Seven Questions: North Korea’s Nukes
In recent weeks, Pyongyang has reportedly expressed its intention to test a ballistic missile in the near future. The threat has put the United States, Japan, and other nations on edge. FP sat down with veteran journalist and author Don Oberdorfer for his take on the North Korean missile test, the prospects for a diplomatic solution, and the questionable sanity of Kim Jong Il.
FOREIGN POLICY: Why do you think North Korea is pressing for a missile test right now?
FOREIGN POLICY: Why do you think North Korea is pressing for a missile test right now?
Don Oberdorfer: I think its essentially for domestic reasons. Following their last big test in 1998, the North Koreans were persuaded to agree to a self-imposed moratorium on further tests in return for the lifting of some sanctions. Many of the sanctions that were removed by President Clinton have been reimposed and [new] ones have been put in [place]. The benefits they had expected under the nuclear agreement are gone. My own guess is that the people in North Korea want to go ahead with the missile program. And in the absence of countervailing forces explaining to them why they shouldnt, I think they will proceed in the face of considerable international anxiety.
FP: Are military strikes against North Korea a realistic policy option for the West?
DO: I guess its an option, but the Bush administration shut it down pretty fast. It would be a very foolish thing to do [and] I think Vice President Cheney alluded to this. The North Koreans know perfectly well that if they ever fired a missile against U.S. territory, that would be the end of North Korea. Deterrence can work with North Korea. Theres absolutely no reason why it would not work. These people are not crazy.
FP: Do you think an economic collapse could take down Kims regime?
DO: I dont see much likelihood of it at the present time. China has increased its trade and aid to North Korea [and] is reported to account for close to half of all North Korean trade at the present time. South Korea has steadily increased its interaction, trade, and aid with North Korea. [The economy] is obviously not great. There are a lot of people in distress in the far reaches of the country. But those who have been to Pyongyang and other cities recently report that theres more economic activity going on than there was in the past. I havent seen any indication of an imminent collapse.
FP: Will recent events in North Korea ensure the end of Japanese passivity?
DO: The Japanese were shocked by the 1998 test. Japan has been one of the worlds most passionate pacifist nations, although it does have some military forces. But the North Korean issue is the thing that has been turning public opinion and government policy in Japan toward eliminating more of those restrictions and moving toward a more robust military posture.
FP: Pyongyang says it wants to have direct talks with the United States. How successful would such talks be?
DO: I think theyre a necessary first step. I find the [Bush] administrations policy on this very difficult to understand or to justify. The United States posture is that it will not [deal directly with North Korea] because it would downgrade the six-party talks. But all the other parties have engaged in direct talks and want the United States to engage in direct talks. And while engaging North Korea is not likely to solve all the problems or be some magic solution thats going to change the relationship, it is a first step. You would have thought that wed learned from the Cold War. President Reagan took a very tough attitude toward the Soviet Union, but he was determined to engage them. Without that engagement, it would have been a much more dangerous era at the end of the Cold War. So I find it really hard to understand why the United States is afraid to engage with North Korea.
FP: What kinds of advisors surround Kim Jong Il? What are the internal power dynamics in North Korea?
DO: We know very little about this. U.S. intelligence and the agencies of nearly [all] other countries are not very good at penetrating the internal dynamics of Kim Jong Il and the people around him. What we do know is that it is a military-first regime, that he is affected by the policies and ideas of others in North Korea, and that he does not have the same undiluted, unqualified authority that his father had. But he has far greater authority than anybody else in the country. He is a fairly modern person. He spends a good deal of time on the Internet. When former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was there, he asked her for her e-mail address. So there is certainly a dynamic, but most of it is hidden from us.
FP: The Western media like to portray Kim as a little bit crazy. Is that accurate?
DO: Ive been to North Korea three times, and Ive met a number of his senior aides, particularly in foreign policy, but Ive never met him. Those who have met him, including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and a number of others, have said that hes a serious person who speaks intelligently. I think the idea thats hes crazy has been refuted by almost everybody who has met him.
Don Oberdorfer is distinguished journalist in residence at Johns Hopkins Universitys Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He was chief diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Post for 17 years and is the author of The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
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