Incentives and Iran

I would be remiss if I failed to post on the argument made by Ray Takeyh and James Dobbins in Monday’s FT. The key take-away is that Tehran is having an internal debate and we should know that only issuing threats (military and economic) gives the "good guys" in that internal debate very little to ...

By Jai Singh

April 6, 2006, 12:10 AM

I would be remiss if I failed to post on the argument made by Ray Takeyh and James Dobbins in Monday's FT. The key take-away is that Tehran is having an internal debate and we should know that only issuing threats (military and economic) gives the "good guys" in that internal debate very little to work with. We need to tout the upside of abandoning their pursuit of the bomb and submitting to scrutiny and safeguards, they say.

I would be remiss if I failed to post on the argument made by Ray Takeyh and James Dobbins in Monday’s FT. The key take-away is that Tehran is having an internal debate and we should know that only issuing threats (military and economic) gives the "good guys" in that internal debate very little to work with. We need to tout the upside of abandoning their pursuit of the bomb and submitting to scrutiny and safeguards, they say.

In order to achieve its counter-proliferation objectives, the US must build the other side of the equation by explaining the benefits Iran would derive from abandoning the same nuclear option that India, Pakistan and Israel have successfully chosen. Only an array of incentives will allow Iran’s leaders to justify suspending the programme in the face of nationalistic public opinion, aroused in no small degree by continual US threats.

I know, it’s hard to stomach incentives for an oppressive regime. Like Dick Cheney, I’d rather defeat than negotiate with bad guys. But even Bush ended up holding his nose and offering North Korea incentives. What might we offer Iran? The authors don’t say. But I’m guessing mostly economic stuff. Christopher Hitchens recently envisioned Bush lifting sanctions and thereby undermining the regime:

So, picture if you will the landing of Air Force One at Imam Khomeini International Airport. The president emerges, reclaims the U.S. Embassy in return for an equivalent in Washington and the un-freezing of Iran’s financial assets, and announces that sanctions have been a waste of time and have mainly hurt Iranian civilians. (He need not add that they have also given some clerics monopoly positions in various black markets; the populace already knows this.) A new era is possible, he goes on to say. America and the Shiite world have a common enemy in al-Qaida, just as they had in Slobodan Milosevic, the Taliban, and the Iraqi Baathists. America is home to a large and talented Iranian community. Let the exchange of trade and people and ideas begin! […] The aging mullahs might claim this as a capitulation, which would be hard to bear. But how right would they be? The pressure for a new constitution and genuine elections is already building. Within less than a decade, we might be negotiating with a whole new generation of Iranians.

Sure, it’s optimistic, but worth thinking through. Maybe a pared-down version of this? I’ll be on the lookout for wisdom on the incentive issue.