What America Must Do: Dmitri Trenin

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Foreign Policy: How has the release of the recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Irans nuclear program changed the tenor of the Iran debate?

Dmitri Trenin: It allows for a broader range of views. I think that the importance of this debate is not to discuss the technical issues, but rather to use the technical issues as a platform to a higher plane of strategizing about Iran. Im not an American and I can only say so much being a foreigner, but I think the focus should be on U.S. policy, rather than on what Iran is doing. I am struck by people debating what Iran is doing, and not thinking enough, in all due respect, about what the United States should be doing. In other words, people are prepared to give Iran the initiative, rather than to seize the initiative.

FP: Whats the view from abroad about the new estimate?

DT: I think the view from here is that the intelligence community, heavily battered over Iraq, has thrown a monkey wrench into what they believe could be the possibility of another major blunder. [That possibility] is that strong-willed persons within the administration would persuade the president to finish business, and not pass the Iranian issue onto his successor. But theres only so much that you can see from several thousand miles away from Washington.

FP: If Iran indeed halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, as the estimate states, does that suggest that sanctions and international pressure are working? And what does it mean for the future of sanctions on Iran?

DT: I think sanctions do work, up to a point. They are an instrument capable of sending a message. Iran needed that message from the outside worldand not just from the United States. The fact that its not only the United States and its European allies but at times China and Russia that have joined in at the U.N. Security Council and expressed their disapproval of Iranian policies: thats a message that you cant ignore if youre Iran. While the worlds big five disagree about a lot of things, they are clearly united on one issue: Iran should not have nuclear weapons.

I think that at this point, however, there is a feeling both in Beijing and Moscow that the National Intelligence Estimate has let them off the hook. The Chinese have an interest in Iranian oil. The Russians have an interest in Iranian gas and Irans civilian nuclear energy program. The Russians and the Chinese are certainly using this [estimate] to suggest that Iran is more of a rational actor and not some madman rushing toward the bomb, no matter what.

FP: Iran hasnt halted the production of nuclear fissile material. What do you make of that fact?

DT: I dont think that they have concluded internally in Tehran that they will not seek nuclear weapons. I think theyre open on these issues. I am absolutely sure that they are much more rational than what people make of them. And again, one may disagree with their policies and say with a lot of credence that those policies are destabilizing. But those policies are not irrational. Iran is using the instruments it has to pursue its policies. Quite frankly, I believe that to be able to deal with Iran effectively, one has to assume Iran is a rational actor.

FP: Has the estimate been a boon to hard-liners in Tehran?

DT: Its paradoxical. In the short run, the hard-liners may say, Were winning. They may say, Those guys are weaklings, and Those guys are going back on their previous positions. But if Iran ends up engaging with the West as a result, that inevitably strengthens the more liberal, moderate forces within Iran. On the other hand, confrontation between Iran and the West strengthens the more hard-line elements. Engagement is more likely to moderate both Iranian domestic politics and Iranian foreign policy. Having said that, I am not going to say that Iran is going to bandwagon with U.S. policies in the region. Its always going to be tough with Iran.

FP: In your article, you argue that regime change in Iran is possible only from within. What are the chances of that occurring in the near future?

DT: Regime change will not happen as a revolution. It would happen as the erosion of the power system that exists today. Im not suggesting this power change would lead to a democratic, Western-style Iran. Look at Russia compared to the Soviet Union.

The chances for regime change are fairly good the longer view you take. In 20 years, openness to the outside world could play a major role, especially in Iran. It has an urban middle class. Although they exist under this black veil of Islamic fundamentalism, these things do exist. [Iranians] see themselves as isolated in the world. I just had an interesting conversation in Brussels with an Iranian academic. He said, We dont consider anyone to be our strategic partner. The United States is a political adversary at this point. Russia and China have their own interests. If those interests demand they leave Iran in the lurch, it will be done. We do not count on Moscow or Beijing to bail us out. Its not the Soviet Union; they dont always give you the party line. You can discuss things. Whether you can agree is a different thing.

FP: If the United States chose to engage Iran, what should it do to show Iran it is serious, and what must Iran show in return?

DT: The United States needs to impress upon Iran that it considers Iran a major power in the region, and that it recognizes it has legitimate interests. So, when the United States deals with countries such as Iran and Afghanistan, it will do so in consultation with Iran. Its not to say that Iran will have an impact on what the United States does, but that those policies will factor in Iranian interests. Iran shares a long-standing relationship with the Shia in Iraq. Thats not going to change. Iran has an interest in the western provinces in Afghanistan. This is something that the United States cannot wish away.

Iran needs to be assured that the United States isnt thinking in terms of regime change or war. Renouncing the use of force does not mean the United States abdicates the use of force when circumstances change.

FP: If the United States began a serious policy of engagement with Iran, how would the American relationship with other states in the region change?

DT: Some countries would still ask for American support. I wonder how stable in the long term, even in the medium term, the regime in Saudi Arabia is. And I wonder how Pakistan fares in the medium term. This is a very volatile region. And in this volatile region, Iran looks like an island of stability to me. Its always been there. And its a state; its not al Qaeda. Its so much easier to deal with states than it is the likes of al Qaeda. Looking ahead, [the next U.S. president] needs a partner in that part of the worldnot necessarily an ally, not even a friend, maybe. But a partner. And Iran could be one of the partners.

FP: Your book Getting Russia Right was published in August. From your perch in Moscow, how has the Russian political landscape changed in recent weeks?

DT: I think we are witnessing a major change in the constitution, from one-man rule into regency. I would expect Dmitri Medvedev to win on the first ballot and grow into his role as president. Putin will facilitate this process and make sure the policies that he has laid down are continued. What I see in the next two years is a situation in which we have a tandem at the top: the president and Putin. I dont see Putin using this as a ruse to return to the Kremlin within six months, a year, two years. He might, but only if Medvedev fails as president. Otherwise, I see Putin helping Medvedev. [Putin] is a responsible autocrat. He wants the system he has built to continue and evolve. He clearly understands that if he were to stay as president, then he would almost inevitably fall into the crack of stagnation and become another [Leonid] Brezhnev and this is something he doesnt want. He is working for the history books. He has everything else, everything you can imagine. His ambition is to become one of the towering figures of Russian history. And thats a tall order.

Dmitri Trenin is deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center and author of Getting Russia Right (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).