Russia’s nuclear threat

With Vladimir Putin newly christened as Time‘s “Person of the Year” and oil prices still high, it’s probably a safe bet that Russia will keep flexing its diplomatic muscles in 2008. One area to watch is the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which roiled U.S.-Russian relations throughout 2007. At issue is the U.S. decision to place ten BMD interceptors in Poland and a related decision to place a BMD radar facility in the Czech Republic.

Contention over U.S. BMD proposals in Europe has been simmering at least since May of 2006, but the war of words ratcheted up a notch last week when, following “disappointing” talks with the United States, Russian Army Chief of Staff Yuri Baluevsky said that using the interceptors based in Poland could trigger a retaliatory strike from Russia. Presumably he was referring to the possibility that the Russian early warning radars would mistake the interceptors as part of a nuclear attack. That could conceivably spur a hair-trigger response from Russia, which, if it happened, could involve massive nuclear retaliation.

Yet Russia’s threat isn’t as credible as it may seem. First, the reliability of the Russian early warning system—consisting of radar installations and satellites—is highly questionable. While Russia’s concerns about not being able to distinguish between an offensive missile launch and a defensive interceptor launch are valid, there are also valid concerns that the Russian system would not be able to detect either type of launch reliably.

Second, BMD interceptors are fundamentally a defensive weapon. They will launch only in response to an attack or missile launch elsewhere (the United States claims its nascent system is aimed at Iran, but interceptors based in Poland could also block missiles from Russia). The interceptors alone therefore could not be mistaken for a threat to Russia. For that, a launch of offensive missiles would be required. 

Russia’s real concern is probably twofold. First, BMD interceptors in Poland might block Russian missiles and limit Russia’s freedom of action. Baluevsky’s recent statement may actually be intended to derail the U.S. basing plan by raising the specter of nuclear attack in Poland, since public opinion there is already skeptical of the U.S. proposal. Second, Russia has long sought to keep NATO and the United States out of the former Soviet “sphere of influence.” Missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic may bring the alliance too close to Russian territory for comfort. And it looks as if the Russian bear still knows how to growl, at least.