Seven Questions: Dealing with North Korea
A new round of six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program began this week, with many optimistic readings of diplomatic tea leaves and dissecting of statements. Don’t believe the hype, says Joel Wit, a former State Department official who negotiated with Pyongyang.
FOREIGN POLICY: How optimistic are you that progress will be made in this round of talks?
FOREIGN POLICY: How optimistic are you that progress will be made in this round of talks?
Joel Wit: Im cautiously pessimistic. I dont expect much progress at all. I think the most that we can hope for is putting in place a process for further discussion. But I dont think there will be any substantive progress at all. There hasnt been a meeting in over a year, and in the time in between, theres been a lot of bad blood between Washington and Pyongyang. Secondly, the U.S. and North Korean positions are very different, and I dont see much chance for change on either side.
FP: Some say North Korea might have softened its stance, with Kim Jong-Il recently saying that it was the dream of his father, Kim Il-Sung, to have a nuclear-free peninsula.
JW: Look, the North Koreans change their tune depending upon the time of day. I wouldnt read a lot into that stuff. The North Koreans have been saying all along that theyre willing to give up their nuclear program in exchange for a change in the U.S. attitude toward North Korea. Thats just rhetoric. Its nothing more than that. Its just mom and apple pie language.
FP: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill acknowledged that he held a bilateral discussion with his North Korean counterpart prior to formal talks. Does that suggest the administration will take a more flexible approach to this round?
JW: There may be a slight change of process there, but the American team has met bilaterally with the North Koreans in Beijing before. I wouldnt really read too much into that.
FP: Theres been some commentary about Secretary of State Condoleezza Rices taking a more active role in pushing for negotiations.
JW: Its all [overblown]. Theres just no proof of any basic change in the attitude of the Bush administration or of North Korea. Rhetoric is one thing; actually sitting down rolling up your sleeves and reaching an agreement is quite a different thing. In terms of reaching a negotiated agreement, theres no sign that theres a change in attitude among the senior decision makers in the Bush administration.
FP: Might China apply more pressure on Pyongyang if Washington makes a good faith effort through this round of talks?
JW: Theres a real game here. Everyone wants to appear like they are making a good faith effort. You could argue that the United States is probably doing that a little better this time around than it has in the previous sessions of the six-party talks. But playing that game is very different from actually reaching an agreement.
FP: If a reasonable deal ever comes about, what would it look like?
JW: I think a reasonable deal is that, in return for North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons program, the United States and North Korea establish diplomatic relations and have a much better bilateral relationship. There are a number of things that the North Koreans want, such as energy assistance, normal diplomatic relations, and security guarantees. In exchange, we want to make sure their nuclear program is gone and not coming back again. Thats the basic deal, but working out the details is difficult.
FP: If the talks fail, where do we go from here?
JW: If the United States is once again seen as not having made a good faith effort, it will still try to get support for taking tougher measures against North Korea, and no other country is going to support that. So well be kind of stuck.
If the North Koreans do something really stupid and scuttle the process, I still dont think that Washington will get support for tougher measures on North Korea. Because, at the end of the day, China doesnt want to do anything that might create a tense situation, and it is willing to be patient with North Korea, and keep trying for a long time.
Joel Wit is senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and served for 15 years in the State Department in positions related to Northeast Asia and nuclear arms control.
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