The Iraq Study Group report

It's out. The Executive Summary to the Iraq Study Group report starts grimly: "The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved." It continues with a number of recommendations, divided into two approaches, External and Internal. The key points: External Approach—"Launch a ...

By Mark I. Levenstein

December 6, 2006, 5:35 PM

It's out. The Executive Summary to the Iraq Study Group report starts grimly: "The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved." It continues with a number of recommendations, divided into two approaches, External and Internal. The key points:

External Approach—"Launch a new diplomatic offensive," involving all of Iraq's neighbors, who by definition have an interest in a stable Iraq.

Use all of the carrots and sticks available to get Iran to halt the proliferation of arms and training to Iraqi combatants, recognize Iraq's territorial integrity, and promote national reconciliation. Negotiations about Iran's nuclear program should remain the responsibility of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany.
Employing similar pressures, coerce Syria to tighten its border with Iraq.
Work to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace that includes the Lebanese, Palestinians, and Syrians, using direct negotiations "with, by and between" all parties involved (except for those who deny Israel's right to exist).
Plan for eventual redeployment and increase political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan.

Internal Approach—the future of Iraq is "the responsibility of the Iraqis."

"[S]ignificantly increase" the number of U.S. troops supporting the Iraqi Army, while the Iraqi government assumes responsibility for Iraqi security and improves its military capabilities, with the intention of an eventual drawdown of U.S. forces.
Encourage the Iraqi army to achieve "primary responsibility for combat operations" by the first quarter of 2008 (barring "unexpected developments"), at which point U.S. forces would serve as support for rapid-reaction and special operations, and for training, advising, force protection, and search and rescue.
Notify the Iraqis that although the United States is willing to assist militarily, politically, and economically, it may not do so if the Iraqi government does not make significant steps toward assuming more responsibility.
To measure the progress mentioned above, set "specific objectives" for achieving national reconciliation, security and governance, expanding on the milestones already offered by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

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