Confronting Iran

Iran in his sights: President Bushs address to the nation on Jan. 10, 2007, signaled a tougher approach to Tehran.

President Bush: Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that continues today.

Karim Sadjadpour, Analyst, International Crisis Group: If you asked U.S. officials, they would say that theyve had evidence all along that Iran has been conducting illicit activities in Iraq, whether its supporting radical Shiite groups, or even radical Sunni or Kurdish groups. And up until now, the United States has turned a blind eye to Irans disruptive behavior because they felt they needed Irans cooperation to help stabilize Iraq and they didnt want to take on Tehran. Now, were seeing a shift in policy. It seems like a much more provocative, proactive U.S. approach toward Iran. But Irans influence should be put in context.

In 2005, the question being asked was: How much influence does Iran have over the Shiite militia groups like the Mahdi Army, Moqtada al-Sadrs army? In 2007, Iraq has degenerated to such an extent that the question to ask is not how much influence Iran has over Moqtada al-Sadrs Mahdi Army, but how much influence Moqtada al-Sadr has over his own Mahdi Army. Sectarian and militia groups once considered monolithic have splintered into mini-militias and sectarian groups, and therefore the idea that Tehran somehow has the control over all these groups is probably exaggerated, and it follows that engaging Iran is not a panacea to bring about stability.

Cliff Kupchan, Director for Europe and Eurasia, Eurasia Group: Its true that radical Shia elements have been central to the vicious cycle of sectarian violence. Its also true that some are supported by Iran. The implicit deduction that one could make that Iran is therefore centrally involved in the violencejust doesnt follow. Its my own view that there are elements in Iran, and especially the Revolutionary Guards, that have provided funding, if not weaponry, to radical Shia militias. The president was tapping into anti-Iranian sentiment in the congress and the public in the speech. It is a statement of much more aggressive policy toward Iranian activity in Iraq, than was previous U.S. policy.

The consequences of failure are clearIran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Sadjadpour: Iran thinks the United States is bogged down in a Vietnam-style conundrum, and that neither the U.S. nor the international community has the will to challenge Iran like it might have in 2003. So I dont think that an abrupt U.S. withdrawal would change Iranian strategy on the nuclear issue. Although the Bush administration has finally come to the conclusion that Iraq is not going as well as it should be, the Iranians reached that conclusion long ago.

Kupchan: From my recent meetings with Iranian officials and high-level advisors, its clear that the Iranians view themselves to be on a roll right now, from advances in the nuclear program to Hezbollah to Bahrain, that its the coming age of the Shiite Crescent. Certainly withdrawing from Iraq would further embolden an already confident and risk-acceptant Iranian leadership. It could incrementally embolden them in the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But youre emboldening the bold.

A better formulation [than the consequences of failure] would be the consequences of different U.S. policies. The president might have argued that our best chances to avoid extremism, the toppling of moderate governments, chaos, and nuclear weapons is to try more troops. Thats a rational argument. But the rebuttal to [his actual] argument is just too easy: The consequences of failure are clearbecause weve failed.

Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of extremist challenges. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces.

Sadjadpour: [Until recently,] the primary source of unrest in Iraq was the Sunni insurgency. It wasnt being driven by Iran. In fact, the Sunni insurgents were attacking Irans Shiite friends. Up until a certain point, Irans influence over the Shia was as a restraining influence, because Iran doesnt want to see sectarian warfare in Iraq. Iran doesnt want to see a cleavage between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East, because even though Iran itself is Shiite, it perceives itself and wants to be the vanguard of the entire Islamic world, not just the Shiite world. So it doesnt benefit Tehran to see growing Sunni concern about Shiite ascendancy and Iranian ascendancy. Second, by all accounts, the slew of arms has been primarily from Iraq to Iran, not vice-versa. Theres no shortage of free arms in Iraq.

Kupchan: My guess is that they are meeting in Tehran, and saying, Well, theres going to be 20,000 more Americans there in a couple months. What are we going to do? [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmedinejad has a track record [of thinking that] when provoked, they should act. And given their track record, and given a qualitatively more belligerent U.S. policy, I think it will be very hard, it is already very hard, for us to disrupt attacks on our forces. The casualty figures speak for themselves. But I think Iran is going to make it even harder.

