The thing about credible commitment….
The masses ain’t too thrilled with the surge option. This has little to do with the actual merits and demerits of the option. According to Mystery Pollster: [T]he data above suggest that general assessments of President Bush- both among speech watchers and other Americans – are driving judgments about the troop surge. Since the majority ...
The masses ain't too thrilled with the surge option. This has little to do with the actual merits and demerits of the option. According to Mystery Pollster: [T]he data above suggest that general assessments of President Bush- both among speech watchers and other Americans - are driving judgments about the troop surge. Since the majority of Americans are skeptical of Bush, they are also skeptical of this new proposal. So what about the actual plan? Over at NRO, John Derbyshire confronts the paradoxes of the latest Bush plan on Iraq: The central and most glaring contradiction is the implied threat to walk away... Yoked to the ringing declaration that, of course, we can't walk away. We seem to be saying to the Maliki govt.: "Hey, you guys better step up to your responsibilites, or else we're outa here." This, a few sentences after saying that we can't leave the place without a victory. So-o-o-o: ?-We can't leave Iraq without a victory. ?-Unless Maliki & Co. get their act together, we can't achieve victory. ?-If Maliki & Co. don't get their act together, we'll leave. It's been a while since I studied classical logic, but it seems to me that this syllogism leaks like a sieve.Tom Maguire offers a valiant attempt to bail out the syllogism: However, it *may* be that Bush is simply greasing the skids for something resembling an "acceptable" US defeat. Increasing our troops shows our commitment and gives the lie to Osama and others who took from Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia that the US lacked the stomach for an extended fight. However - if we "lose" because the Iraqis don't have the will to a fight, well, we didn't really lose, now did we? We're not the paper tiger, they are. Say it with me, say it a lot, and maybe someone will believe it. Look, of course this is pretty thin, but let me throw it out there as a possibility - Bush's plan is meant to lead either to something resembling victory, or to a face-saving withdrawal.Even Tom knows this is weak beer, but it's worth pointing out one empirical flaw in Maguire's reasoning: what Bush is proposing now is exactly what happened in Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia. In each case: 1) The United States suffered a pivotal attack that altered their perception of the enemy (the Tet Offensive, the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, and the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident); 2) The American response at some point after the attack was a show of escalation, not de-escalation (Nixon/Kissinger escalation in Vietnam, naval and air bombardments in Lebanon, six-month force expansion in Somalia); 3) After this display of strength, the U.S. withdraws; 4) Despite the increase in forces and retaliatory attacks, everyone recognizes the withdrawal for what it was. I see very little reason to go through this charade again.... but I'm willing to listen to commenters who disagree. To them, I must ask -- how with the surge option be anything other than a more grandiose version of the Clinton administration's response to the Somalia bombings? [So you're saying that no matter what we do, our credibility is damaged for the future?--ed.] Not necessarily. In Calculating Credibiliy: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Daryl Press argues that the past is not a significant factor when leaders assess the credibility of other states' actions.
The masses ain’t too thrilled with the surge option. This has little to do with the actual merits and demerits of the option. According to Mystery Pollster:
[T]he data above suggest that general assessments of President Bush- both among speech watchers and other Americans – are driving judgments about the troop surge. Since the majority of Americans are skeptical of Bush, they are also skeptical of this new proposal.
So what about the actual plan? Over at NRO, John Derbyshire confronts the paradoxes of the latest Bush plan on Iraq:
The central and most glaring contradiction is the implied threat to walk away… Yoked to the ringing declaration that, of course, we can’t walk away. We seem to be saying to the Maliki govt.: “Hey, you guys better step up to your responsibilites, or else we’re outa here.” This, a few sentences after saying that we can’t leave the place without a victory. So-o-o-o: ?-We can’t leave Iraq without a victory. ?-Unless Maliki & Co. get their act together, we can’t achieve victory. ?-If Maliki & Co. don’t get their act together, we’ll leave. It’s been a while since I studied classical logic, but it seems to me that this syllogism leaks like a sieve.
Tom Maguire offers a valiant attempt to bail out the syllogism:
However, it *may* be that Bush is simply greasing the skids for something resembling an “acceptable” US defeat. Increasing our troops shows our commitment and gives the lie to Osama and others who took from Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia that the US lacked the stomach for an extended fight. However – if we “lose” because the Iraqis don’t have the will to a fight, well, we didn’t really lose, now did we? We’re not the paper tiger, they are. Say it with me, say it a lot, and maybe someone will believe it. Look, of course this is pretty thin, but let me throw it out there as a possibility – Bush’s plan is meant to lead either to something resembling victory, or to a face-saving withdrawal.
Even Tom knows this is weak beer, but it’s worth pointing out one empirical flaw in Maguire’s reasoning: what Bush is proposing now is exactly what happened in Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia. In each case:
1) The United States suffered a pivotal attack that altered their perception of the enemy (the Tet Offensive, the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, and the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident); 2) The American response at some point after the attack was a show of escalation, not de-escalation (Nixon/Kissinger escalation in Vietnam, naval and air bombardments in Lebanon, six-month force expansion in Somalia); 3) After this display of strength, the U.S. withdraws; 4) Despite the increase in forces and retaliatory attacks, everyone recognizes the withdrawal for what it was.
I see very little reason to go through this charade again…. but I’m willing to listen to commenters who disagree. To them, I must ask — how with the surge option be anything other than a more grandiose version of the Clinton administration’s response to the Somalia bombings? [So you’re saying that no matter what we do, our credibility is damaged for the future?–ed.] Not necessarily. In Calculating Credibiliy: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Daryl Press argues that the past is not a significant factor when leaders assess the credibility of other states’ actions.
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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