The storm hasn’t passed yet for Musharraf

AFP

Angry protests over Pervez Musharraf’s suspension of the chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court have (mostly) simmered down, but the move has clearly backfired against a regime that is now in damage control mode. Even assuming that President Musharraf recovers from the crisis, it will have crucial implications for general elections that are slated for sometime later this year or early next year.

The chief justice affair was not the first political crisis to hit the Musharraf regime in the past couple of months. The United States had stepped up pressure on Pakistan to aggressively pursue militants along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, amid concerns that the Pakistani Army was turning a blind eye to terrorist infiltration into Afghanistan. The possibility that millions of dollars in U.S. aid would be made conditional on Pakistan’s performance in the war on terror has agitated Pakistan’s leaders to no end, and humiliated Musharraf as well.

Nor is the judicial crisis likely to be the last for Musharraf in months ahead. Already, trouble is brewing elsewhere that could provide more rallying points for opposition activists. Only last week, Dawn, a prominent Pakistani daily, reported that “hard-line religious leaders established on Thursday a Qazi court in Lal Masjid, a parallel judicial system in the federal capital”—a clear indication that Pakistan’s Islamists are no longer willing to remain subservient to Musharraf’s stances on Islam in Pakistan. Stuck in multiple crises simultaneously, the state is now attempting to resolve this challenge to its authority through negotiations from a position of weakness, even though it initially threatened administrative action against the clerics at Lal Masjid and Madressah Hafsa, another rebellious Islamist stronghold.

Rumors are flying high that these recurring crises have increased the chances of a pre-election deal between exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s political party (PPP) and the ruling regime. Meanwhile, the United States continues to exert pressure on Musharraf to create some political space and refocus the attention of the Army on anti-terrorism efforts. To do that, Musharraf might very well have to hand over the reigns of domestic governance to a civilian while retaining control of the Army.

Whatever happens, it’s clear that Musharraf’s image at home and abroad has suffered badly. His weakness means that even if his government can manage to resolve these crises, change—such as a renewed commitment to free and fair elections and a pre-election deal with the PPP—is looking more likely than ever.

Anirudh Suri is a junior fellow in the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.