Well interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.

Sadjadpour: Iranian influence in Iraq is very subtle. It usually works through proxies. There were half a million Iraqi refugees in Iran during Saddams time. Many of them have gone back to Iraq, and there are no doubt thousands still on Irans payroll. Iran is pursuing a soft-power approach in Iraq. Theyre not sending 140,000 troops and tens of millions of dollars worth of tanks and armament like the United States, but theyre trying to buy influence and popular support in terms of social networks and clinics and mosques and things like that [to] influence the life of the average Iraqi, much like they were doing in Lebanon with Hezbollah in the 1980s. Even if you were able to wipe out the Iranian influence in Iraq, I think you would not solve the violence and sectarian warfare in Iraq. I dont think youre addressing the root problem. Irans policies in Iraq are very much a byproduct of U.S.-Iran relations. When U.S.-Iran relations are going very poorly, then Iran views Iraq as a battleground where it can weaken any U.S. ambitions aimed at Tehran. But in the event that U.S.-Iran relations improve, it is in Irans national interests to play a more cooperative role.

Kupchan: If [the United States] could have disrupted the flow of support, it already would have. Iran has been a neighbor of Iraq for thousands of years. U.S. troops are recent visitors. The ability to root out longstanding networks and connections is dubious at best. What then have we been doing for the last several years if we havent been doing this? I dont think its very likely to be successful.

Were also taking other steps to bolster the security of Iraq and protect American interests in the Middle East . We will work with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region.

Sadjadpour: The Gulf Arab countries specifically are in a very difficult position because, on the one hand, they dont want to see Iran acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, they dont want to see a real U.S.-Iran confrontation. So if theyre asked to be complicit in any type of strategy to antagonize Iran or confront Iran, I dont think theyre going to sign up, because the Gulf Arab countries dont have the same luxury as the United States not to be on Irans borders. The United States can take on Iran from 4,000 miles away, [and] its not going to affect the daily lives of the average American. But Gulf Arab countries are worried that Iran can stir up unrest, it can support already disenchanted Shiite minorities within Saudi Arabia, within Kuwait, within Bahrain. The worst-case scenario is a military confrontation between the United States and Iran. If they have to choose between seeing Iran go nuclear, or a U.S.-Iran military confrontation, they would prefer the former. But above all, they would like to see a diplomatic approach.

Kupchan: This angle is arguably the most interesting part of whats going on right now. The references in the speech involve that line, and [the one that mentions] Patriot air defense missiles going to our friends and allies in the Gulf. Negroponte, in his [January 11 Senate] testimony, makes a big point of the threat that Iran poses to Americas Sunni Arab allies in the region. A sub-thread in this new hard-line Iran policy is a decision to increasingly court Sunni Arab governments, who are indeed terrified of Iranian hegemony, Iranian leadership in the Shiite Crescent, and most of all, an Iranian nuclear weapon. The United States recognizes that European spines probably cant be stiffened, and so [the United States] is now focusing on a new target, the Gulf Arab allies. Its a long shot. Theyre going to be hamstrung between their elite interests and the Muslim street. The leadership will be tempted to play a much more active role, whether its intercepting financial flows, or granting the United States more of a military presence (such as the carrier group that headed over there). But between this speech and the Negroponte speech, its clear that the U.S. is making a much stronger pitch to Americas Arab allies in the region.

As the Sunni Arabs become more drawn in, Irans Shia patrons will be responding in kind. You could well see, for instance, a Saudi-Iranian proxy war between Sunni and Shia militias in Iraq. Thats risk number one. In risk number two, you have so many Americans with so many guns, so many Iranians with so many guns, in the same country, that you have a huge risk of miscalculation and unintended hostilities. There are new military and market risks that emerge from the presidents speech. The military risks are obvious. But the market risks are that once Saudi gets involved in a proxy war, investors will inevitably get concerned about production. This is a quite destabilizing speech overall.