BDM, in profile

Good Magazine has a long Michael Lerner profile of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, the chair of political science at New York University (in the field, Bruce will forever be known by the three letter acronym "BDM.") Lerner's story is about BDM's political forecasting techniques, his use of rational choice methodology... and the uniqueness that is Bruce: If you listen to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and a lot of people don?t, he?ll claim that mathematics can tell you the future. In fact, the professor says that a computer model he built and has perfected over the last 25 years can predict the outcome of virtually any international conflict, provided the basic input is accurate. What?s more, his predictions are alarmingly specific. His fans include at least one current presidential hopeful, a gaggle of Fortune 500 companies, the CIA, and the Department of Defense. Naturally, there is also no shortage of people less fond of his work. ?Some people think Bruce is the most brilliant foreign policy analyst there is,? says one colleague. ?Others think he?s a quack.? Today, on a rare sunny summer day in San Francisco, Bueno de Mesquita appears to be neither. He?s relaxing in his stately home, answering my questions with exceeding politesse. Sunlight streams through the tall windows, the melodic sound of a French horn echoing from somewhere upstairs; his daughter, a musician in a symphony orchestra, is practicing for an upcoming recital. It?s all so complacent and genteel, which is exactly what Bueno de Mesquita isn?t. As if on cue, a question sets him off. ?I found it to be offensive,? he says about a colleague?s critique of his work. ?This is absolutely, totally, and utterly false,? he says about the attack of another.... To verify the accuracy of [BDM's] model, the CIA set up a kind of forecasting face-off that pit predictions from his model against those of Langley?s more traditional in-house intelligence analysts and area specialists. ?We tested Bueno de Mesquita?s model on scores of issues that were conducted in real time?that is, the forecasts were made before the events actually happened,? says Stanley Feder, a former high-level CIA analyst. ?We found the model to be accurate 90 percent of the time,? he wrote. Another study evaluating Bueno de Mesquita?s real-time forecasts of 21 policy decisions in the European community concluded that ?the probability that the predicted outcome was what indeed occurred was an astounding 97 percent.? What?s more, Bueno de Mesquita?s forecasts were much more detailed than those of the more traditional analysts. ?The real issue is the specificity of the accuracy,? says Feder. ?We found that DI (Directorate of National Intelligence) analyses, even when they were right, were vague compared to the model?s forecasts. To use an archery metaphor, if you hit the target, that?s great. But if you hit the bull?s eye?that?s amazing.? How does Bueno de Mesquita do this? With mathematics. ?You start with a set of assumptions, as you do with anything, but you do it in a formal, mathematical way,? he says. ?You break them down as equations and work from there to see what follows logically from those assumptions.? The assumptions he?s talking about concern each actor?s motives. You configure those motives into equations that are, essentially, statements of logic based on a predictive theory of how people with those motives will behave. From there, you start building your mathematical model. You determine whether the predictive theory holds true by plugging in data, which are numbers derived from scales of preferences that you ascribe to each actor based on the various choices they face. Read the whole thing if you want a mostly accurate but incomplete discussion of rational choice theory and its critics -- Mearsheimer and Walt make cameo appearances! [Jeez, doesn't BDM seems like a bit of a self-promoter?--ed. Compared to whom? Relative to many IR scholars, Bueno de Mesquita has not been shy in trumpeting his own horn. Compared to others, however, BDM seems pretty normal.] The part that grabbed my attention was BDM's proposal for how to address the Israel/Palestinian conflict: Recently, he?s applied his science to come up with some novel ideas on how to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ?In my view, it is a mistake to look for strategies that build mutual trust because it ain?t going to happen. Neither side has any reason to trust the other, for good reason,? he says. ?Land for peace is an inherently flawed concept because it has a fundamental commitment problem. If I give you land on your promise of peace in the future, after you have the land, as the Israelis well know, it is very costly to take it back if you renege. You have an incentive to say, ?You made a good step, it?s a gesture in the right direction, but I thought you were giving me more than this. I can?t give you peace just for this, it?s not enough.? Conversely, if we have peace for land?you disarm, put down your weapons, and get rid of the threats to me and I will then give you the land?the reverse is true: I have no commitment to follow through. Once you?ve laid down your weapons, you have no threat.? Bueno de Mesquita?s answer to this dilemma, which he discussed with the former Israeli prime minister and recently elected Labor leader Ehud Barak, is a formula that guarantees mutual incentives to cooperate. ?In a peaceful world, what do the Palestinians anticipate will be their main source of economic viability? Tourism. This is what their own documents say. And, of course, the Israelis make a lot of money from tourism, and that revenue is very easy to track. As a starting point requiring no trust, no mutual cooperation, I would suggest that all tourist revenue be [divided by] a fixed formula based on the current population of the region, which is roughly 40 percent Palestinian, 60 percent Israeli. The money would go automatically to each side. Now, when there is violence, tourists don?t come. So the tourist revenue is automatically responsive to the level of violence on either side for both sides. You have an accounting firm that both sides agree to, you let the U.N. do it, whatever. It?s completely self-enforcing, it requires no cooperation except the initial agreement by the Israelis that they are going to turn this part of the revenue over, on a fixed formula based on population, to some international agency, and that?s that.? I'm not sure the long-run demographics of the region would support this idea, but it's certainly intriguing. Full disclosure: When I was putting together my dissertation committee oh so many years ago, I was fortunate enough to persuade Bruce to join -- and The Sanctions Paradox is a much, much better book because of that decision.