Moroccans and two Spaniards of Indian origin. On the tape, a man identified as Abu Dujan al-Afghani spoke in Moroccan-accented Arabic, saying the attacks were al-Qaida’s retribution for Spain’s support of the U.S.-led war in Iraq. “It is a response to your cooperation with the criminals Bush and his allies,” said the speaker, according to a Spanish-language translation issued by Acebes’ ministry. An anonymous caller told a Madrid TV station where to find the tape, in a trash bin near a mosque. Acebes cautioned that the tape may not be authentic and that al-Afghani is unknown to intelligence officials.

The loose affiliation between a Moroccan terrorist group and Al Qaeda would not be shocking. Earlier this week I heard Daniel Byman present a World Politics review essay entitled “Al Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?” in which he suggested that Al Qaeda was willing to fund regional and/or national terrorist groups with material support and training as a way of advancing its “brand” as it were. Byman’s conclusions:

First, many of the bromides regarding counterterrorism in general—often drawn from struggles against small, left-wing European groups with at best limited popular appeal—do not apply to al-Qaeda. Its size, dedication, and popular appeal make it unusually, perhaps uniquely, formidable. Second, one must be wary of confusing al-Qaeda with its many affiliates and of confusing these violent radical groups with the broader political Islamist movement. Third, the United States must reengage its allies, ensuring that its counterterrorism strategy is robust enough to maintain their support. Fourth, public diplomacy, always an American weakness, must go from an episodic and underfunded foreign policy instrument to a major tool of national power. Fifth, al-Qaeda’s unusually innovative nature requires the United States to try to defend not only against obvious methods such as truck bombs but also against new means like surface-to-air missiles and sustained suicide bombing campaigns. Sixth and finally, political leaders must engage the public to increase the ability of the United States to stand fast in the event of another major attack. (emphasis added)