An End to Unilateralism

If you dig up a Hebrew newspaper from the month of March, it would read like an artifact from another era. Call it the Era of Unilateralism. Back then, Ehud Olmert was elected prime minister of Israel on the promise that he could magically end Israels entanglement with Palestinians in the West Bank through what he called Hitkansutusually rendered in English as convergence, but better translated as contraction. A sequel to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharons apparently successful exit from the Gaza Strip last summer, it meant Israel would withdraw, without negotiating, to borders of its own choosing. The Palestinians would then be left to their own problems beyond Israels fortified security fence.

That was only a few months ago, but it feels like eons. Israeli troops are back in Gaza. The armed border with the strip prevented neither Palestinian rocket attacks on southern Israeli communities, nor the cross-border guerrilla raid in which militants took an Israeli soldier captive. If the fighting in Gaza is getting less attention at the moment, its only because of the even fiercer battle against Hezbollah in Lebanona bitter postscript to Israels unilateral pullout from that country in 2000.

In these circumstances, does Olmerts signature policy of convergence have a future? Not likely, unless the Israeli prime minister can make another leap in his thinking. The prime minister should accept not only the need to end Israeli rule over the Palestinians, but also the need to negotiate with them on an agreed future.

Already, political support for unilateralism is cracking. Last week, cabinet ministers from Olmerts own Kadima Party began publicly criticizing his policy of convergence. I dont believe in unilateral disengagement, said Housing Minister Meir Sheetrit in a recent television interview. Polls show the same shift. Last September, just after the Gaza pullout, the monthly Peace Index survey found that a clear majority of Israelis favored that move. This May, the Peace Index showed a narrow plurality of 47 percent to 44 percent in favor of Olmerts West Bank pull-out plan. By early July, support was down to 39 percent, with 47 percent opposed.

For decades, the Israeli electorate has been split between those who advocate holding on to the occupied territories, and those who say Israel must give up land for the sake of peace. Three years ago, Olmert, a lifetime hard-liner, finally recognized what Israeli leftists had predicted for decades: The number of Palestinians between the Mediterranean and Jordan would soon surpass the number of Jews. International pressure to enfranchise Palestinians in occupied territory would turn Israel into a binational state, bereft of its Jewish majority. Olmert came out for dividing the land, and Sharon soon followed suit.

But Olmert ruled out a final-status accord with the Palestinians as beyond reach. He insisted that the price of an agreementin land and other concessionswould be too high. Instead, he proclaimed that Israel would unilaterally set its own borders and guarantee itself a Jewish majority. Keeping the Palestinians on the other side of a fence, it would gain security, if not peace. It was a have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too platform, and the center accepted it eagerly. It was also too good to be true.

Before the Gaza pullout, those on both the right and the left warned of the dangers. The right said terror groups would claim victory and turn Gaza into Hamastan. Critics on the left agreed, but added that unilateralism would undermine Palestinian moderates who were willing to negotiate, harming the chances of creating a stable Palestinian state.

Unfortunately, both criticisms proved true. Shortly after the Gaza withdrawal, a survey of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by leading pollster Khalil Shikaki found that 84 percent saw the pullout as a victory for armed resistance, with 40 percent specifically crediting Hamas. In January, Hamas even won the Palestinian Authoritys legislative elections. Today, the power struggle between Hamas and moderate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbasand even between hard-liners and pragmatists within Hamashas turned the already weak authority into a phantom of a government. In Gaza, it appears, the real ruler is anarchy.

Yet few Israelis would really want to return to the quagmire of ruling Gaza. And Olmerts original argument for a West Bank withdrawal remains true: Israel cannot rule over a large Palestinian population and remain both a democracy and a Jewish state.

But if Olmert wants peace with the Palestinians, he will need to negotiate rather than impose. If Israel is to pull out of the West Bank, it needs a stable Palestinian government there, one that is committed to peace and able to control its territory. The only way Palestinian moderateseither from Abbass Fatah movement, or Hamas pragmatists willing to accept Israels right to existcan gain that kind of power is by showing that they alone can deliver what their public wants: full independence. For Israel, therefore, diplomacy is the only way to continue the battle against terror by other means.

Of course, restarting negotiations now will be much harder than it would have been last summer, or even a few weeks ago. One small opening may have been indicated by reports of a recent meeting in Jordan between Abbas and Yuval Diskin, head of Israels Shin Bet security service. Diskin reportedly said Israel would be willing to negotiate a prisoner exchangebut only via Abbas. Abbas, obviously, would then have to dicker with the militants holding the captured Israeli soldier. But he would stand to get credit for the release of Palestinian prisoners and for ending the crisis.

As shown by the diplomatic efforts since the crisis began, any such deal between Israel and the Palestinian Authority would almost certainly involve Jordan and Egypt. It would need to produce a full ceasefire. And, if that held up, it would need to show that improvements in daily life for Palestinianssuch as greater freedom of movement for people and goodsare a priority for all sides involved.

That approach would only have value, though, if it is the first step toward longer-term political negotiations. In order to salvage his idea of withdrawal, Olmert would need to go much further than he once intended. He will need to accept a solution close to the Geneva Accord, the unofficial agreement worked out between Israeli and Palestinian moderates in 2003, which means relinquishing nearly all of the West Bank, including most of the settlements. Most of all, he must accept that the Era of Unilateralism is history and embark on a new Age of Engagement.