Clearly, there are no constructivists at Foggy Bottom
I’ve been remiss in not linking to the new State Department blog, DipNote. Part of the reason for the slow-motion link is that Joshua Keating panned it over at Passport (“most of the posts from the big shots consist of little more than summaries of their schedules…. zzzz.”). Then there’s been the outright mockery. Clicking ...
I've been remiss in not linking to the new State Department blog, DipNote. Part of the reason for the slow-motion link is that Joshua Keating panned it over at Passport ("most of the posts from the big shots consist of little more than summaries of their schedules.... zzzz."). Then there's been the outright mockery. Clicking over, however, I found this Sean McCormack post about negotiating with Iran pretty interesting. McCormack -- who's the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs -- clearly articulates how Foggy Bottom thinks about the utility of negotiations: One way the mainstream media breaks down coverage of Iran policy is to place people (both inside and outside government) into two neat categories ? those who want to engage Iran and those who want to isolate Iran. Admittedly, there are other ways to create camps on the Iran issue ? use of force vs. diplomacy, for example ? but the engage vs. isolation dichotomy is the one I most often read about those at State purportedly chomping at the bit to negotiate with an Iranian, any Iranian. Let me offer another way to look at the issue. I?ll start with a simple premise: diplomacy without incentives and disincentives (carrots and sticks) is just talking. Put another way, diplomacy without the proper mix will accomplish nothing when dealing with an adversary. The question then becomes one of establishing both sides of the equation ? incentives and disincentives -- before any negotiation. So those who want to divide the world into engage vs. isolate camps are missing the point. In fact, it is not a binary choice. Instead engagement and isolation are two different sides of the same coin. Experience tells us that without creating significant leverage, you will fail in a negotiation ? unless of course you face a weak or unthinking opponent. So, unless the U.S. creates the right conditions for successful negotiations with Iran, we won?t get anyplace. This prompts a few questions: 1) Is McCormack correct? If he is, social constrictivists all over the world will be crying themselves to sleep. 2) Does this logic change when one views the very decision to engage in direct negotiations to be an incentive in and of itself? 3) How does the United States look when we don't answer letters?
I’ve been remiss in not linking to the new State Department blog, DipNote. Part of the reason for the slow-motion link is that Joshua Keating panned it over at Passport (“most of the posts from the big shots consist of little more than summaries of their schedules…. zzzz.”). Then there’s been the outright mockery. Clicking over, however, I found this Sean McCormack post about negotiating with Iran pretty interesting. McCormack — who’s the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs — clearly articulates how Foggy Bottom thinks about the utility of negotiations:
One way the mainstream media breaks down coverage of Iran policy is to place people (both inside and outside government) into two neat categories ? those who want to engage Iran and those who want to isolate Iran. Admittedly, there are other ways to create camps on the Iran issue ? use of force vs. diplomacy, for example ? but the engage vs. isolation dichotomy is the one I most often read about those at State purportedly chomping at the bit to negotiate with an Iranian, any Iranian. Let me offer another way to look at the issue. I?ll start with a simple premise: diplomacy without incentives and disincentives (carrots and sticks) is just talking. Put another way, diplomacy without the proper mix will accomplish nothing when dealing with an adversary. The question then becomes one of establishing both sides of the equation ? incentives and disincentives — before any negotiation. So those who want to divide the world into engage vs. isolate camps are missing the point. In fact, it is not a binary choice. Instead engagement and isolation are two different sides of the same coin. Experience tells us that without creating significant leverage, you will fail in a negotiation ? unless of course you face a weak or unthinking opponent. So, unless the U.S. creates the right conditions for successful negotiations with Iran, we won?t get anyplace.
This prompts a few questions:
1) Is McCormack correct? If he is, social constrictivists all over the world will be crying themselves to sleep. 2) Does this logic change when one views the very decision to engage in direct negotiations to be an incentive in and of itself? 3) How does the United States look when we don’t answer letters?
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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