Airstrikes increase in Iraq, bringing risks
I asked Wayne White, who was the chief Iraq analyst at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 2003-2005 and is now an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute, to weigh in on this surprisingly positive story in today's Washington Post: The U.S. military conducted more than five times as many airstrikes ...
I asked Wayne White, who was the chief Iraq analyst at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 2003-2005 and is now an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute, to weigh in on this surprisingly positive story in today's Washington Post:
I asked Wayne White, who was the chief Iraq analyst at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 2003-2005 and is now an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute, to weigh in on this surprisingly positive story in today's Washington Post:
The U.S. military conducted more than five times as many airstrikes in Iraq last year as it did in 2006, targeting al-Qaeda safe houses, insurgent bombmaking facilities and weapons stockpiles in an aggressive strategy aimed at supporting the U.S. troop increase by overwhelming enemies with air power.
The growing use of airstrikes didn't strike me as a natural component of what the military has touted as a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach to Iraq. Here are White's thoughts on the matter:
The military is correct in noting that airstrikes can be rendered more accurate now than in previous conflicts, even in many populated areas. And the use of air power against especially determined al Qaeda in Iraq cadres and related targets is of considerable assistance in weakening their resolove and fighting power—in addition to reducing casualties among U.S. (and Iraqi) ground troops.
However, targeting is not always as precise as desired, and especially large munitions can have considerable collateral impact on Iraqi civilians (killed, injured or substantial damage to private property) even when a direct hit is achieved on the intended target, let alone in the case of occasional mishaps. That is why over 200 Iraqi civilians were reportedly killed by U.S. airstrikes last year, not to mention the far larger number almost certainly injured.
And it is unclear whether one can conclude with any real confidence at this point that U.S. airstrikes will decline with reductions in U.S. troop deployments to Iraq. If violence were to rebound—and there are far too many uncertainties in the evolving situation to rule out such a trend—there could be a tendency to employ even more airpower to compensate for the reduction in U.S. ground strength or to assist less well-equipped and trained Iraqi troops replacing departing American troops to hold their own against determined armed opposition.
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