Pakistan’s Double Dealing

President Bill Clinton once called South Asia the most dangerous place on Earth, with two nuclear-armed countries locked in a seemingly intractable battle over Kashmir. Yet, as President George W. Bush visits South Asia this week, theres little urgency on Kashmir. This general calm is understandable: Talks between India and Pakistan are ongoing, the national cricket teams compete regularly, and a bus line now connects India and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

It is a false spring. Behind the facade are the very conditions that produced the 1999 India-Pakistan war and the 2002 border crisis. Both of those confrontations arose from Islamabads dangerous belief that it could talk peace with New Delhi and at the same time fuel a guerrilla war in Kashmir. When he visits with President Pervez Musharraf this week, Bush should make clear that Washington is watching closely.

Theres a lot to see. Terrorist infiltrations into Kashmir from Pakistan resumed during the summer of 2005. When pressed, the Pakistani authorities argued that its best efforts could not stop entirely the flow of Islamic militants into Indian Kashmir. Indias restraint is the only thing preventing against yet another escalation of tension with unpredictable consequences. But New Delhis patience cannot be taken for granted. Bush should make clear to Musharraf that he sees the Pakistan-funded jihadis in just the same way he sees al Qaeda.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan understood that terrorism had become, at least temporarily, unacceptable. It joined the war on terror and turned itself, once more, into a frontline state. In practice, however, Pakistan drew a distinction between militants active in Kashmir and international terrorists. The latter could be traded for international goodwill, but the former had to be preserved to keep leverage in Kashmir.

Pakistan employed some political theater to get Washington to accept this Faustian bargain. Specifically, Musharraf had to convince the United States that Islamic militants were growling at the gate of power in Pakistan and that only strong support would save him. Pakistans October 2002 legislative elections provided the opportunity. Voting was rigged in favor of pro-government parties and the requirement that candidates have a college degree was redefined to allow madrasa (religious school) graduates to compete in elections. This allowed religious parties obtain a representation much larger than their actual electoral weight. As a result, alone or in coalitions, the MMA, a coalition of six Islamists parties, obtained majorities in the legislatures of the provinces of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province while garnering only 11 percent of the votes at the national level.

The message to the international community was simple: Dont pressure me too much, or I may be overthrown by Islamists. It worked. The West adopted a lenient attitude on the restoration of civilian rule and accepted that Pakistan only had a limited ability to control militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The apparent rise of Islamists made the military regime look like a moderate stalwart against extremism.

The other key component of Musharrafs strategy was to make a show of peace talks with India. Pakistan took the blame for the 1999 Kargil war and the escalation of tensions in 2002. Contrary to Islamabads traditional belief, international interest in the Kashmir issue benefited India, not Pakistan. To reverse this trend, it was necessary to bring India back to the negotiating table without giving up anything substantive. To maintain credibility, Pakistan has been forced to reduce the violence in Kashmir measurably for a period of time. Jihadi organizations used this period of forced relative inaction to indigenize themselves by recruiting young Kashmiris. In the spring and summer of 2005, violence in Kashmir resumed, initiated by supposedly new terrorist organizations such as Al-Nasreen, Al Afreen, and Al Mansoor, cover names for the more traditional and Pakistan-supported groups, Hizbul Mujahedeen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen, and Al-Umar.

But the real test of Pakistans commitment to ending terrorist infiltration comes every spring and summer, as Kashmirs winter snows melt. Last year, it failed that test. The Indian Army and even sources close to the militancy indicated that infiltration and terrorism had resumed on a large scale in Kashmir. In a particularly gruesome July incident, militants stormed a village and slit the throats of five Hindu men, while car bomb blasts appeared in the Kashmir Valley for the first time during the same period. After the October earthquake in Kashmir, terrorist outfits and radical organizations participated in relief operationsand helped legitimize their presence. The supposedly banned Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamaat Ulema Islami are now operating freely in Kashmir.

Pakistan will not change its position on Kashmir, so the United States must change its stance on Pakistan. When asked whether a paradigm shift on Kashmir is possible, Pakistani officials privately assert that nothing more than a cold peace can be expected. Given this environment, it is essential for Bush to understand that the Pakistani army is not the best protection against Islamic extremism but, rather, one of its causes. The fear of an Islamist takeover should stop distorting the administrations dealings with Pakistan, and Bush should make clear to his host that regional terrorism is no more acceptable than the global variety.

Peaceful regime change in Pakistan is the only reasonable hope for sustainable peace in South Asia. Not only should Pakistans army get out of politics, it should promote the civilian institutionssuch as courts and legislaturesthat will cement democratic practices. The benefits of Musharrafs support in the war on terrorism are being cancelled out by military rule in Pakistan. Americas long-term interest in South Asia isnt served by support for a military regime that winks at terrorists.