So, about those Pakistani nukes…
FAROOQ NAEEM/AFP/Getty Images The New York Times recently revealed a secret U.S. program that has spent nearly $100 million over the past six years to help secure Pakistani nuclear weapons and facilities. Concerns about legal issues and Pakistani sovereignty, however, have sharply limited what U.S. funds can achieve. For instance, the U.S. government chose not ...
FAROOQ NAEEM/AFP/Getty Images
The New York Times recently revealed a secret U.S. program that has spent nearly $100 million over the past six years to help secure Pakistani nuclear weapons and facilities. Concerns about legal issues and Pakistani sovereignty, however, have sharply limited what U.S. funds can achieve.
For instance, the U.S. government chose not to share information about its permissive action links (PALs), which are the "crown jewel" of its nuclear security technologies. PALs basically ensure that nuclear warheads cannot detonate without proper authorization. To many scientists, sharing details about PAL technology is a no-brainer. But because PAL systems are designed to be as secure as possible, each is integrated deeply into a warhead’s electronics; disclosing details about PALs could therefore reveal compromising characteristics of U.S. nuclear-weapon designs. Disclosing classified information of this nature also happens to be illegal under U.S. law, and NPT signatories are banned from helping Pakistan (technically a non-nuclear weapon state as far as the NPT is concerned) with its arsenal.
The New York Times recently revealed a secret U.S. program that has spent nearly $100 million over the past six years to help secure Pakistani nuclear weapons and facilities. Concerns about legal issues and Pakistani sovereignty, however, have sharply limited what U.S. funds can achieve.
For instance, the U.S. government chose not to share information about its permissive action links (PALs), which are the “crown jewel” of its nuclear security technologies. PALs basically ensure that nuclear warheads cannot detonate without proper authorization. To many scientists, sharing details about PAL technology is a no-brainer. But because PAL systems are designed to be as secure as possible, each is integrated deeply into a warhead’s electronics; disclosing details about PALs could therefore reveal compromising characteristics of U.S. nuclear-weapon designs. Disclosing classified information of this nature also happens to be illegal under U.S. law, and NPT signatories are banned from helping Pakistan (technically a non-nuclear weapon state as far as the NPT is concerned) with its arsenal.
Perhaps most problematic, though, is that Pakistan has been reluctant to reveal details about the locations of its existing warheads or about fuel production for new weapons. This seems to have limited the United States to training personnel and providing equipment, but in many cases Pakistan won’t even show American officials how or where the equipment is being used. Pakistan is also seeking to downplay the significance of the U.S. aid, describing the Times article as an “exaggerated picture of our efforts to learn from the best practices of other countries with regard to their nuclear safety and export controls.”
The level of funding is substantial, however, given the small size of Pakistan’s arsenal; it’s really a lack of cooperation that is limiting what this program can achieve. Without learning more, we can only hope that the U.S. military doesn’t have to send in special forces to find and secure the weapons itself.
(More here over at Wired’s Danger Room.)
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