The neocon split over George W. Bush

A few weeks ago I was talking with someone far more plugged into Washington than myself. We were chatting about the neoconservatives and my breakfast partner raised an important distinction — that one had to distinguish between the neocons who supported John McCain in 2000 (Robert Kagan, Bill Kristol) and the neocons who supported George W. Bush in 2000 (Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle). Both groups had the same overarching policy goals, but there was one important difference — the McCain supporters understood that democracy promotion in the Middle East and elsewhere was not something that could be done on the cheap. In the case of Iraq, for example, the McCain neocons believed that statebuilding in Iraq would require a heavy force, while the Bush supporters bought into Rumsfeld’s idea that shock, awe, and a light force could do the trick. This split has persisted in the wake of what’s happened in Iraq. However, there’s now a deeper question that could really split the neocons — is the Bush administration really interrested in democracy promotion at all? This question isn’t really inspired by the Bob Novak article — which still sounds fishy to me. Rather, it’s the Bush White House’s non-response to Vladimir Putin’s power grab — a position which über-neoconservative Robert Kagan criticized in his Washington Post column last week (link via Kevin Drum). This week, the problem is Pakistan. The New York Times has an interview with President Pervez Musharraf that opens as follows:

Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, said in an interview today that his leadership was freeing his country from the menace of extremism and that this national “renaissance” might be lost if he kept his pledge to step down as Army chief at the end of this year. “Yes, I did give my word that I would,” he said of his promise to serve only as the country’s civilian president after Dec. 31, 2004 in a step viewed as fulfilling his larger promise to return Pakistan to democratic rule. “But the issue is now far greater than this.” Speaking in a one-hour interview with The New York Times after his arrival in New York for the United Nations General Assembly meeting this week, General Musharraf said Pakistan was making significant inroads into Al Qaeda, arresting some 600 suspects, ending the terror group’s illicit fund-raising in major cities and breaking up long-established bases in remote border areas. This effort, he said, required “continuity.”

This buttresses a Times story from two days ago suggesting that Musharraf was planning this very thing. Substantively, realists argue that regime type doesn’t matter, and that since Russia and Pakistan are vital allies in the war on terrorism, we should look the other way for thesecountries. I’ve alread said why I think this is the wrong move most of the time. Last week, Kagan said why this is wrong with regard to Russia:

With Russians confronting vicious terrorists, Putin is consolidating his own power. How, exactly, does that help us win the war on terrorism? In fact, it will hurt. Failure to take sides with democratic forces in Russia will cast doubt on Bush’s commitment to worldwide democracy. A White House official commented to the New York Times that Putin’s actions are “a domestic matter for the Russian people.” Really? If so, then the same holds for all other peoples whose rights are taken away by tyrants. If the Bush administration holds to that line, then those hostile to democracy in the Middle East will point to the glaring U.S. double standard; those who favor democracy in the Middle East will be discredited. That will be a severe blow to what Bush regards as a central element of his war on terrorism. Nor should the president and his advisers doubt that vital U.S. interests are at stake in the Russian struggle. Fighting the war on terrorism should not and cannot mean relegating other elements of U.S. strategy and interests to the sidelines. A dictatorial Russia is at least as dangerous to U.S. interests as a dictatorial Iraq. If hopes for democratic reform in Russia are snuffed out, Russia’s neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe will be rightly alarmed and will look to the United States for defense. And there is an even more fundamental reality that the president must face: A Russian dictatorship can never be a reliable ally of the United States. A Russian dictator will always regard the United States with suspicion, because America’s very existence, its power, its global influence, its democratic example will threaten his hold on power.

The U.S. will also be blamed by Pakistanis for Musharraf’s anti-democratic decisions as well:

Western diplomats complain that while the country’s opposition members are full of fiery rhetoric and criticism of General Musharraf, they have proven to be largely ineffective political opponents. But Siddiqul Farooq, a spokesman for the anti-Musharraf faction of the Pakistan Muslim League political party, blamed Western countries for the situation. “If the West does not believe in double standards and if the West believes in the democratic system, then it should also like to see the same system in Pakistan,” he said. “The West should put pressure on Musharraf.”

There’s also a political question for the McCain wing of the neocons (at least) — if this administration’s commitment to democracy promotion is this weak, then what difference is there between Bush and Kerry for someone who cares about this issue? [But just yesterday Bush proposed a Democracy Fund at the United Nations!!–ed. Oh, good — the U.N. has excelled at the promotion of democratic governance. Oh, wait…. ] UPDATE: David Adesnik offers some unresolved thoughts on this subject.