What America Must Do: Jessica T. Mathews

Related to this article: What America Must Do Open the Door to Damascus
By Jessica T. MathewsAuthor Interviews:
Kenneth Rogoff
Yang Jianli Reza Aslan Dmitri Trenin For additional Web extras from the January/February 2008 issue of FP, click here.

Foreign Policy: Your advice to the next president is to open the door to Damascus. What do you think the United States stands to gain from a warmer relationship with Syria?

Jessica T. Mathews: First of all, Syria is in a key location in the Middle East. The countries it borders make it, by virtue of its geography, a key to the resolution of an awful lot of crises. But more importantly, there are very few places in the Middle East right now where there is a seeming desire to work with the United States. I think that it is pretty clear that for several years now, the Syrian regime has signaled in every way it can, that it would like to open relations with the United States. Syria seems to have come to the conclusion that it would rather have a relationship with the West than simply be isolated in a pot with Iran. Given that we have so few positive options in the Middle East, this seems to me to be an obvious opportunity that we have ignored. We are taking a critical regime in a critical place that wants an opening, and were slamming the door shut. It makes no sense.

FP: Do you think that inviting Syria to the November Middle East peace conference in Annapolis signals a change in U.S. policy?

JTM: That may be a little farther than I would go, but perhaps. One can always hope. But I think it was a good thing to have included Syria and all the Arab regimes.

FP: What do you make of those who believe Syria shouldnt have been invited to Annapolis? These critics point to the Syrian foreign minister returning from the United States and announcing that the conference was a defeat for the Palestinians. They point to the Syrians reaffirming their relationship with Tehran just after the conference.

JTM: You cant really leap off one boat until youre sure that youre welcome on the other one. Put in a similar position, we would behave in exactly the same way. The relationship between a secular Sunni regime in Syria and a theocratic Shia regime in Iran is a very strained one. Its one that has no natural glue to hold the two together, which is one of the reasons I think we ought to try to work that glue and undo it.

I dont want to suggest, by saying this, that the Syrian regime is a good guy. Theyve pursued a murderous policy of targeted assassinations and destabilization in Lebanon. But on the other hand, keeping Lebanon from tipping over into chaos is in Americas interest. Thats another reason why one would want to have things on the table to be talking to the Syrians about.

FP: Imagine its January 2009. The new president has just been sworn in. What would be the sensible next move [regarding Syria]? Is it lifting sanctions? Is it reinstating the ambassador? Is it really just picking up the phone?

JTM: Well, picking up the phone is just the first step. Then you start having conversations at the appropriate level, which would depend on where both governments want to start. And then you start laying out a series of step-response, step-response on both sides and what youve mentioned are two early steps. But the first step is to say to them, We want to reestablish the relationship. Theres no mystery here. Its that forgotten art we call diplomacy.

FP: What do you make of the news blackout on the Israeli attack on Syria in September? Is it, as recent analysis has suggested, that if there were a connection between North Korea and Syria, the White House wants it buried simply because it wants the North Korean deal to stick?

JTM: I think thats probably true, but there are other reasons why they would want to keep it quiet. The Israeli move is illegal under international law and IAEA [rules], and I think the [Bush] administration probably doesnt want to have that discussed.

Whats more extraordinary is the fact that it stayed a secret in Israel, where nothing generally stays a secret among people-in-the-know for longer than about two days. I think that the Israelis did feel a threat and had credible intelligence, but I think their desire to reestablish their existential deterrent, which was badly damaged by their military failings in the war in Lebanon, was very important to them. Israel really depends on a belief in their incredibly potent military force that can do anything. I think that when Gen. [Ehud] Barak came back into the government, his No. 1 assignment was to find a way to repair the damage that the war did to the Israeli Defense Forces reputation. That had everything to do with this raid.

Jessica T. Mathews is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.