Seven Questions: Guests of the Ayatollah, Round Two?

Screen capture from al-Alam TV/Getty ImagesPersian provocateur: Iran proved it can pull the tail of the British bulldog and get away with it.

FOREIGN POLICY: Why did Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad end up releasing the 15 British sailors and marines?

Mark Bowden: Because there was nothing to be gained for Iran holding them any further, and there was no really serious issue at stake. I dont think anyone was making the claim that 15 British sailors in a rubber boat were invading Iran. Its at best a technical violation of a very obscure border in the water. So there was really no point in them holding them any further, and even though there have been denials that the release of the Iranian diplomat in Iraq has anything to do with this, I suspect that its directly related.

FP: What does this release say about the prospects for further tensions between Iran and the West? Is this a sign that diplomacy can work?

MB: Yes and no. Theres a pattern in some of the ways that Iran deals with the world: Provoke an incident, blow it out of proportion, create a great deal of consternation, and then resolve it peacefully. I suspect this sort of thing will happen again. I dont know if Iran got anything out of this. It might have hastened the release of the diplomat in Iraq; I dont know. But it does seem to be a pattern, and I suspect well see it again.

FP: This sailor incident is said to reveal some of the political split inside Iranthe radicals being aligned with the president, and more pragmatic officials concerned about Irans growing isolation. Does this release of the sailors mean that the more pragmatic people there are getting the upper hand?

MB: I dont think it necessarily means that. I do think, as I said, theres a pattern to these things. I think that Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards are the most unpredictable and aggressive element within the Iranian leadership, and they dowhen they take steps like thisworry and concern the more pragmatic, traditional leaders in that country. In this case, Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard probably pushed this issue of the British sailors as far as they could productively push it, and at that point they relent[ed] to the more pragmatic elements in the government. But until you see Ahmadinejad out of office, I think you have to consider him to be a formidable player within that power structure.

FP: Is there anything we learned from the 1979 seizure of the American embassy in Iran that can help us understand this recent crisis?

MB: There are things we can learn; Im not sure that theyve been learned. In both instances it wasnt a severe threat to the region or to the national security of Great Britain or the United States. What it was, was a kind of a humiliating, galling provocation, and the media played a role in amplifying the tension when these things happened. But it didnt really amount to anything terribly significant except to, obviously, the individuals who were caught up in it. My advice to political leaders [during the most recent incident] would have been to put national pride aside and endure the onslaught of critical television commentary for a day or two, and deal with it for what it was, a relatively minor problem.

FP: Why did Iran capture these sailors and marines?

MB: Iran thrives on provocation. If you look back to the hostage crisis of 1979, the whole point of seizing the American embassy [was] to provoke the West, to demonstrate their [power] for domestic political consumption, and to show off for the region. They get something out of it by proving that they can pull the tail of the tiger and get away with it. Where it played into the hands of the Iranians is when the British governmentTony Blairwent on TV in an outrage and [threatened] to move to escalating the disagreement.

FP: Who benefited from this crisis?

MB: I dont think anyone did. Iran has advertised itself as a provocateur, as a country thats willing to create an international incident where one doesnt really exist. Some of the rhetoric out of Iran was perfectly ridiculous. So their reputation has taken another blow. Its also a reminder of the outrageous criminal act of taking the American embassy in 1979. Its a reminder that these are the same characters in charge.

FP: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has tried to distance himself from the 1979 hostage crisis, but many think he relished this most recent crisis. What explains this disconnect?

MB: I dont see a disconnect at all. He was an integral player in the takeover of the American embassy in 1979, and I dont see any evidence hes changed since then. Hes still a true believer in the Iranian Revolution. Hes a provocateur, evidenced by any number of things that hes done to deliberately stick his thumb in the eye of the West. He denies [involvement in the embassy takeover] in part because the consequence has been a steady stream of catastrophes for Iran, to the extent that many in that country conclude that any act that has resulted in so much catastrophe could only have been planned by their worst enemy. So they tend to believe that the CIA was behind the taking of the American embassy in 1979, as ridiculous as that sounds. So to acknowledge your central role in that is either to acknowledge that youre an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency or a stooge.

Mark Bowden is a national correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly and author of Guests of the Ayatollah (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), a book about the 1979 takeover of the American embassy in Iran.