Seven Questions: The Urge to Surge

JOHN MOORE/AFP/Getty Images Will Iraqis stand up?: President Bushs latest plan emphasizes the training of Iraqi troops. But will they be able to fight?

FOREIGN POLICY: Many in the U.S. military dont support a plan to surge U.S. troops to Iraq. The worry is that it wont adequately address the political and economic facets of the conflict. So, why announce a surge now?

Anthony Cordesman: The medias reporting on a possible surge has been terrible. Without endorsing the presidents speech, he isnt presenting a surge plan. He will present a plan that describes political and aid strategies for Iraq, a strategy for dealing with Iraqi forces, and a shift in the U.S. military approach. That doesnt simply affect additional troops, but the 130,000 troops who are already there and 100,000 civilian employees and contractors as well.

FP: What do you expect the president to recommend?

AC: I think hell say that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has agreed to move forward with efforts at reconciliation and dealing with both the insurgents and the militias, and that there are benchmarks for progress. Hell announce a significant increase in aid. I believe hell announce a phased increase in U.S. troops, but he wont describe any time limit about how long they are going to be there. And he will probably not address whether this requires a change in the amount of time that people in the National Guard and other forces can be deployed. There will also be mention of new efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces.

FP: Can the U.S. military afford a surge?

AC: We certainly have enough men and women in uniform to deploy more forces to Iraq. But we cant do it without consequences. It costs money, and weve already created a deployment burden where many people have been over-deployed or deployed at cycles that are too frequent. That creates a problem with retention and recruitment. But the question always in war is that you have these kinds of costs. It doesnt mean you shouldnt do it. It just means you should know the price tag.

FP: Is there any reason to believe that Prime Minister Maliki is the partner that the Americans need now?

AC: The problem is that there is no other partner. Theres no strongman, no alternative government, no substitute. But one of the dangers is believing that somehow the head of a sovereign government will behave as if he had an American constituency. Prime Minister Maliki has to juggle a different kind of political and strategic reality than the United States does. One thing we will never have is a partner who has values and interests that are identical to our own.

FP: President Bush is expected to announce that any surge in U.S. troops is accompanied by a surge in Iraqi troops. Is there any reason to doubt that Iraqi forces will show up?

AC: The forces will probably arrive. The question is whether they can fight. The evidence to date is [that they fight] very badly. One of the problems we face is that we recruited Iraqi troops for local defense missions. We are now using them for offensive missions outside their area of operations. Many troops have an ethnic or sectarian identity, and we expect them to fight for broad national reasons. We have often put these troops into combat without the time and experience they really need to be effective. One of the key elements that the president has to deal with in a new strategy is to provide new resources, more trainers, and a more realistic approach to developing and using Iraqi forces.

FP: The president is also expected to ask for an increase in aid to Iraq. But tens of billions of dollars in aid have already been spent. What needs to be done to make the new money more effective?

AC: We thought we could change the nature of Iraqs economy. At the same time, we conducted an economic aid plan that only made sense in a country at peace where the objectives were long-term improvements and infrastructure. This money is going to be used essentially as a tool in a counterinsurgency campaign to provide security and stability. It is the prelude to later development. In that sense, its objectives and the way it will be used is fundamentally different from the bulk of the aid money that has been spent to date.

FP: Many critics of the surge plan contend that its more of the same, just on a bigger scale. What should people listen for in the presidents speech to determine whether the United States will try a new strategy?

AC: The key is not the strategy; its whether you can make it work. Does the president say something different about political conciliation, compromise, and the willingness of the Iraqi government to act? Are there important new ideas for creating effective Iraqi forces? Does the president have a detailed and credible approach to using U.S. forces to implement a win, hold, build strategy? Will he respond to the idea that we should be talking to Iran and Syria?

But above all, are there realistic operational plans as distinguished from broad concepts? A presidential speech cant present that kind of content. One of the most important things in judging this speech is to see how well the president can, over the next few weeks, present a credible plan of action with all the necessary details to the American people, the congress, and the world. The time to judge this speech is going to be several weeks from now when people have the time to see how good the administrations plans really are. The details are the critical measure of what will probably be the presidents last chance not only to win in Iraq but to claim any success in his presidency.

Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.