I’ll say it again — it’s good to have more troops
Over the past year one of my constant refrains about Iraq is that the administration had failed to put sufficient numbers of troops to deal with the occupation phase of the campaign. This argument inevitably triggered comments from readers saying that more troops would have minimal effect on peacebuilding while increasing the number of inviting ...
Over the past year one of my constant refrains about Iraq is that the administration had failed to put sufficient numbers of troops to deal with the occupation phase of the campaign. This argument inevitably triggered comments from readers saying that more troops would have minimal effect on peacebuilding while increasing the number of inviting targets for insurgents. I would urge those skeptics to read Rowan Scarborough's account in the Washington Times about how the U.S. army effectively destroyed Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi militia. The highlights:
Over the past year one of my constant refrains about Iraq is that the administration had failed to put sufficient numbers of troops to deal with the occupation phase of the campaign. This argument inevitably triggered comments from readers saying that more troops would have minimal effect on peacebuilding while increasing the number of inviting targets for insurgents. I would urge those skeptics to read Rowan Scarborough’s account in the Washington Times about how the U.S. army effectively destroyed Sheik Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi militia. The highlights:
Once he had targets, Gen. [Martin] Dempsey [commander of the 1st Armored Division] could then map a battle plan for entering four key cities — Karbala, Najaf, Kufa and Diwaniyah. This would be a counterinsurgency fought with 70-ton M-1 Abrams tanks and aerial gunships overhead. It would not be the lightning movements of clandestine commandos, but rather all the brute force the Army could muster, directed at narrowly defined targets. Last week, Sheik al-Sadr surrendered. He called on what was left of his men to cease operations and said he may one day seek public office in a democratic Iraq. Gen. [Mark] Hertling [one of two 1st Armored assistant division commanders] said Mahdi’s Army is defeated, according the Army’s doctrinal definition of defeat. A few stragglers might be able to fire a rocket-propelled grenade, he said, but noted: “Do they have the capability of launching any kind of offensive operation? Absolutely not.” The division estimates it killed at least several thousand militia members. Gen. Dempsey designed “Iron Saber” based on four pillars: massive combat power; information operations to discredit Sheik al-Sadr; rebuilding the Iraqi security forces that fled; and beginning civil affairs operations as quickly as possible, including paying Iraqis to repair damaged public buildings. “As soon as we finished military operations, we immediately began civil-military operations,” said Gen. Hertling. “We crossed over from bullets to money.”
Only time will tell if Sadr has been truly defanged — and it’s worth pointing out that his armed resistance appears to have caused a steady increase in public support for him. Still, Sadr’s decision to try to attain power through legal rather than extralegal means seems a pretty powerful argument for the virtues of more troops.
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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