Seven Questions: Reshaping Japan’s Security

FOREIGN POLICY: Outgoing Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid another visit this week to the Yasukuni shrine, which honors Japanese war dead and which many in the region consider a symbol of Japanese military aggression. Are the shrine visits simply a public relations issue or do they really affect regional security?

Michael Green: Issues like Yasukuni can affect security policy choices other countries in the region make. The history between Asian powersand Yasukuni specificallyallows Chinese hawks to push a more aggressive line toward Japan. The Chinese military, the PLA, is unhappy that Japan has tightened its alliance with the United States and that it has improved its internal defense capabilities. It is also upset that Japan is moving forward with missile defense. Controversies over history allow the PLA to demonize and mobilize against Japan. Civilian control of the military in China is weak and in an environment of heightened criticism of Japan, I worry that it is hard for the civilian leadership to put the brakes on the military.

FP: Should the United States pressure Japanese leaders to stop the shrine visits?

MG: It would be an enormous mistake for the United States to somehow intervene. Yasukuni is in many ways symptomatic of the power struggles between China and Japan, not the source of them. And because visits to the shrine are a very complicated and sensitive domestic issue in Japan, a heavy-handed U.S. approach could end up having several negative consequences.

First, the United States would signal to the Chinese that it in effect agrees that Japans action is illegitimate on this issue. Public U.S. pressure would signal that [the United States] doesnt entirely trust Japan and that [the country’s] legitimacy as a democracy is questioned in Washington. The second problem is that it will make it much more difficult for the next Japanese prime minister to come up with a sustainable consensus. If it looks like the prime minister has changed course on Yasukuni because the Americanswho dropped bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasakimade him do it, its going to create a backlash and further polarize Japanese society.

FP: Is it likely regional tensions on the shrine issue will escalate?

MG: Over the past six months, the Chinese have exhibited more pragmatism on the issue behind the scenes. China and Japan are significant trading partners and China relies heavily on Japanese investment. It doesnt help [Chinese President] Hu Jintao or the rest of the leadership to have an out-of-control anti-Japan movement in China. In the past, Chinese students allowed to protest against the Japanese tend to also shift their focus to the [Chinese Communist] regime once theyre in the streets.

FP: How would you assess the strategic balance between Japan and China?

MG: I think the Chinese are finding that Japan has a much more effective military than it has in the past. Im not talking about a significant increase in [Japanese military] spending. How they manage and organize themselves, how they work with the United States, how they use intelligence and technology has changed. Its the first time in the modern era the two countries have been powerful at the same time. The only real precedent is 1894, as Japan was ascending and China was descending. They fought a war, which Japan won. But this is really the first time that theyre both at significant power levels.

There have been very quiet incidents at sea between Japan and China in recent years that were similar to the kinds of things you used to see between the United States and the Soviets during the Cold War: ships moving at close range and aircraft buzzing each other, particularly around the disputed Senkaku Islands.

FP: What concerns Japan most about military developments in China?

MG: The real concerns for Japan are that the Chinese have for several years been building up their medium-range missiles, which are primarily targeted at Japan, India, and the Philippines. China has purchased Soviet Su-27s to establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. That gets right into Japans backyard. The Chinese also have procured destroyers and sea-skimming missiles designed to take out U.S. carrier battle groups or those that work with them (like the Japanese). They also have cyberwarfare and anti-satellite capabilities. You take this all together and its pretty threatening. I would argue it is more threatening than what Japan is doing, which is primarily missile defense and coalition operations in support of Afghanistan and Iraq.

FP: How did the North Korean missile tests affect Japans security strategy?

MG: Shinzo Abe, Koizumis likely successor, stated that Japan has the right to preemptively hit a North Korean missile if it knows its going to be launched at Japan. This has been the policy since 1998. However, he said this without reiterating that Japan will continue to rely on diplomacy and security coordination with the Americans. His statement was severely criticized in China and South Korea. Abe came back right away12 hours laterand provided that context. But if you step back and look at what North Korea is doing and their resistance to six party talks, there is strong evidence to suggest that Pyongyang is on a predetermined course to a nuclear test. For now, the Japanese are very much focused on the abductee issue, but beneath the surface, Japan’s strategic culture is steadily being changed by North Koreas stance. It is likely that there will be increasing debate about how much Japan can rely on the United States for its nuclear umbrella and how much Japan should try to have its own independent capability. I think the answer will ultimately be that Japan should rely on the extended deterrent [capability of the United States]. But the United States will have to be highly attentive to Japans security concerns and clear about its commitments to the alliance.

FP: Where does the issue of amending Japans pacifist constitution stand?

MG: There is a generational divide on this issue. The younger generation coming into powerrepresented best by Abefavors constitutional change. In the Diet, about 90 percent of politicians born after World War II are in favor. In the public, its a lower number. Very few Japanese politicians would say that China should have a veto over constitutional change, but there is a broad recognition in the body politic that without more stable relations in the neighborhood, it will be hard for Japan to have this discussion in a serious way right now. Its not likely to happen in the next few years. But I suspect that, if Abe can have a long tenure like Koizumi did, he would like to put a change in place before he leaves office.

Michael Green is the Japan chair and a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council from January 2004 to December 2005.