Nu-cu-lar problems
Quick: who’s in charge of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program? Actually, I don’t know myself, but the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which has authority over CTR, is apparently run by this woman. Nevertheless, I agree with MIT prof Steve Van Evera that the simple fact that the program to secure loose nuclear material does not ...
Quick: who’s in charge of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program? Actually, I don’t know myself, but the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which has authority over CTR, is apparently run by this woman. Nevertheless, I agree with MIT prof Steve Van Evera that the simple fact that the program to secure loose nuclear material does not report to a political heavyweight (say, Jim Baker) is prima facie evidence that the administration is not taking the threat seriously. Van Evera argues that only a well-known Washington arm-breaker (remember how Baker got all that Iraqi debt forgiven?) can get the results necessary to make us truly safer from nuclear attack. A lot of people have been harping about this since well before 9/11 and today Nick Kristof picks up the thread, asking why we’re not doing more. It’s not like what we need to do is a secret. Fareed Zakaria summarized a while ago a series of important steps, including spending as much money as necessary to buy or otherwise secure Russian fissile material, banning the use of highly enriched uranium, demanding aggressive IAEA inspections, and tackling the Iranian and North Korean programs head on. Hard to do, he says, but doable. This issue is an obvious hammer that Kerry can use against Bush, and it grows naturally out of the campaign rhetoric that the Bushies have not been doing enough to protect the homeland (not funding port security, first-responders, and all the rest of it). Similarly, it would seem that Bush has not just the national interest, but an overwhelming political interest, in being and being seen to be way out in front on this issue. I’d like to hear a good explanation for why there is not a more apparent commitment to the plodding but supremely important counterproliferation work that virtually every expert in the field has been demanding. And let's not enter Libya into evidence. Leaving aside the question of whether Libya had made conciliatory moves even before the Iraq war, any progress in disarming Libya must be balanced against the acceleration of North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear efforts that the war also brought about. And, finally, once we take these steps, we can focus on really scary and intractable problems like bioterrorism…
Quick: who’s in charge of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program? Actually, I don’t know myself, but the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which has authority over CTR, is apparently run by this woman. Nevertheless, I agree with MIT prof Steve Van Evera that the simple fact that the program to secure loose nuclear material does not report to a political heavyweight (say, Jim Baker) is prima facie evidence that the administration is not taking the threat seriously. Van Evera argues that only a well-known Washington arm-breaker (remember how Baker got all that Iraqi debt forgiven?) can get the results necessary to make us truly safer from nuclear attack. A lot of people have been harping about this since well before 9/11 and today Nick Kristof picks up the thread, asking why we’re not doing more. It’s not like what we need to do is a secret. Fareed Zakaria summarized a while ago a series of important steps, including spending as much money as necessary to buy or otherwise secure Russian fissile material, banning the use of highly enriched uranium, demanding aggressive IAEA inspections, and tackling the Iranian and North Korean programs head on. Hard to do, he says, but doable. This issue is an obvious hammer that Kerry can use against Bush, and it grows naturally out of the campaign rhetoric that the Bushies have not been doing enough to protect the homeland (not funding port security, first-responders, and all the rest of it). Similarly, it would seem that Bush has not just the national interest, but an overwhelming political interest, in being and being seen to be way out in front on this issue. I’d like to hear a good explanation for why there is not a more apparent commitment to the plodding but supremely important counterproliferation work that virtually every expert in the field has been demanding. And let’s not enter Libya into evidence. Leaving aside the question of whether Libya had made conciliatory moves even before the Iraq war, any progress in disarming Libya must be balanced against the acceleration of North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear efforts that the war also brought about. And, finally, once we take these steps, we can focus on really scary and intractable problems like bioterrorism…
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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