Seven Questions: Testing North Korea’s Will

FOREIGN POLICY: What do you think the North Koreans hope to accomplish with this weeks test?

Marcus Noland: The North Koreans believe that the possession of nuclear weapons is central to the survival of their regime. Most likely, they were testing a nuclear weapon because testing a nuclear weapon is a useful act if you are operating a nuclear weapons program. Its actually straightforward. They want nuclear weapons, they need to make sure they work, they need to do testing, and this is simply another step along the path toward a nuclear weapons program.

FP: What is the significance of the timing?

MN: There are a number of hypotheses about the timing. One is that it was to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong Ils elevation to the general-secretary [post] of the Korean Workers Party. Another is that they were trying to upstage [South Korean Foreign Minister] Ban Ki-moons selection as United Nations secretary-general. Then there is the theory that they wanted to mess up the visit of [Japanese] Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to China.

FP: Is this an invitation for other countries to develop their nuclear programs?

MN: This will clearly strengthen the hand of people within Japan who want it to become, as they say, a normal country: one with a more robust military capacity and foreign policy. I expect the Japanese reaction will be to increase defense expenditures and to intensify cooperation with the United States, especially on things like national missile defense. In the longer run, you can imagine more dramatic sorts of steps by Japan, if North Korea proceeds with the nuclear weapons program. Its conceivable that Japan would invite the United States to station nuclear armed short-range missiles in Japanunder U.S. controlas a deterrent against the North Koreans.

I assume people in Taipei are watching as well because they are in a somewhat analogous positiona smaller country confronting what they see as a much larger power. If the North Koreans are able to develop nuclear weapons and not face severe penalties, Im sure there are some in Taiwan who will be tempted to follow suit. Beyond Northeast Asia, I think there is a great concern that North Korea will be tempted to export nuclear technology, fissile material, or in the worst case, a nuclear weapon. North Korea has a long history of [secret] military cooperation with virtually every major oil exporter in the world, including some fairly unsavory regimes like Iran and Syria. It also has very significant contacts with criminal gangs around the world.

FP: Is it more likely that fissile material would end up in the hands of a state or some organization like al Qaeda?

MN: Its much more likely it would end up in the hands of a state. Transferring nuclear technology is not a simple task. I think this would require a state with a fixed location, fixed facilities, and some kind of cadre, either homegrown or mercenary, that is technologically capable of handling this stuff. I think it would be difficult for a non-state actor to do this, but of course that is the great fear.

FP: Will China follow through with meaningful sanctions?

MN: Chinas behavior toward North Korea is really ambivalent. At some level, China probably sees North Korea a useful pawn, both in its rivalry with the United States and in its rivalry with India. This is a situation in which the client state has gotten a little too rambunctious. How far China is willing to go to rein them in is unknown at this point. The Chinese are talking about punitive sanctions, which they didnt do in the past. But the Chinese still seem to be approaching this in a fairly restrained manner, at least in comparison with the United States and Japan. I am skeptical, though, that any policy of economic sanctions would deter North Korea or shift it off such a core regime goal.

FP: If sanctions arent the appropriate approach, what should the international communitys response be?

MN: The international community, including the United States and the South Koreans, basically huff and puff and tell the North Koreans this is intolerable and unacceptable, but then in the end are not willing to impose severe enough penalties to actually alter behavior. My great fear is that the North Koreans will eventually miscalculate and cross a red line where the United States acts militarily, whether South Korea likes it or not. And then youd get a resumption of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. Youd have North Koreans potentially lashing out at Japan, and so on. By appeasing North Korea, we would create a situation thats ripe for miscalculation at a much higher level of stakes further down the road.

FP: Whats next for North Korea?

MN: The North Koreans have been hoarding oil for some time now. My inference from this is that they were planning a test and they understood they were going to get hit by sanctions so theyre hunkering down. And they look at the Pakistan example, where the United States and other countries put sanctions on Pakistan with varying degrees of enthusiasm. But almost immediately, agricultural interests were trying to export to Pakistan, and then you had various foreign policy reasons why countries were trying to relax the sanctions, and then you had 9/11, and all the sanctions were lifted.

At the end of the day the South Koreans and the Chinese are more afraid of instability in the northern part of the Korean peninsula than they are of a nuclear armed North Korea. And so my calculation would be that this will be like Pakistan. [North Korea is saying], Basically well do this and well get hit. And after a year or two of arduous marching, the status quo ante will be reestablished, except that well be an accepted nuclear power. Thats the calculation theyve made. And I think thats probably a good calculation. To be clear: I dont accept their goal and I dont believe you need nuclear weapons to ensure your survival. But once you accept that goal, the tactical logic they are pursuing makes sense to me.

Marcus Noland is a senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics.