How bad was Hezbollah hurt?
Last month I posted the following caveat to my blogging about the Lebanon conflict: [I]it is possible that Hezbollah has suffered far greater losses than we know. There is an asymmetry in the reporting of the conflict — reporters clearly have much greater access to the Israeli military than Hezbollah. While it’s in both sides’ ...
Last month I posted the following caveat to my blogging about the Lebanon conflict: [I]it is possible that Hezbollah has suffered far greater losses than we know. There is an asymmetry in the reporting of the conflict -- reporters clearly have much greater access to the Israeli military than Hezbollah. While it's in both sides' interest to keep published reports of their losses to a minimum, it's institutionally tougher for Israel to do this. As a result, the Israeli losses are known -- the Hezbollah losses are not completely known. So the war is over now -- how bad was Hezbollah hurt? I still don't know the answer. According to Greg Djerejian, Hezbollah has acted so swiftly to reconstruct and rebuild the affected portions of Lebanon that, "Hizbollah's vast independent network undermines the state and encourages criticism of the cash-strapped central government." On the other hand, according to Michael Totten, Hezbollah is acting in a quite chastened manner in South Lebanon: [T]he most recent development in Hezbollah?s post-war saga is frankly humiliating. Hizbullah has dismantled 14 outposts on the Israel-Lebanon border near the Shaba Farms, Lebanese security sources said Monday. Reportedly, the group evacuated the posts using trucks to carry artillery, other weapons and military equipment, while bulldozers blocked access to tunnels and bunkers. Witnesses said that the vehicles laden with weapons and other military equipment were headed northward. A French news agency reported that the Lebanese army had deployed troops along the border with Syria and that its soldiers had blocked routes used by weapons smugglers. I challenge my readers to parse out these contradictory developments. UPDATE: Below is an extract from an e-mail relayed to me by someone within the "defense establishment" -- make of it what you will: 1. All serious military analysts in the US, Iran and Israel understand that Hezbollah suffered an enormous defeat on the battlefield. 2. However, Hezbollah?s military branch developed a technique to nullify the tactic that the IDF normally uses in cross-border raids. Specifically, the IDF often conducts raids by quickly sending in a platoon backed up by a few tanks/mobile armor units. By arming their fighters with anti-tank weapons, Hezbollah nullified the tank advantage. By using tunnels, they were able to surprise the IDF infantry and evade reprisal. 3. In response, IDF changed tactics. Specifically, they activated massive reserves and then flooded the areas with troops. This nullifies the Hezbollah technique because the IDF could cut retreat routes, block routes to other tunnels, and can quickly kill the people who pop out of tunnels. In short, after you take a cheap shot at the IDF and you try to run, you will encounter more IDF. 4. In the last days, when the IDF called its reserves, Hezbollah lost much ground and was powerless to stop most IDF actions. 5. Also, the strategy of distributing rockets throughout the population is very effective for publicity. Though the rockets themselves cause relatively little damage and have little effective military use, they are easy to use, hard to stop and are sensational (in the sense that they bring attention).
Last month I posted the following caveat to my blogging about the Lebanon conflict:
[I]it is possible that Hezbollah has suffered far greater losses than we know. There is an asymmetry in the reporting of the conflict — reporters clearly have much greater access to the Israeli military than Hezbollah. While it’s in both sides’ interest to keep published reports of their losses to a minimum, it’s institutionally tougher for Israel to do this. As a result, the Israeli losses are known — the Hezbollah losses are not completely known.
So the war is over now — how bad was Hezbollah hurt? I still don’t know the answer. According to Greg Djerejian, Hezbollah has acted so swiftly to reconstruct and rebuild the affected portions of Lebanon that, “Hizbollah’s vast independent network undermines the state and encourages criticism of the cash-strapped central government.” On the other hand, according to Michael Totten, Hezbollah is acting in a quite chastened manner in South Lebanon:
[T]he most recent development in Hezbollah?s post-war saga is frankly humiliating.
Hizbullah has dismantled 14 outposts on the Israel-Lebanon border near the Shaba Farms, Lebanese security sources said Monday. Reportedly, the group evacuated the posts using trucks to carry artillery, other weapons and military equipment, while bulldozers blocked access to tunnels and bunkers. Witnesses said that the vehicles laden with weapons and other military equipment were headed northward. A French news agency reported that the Lebanese army had deployed troops along the border with Syria and that its soldiers had blocked routes used by weapons smugglers.
I challenge my readers to parse out these contradictory developments. UPDATE: Below is an extract from an e-mail relayed to me by someone within the “defense establishment” — make of it what you will:
1. All serious military analysts in the US, Iran and Israel understand that Hezbollah suffered an enormous defeat on the battlefield. 2. However, Hezbollah?s military branch developed a technique to nullify the tactic that the IDF normally uses in cross-border raids. Specifically, the IDF often conducts raids by quickly sending in a platoon backed up by a few tanks/mobile armor units. By arming their fighters with anti-tank weapons, Hezbollah nullified the tank advantage. By using tunnels, they were able to surprise the IDF infantry and evade reprisal. 3. In response, IDF changed tactics. Specifically, they activated massive reserves and then flooded the areas with troops. This nullifies the Hezbollah technique because the IDF could cut retreat routes, block routes to other tunnels, and can quickly kill the people who pop out of tunnels. In short, after you take a cheap shot at the IDF and you try to run, you will encounter more IDF. 4. In the last days, when the IDF called its reserves, Hezbollah lost much ground and was powerless to stop most IDF actions. 5. Also, the strategy of distributing rockets throughout the population is very effective for publicity. Though the rockets themselves cause relatively little damage and have little effective military use, they are easy to use, hard to stop and are sensational (in the sense that they bring attention).
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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