Drezner’s assignment: define the foreign policy community

Spencer Ackerman and Henry Farrell are having some fun at Michael O’Hanlon’s expense, in response to the latter’s Wall Street Journal op-ed this past week. The O’Hanlon jihad in and of itself I find uninteresting — O’Hanlon distorted his “hook,” but, frankly, I’ve read a lot worse on major op-ed pages. To go meta, however, ...

By , a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast.

Spencer Ackerman and Henry Farrell are having some fun at Michael O'Hanlon's expense, in response to the latter's Wall Street Journal op-ed this past week. The O'Hanlon jihad in and of itself I find uninteresting -- O'Hanlon distorted his "hook," but, frankly, I've read a lot worse on major op-ed pages. To go meta, however, I do find two things interesting about the flare-up. First, as Moira Whelan reports in Democracy Arsenal, "O?Hanlon has by now gotten the message that he?s burned his bridges with his Democratic friends. Those that like him personally even agree that he?s radioactive right now thanks to his avid support of Bush?s war strategy." Going back to a debate I had with Glenn Greenwald six months ago, O'Hanlon's op-ed and Whelan's observation means that we were both right. Greenwald was correct to say that, "[O'Hanlon] can still walk onto the Op-Ed pages of the NYT, WP and cable news shows at will, will still be treated as 'serious experts.'" On the other hand, I was right to propose the following wager: "I'll bet Greenwald that neither Pollack nor O'Hanlon will be given a Senate-confirmable position in any Democratic administration." Second, Farrell asks and answers an interesting question: Part of the problem with saying that the foreign-policy establishment, or the foreign policy community should exclude someone is that there isn?t any good definition of what that establishment or community is, let alone a central membership committee.... Given the vagueness of boundaries, the best definition I?ve been able to come up with is the following. Anyone who has a credible chance of being able to publish a single authored article in one of a small number of key journals qualifies as a member of the foreign policy community. The list of journals would certainly include Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy; I think that there is a strong case to be made too for The National Interest and The American Interest. There may be one or two others, depending on how expansively you want to define it. These journals provide, in a sense, a sort of rough and ready credentialling mechanism.... Disagreements, qualifications and alternative definitions welcomed, of course.Hmmmm.... much as I would love for this to be the proper definition, it doesn't work for a variety of reasons. First, operationalizing "a credible chance of being able to publish" is next to impossible -- I suppose one could survey the editors at these publications, but even that's a bit suspect. The odds of publication depend on the person making the argument, but they also depend crucially on the argument being made. I guarantee that the head of AIPAC would get published in Foreign Affairs if s/he argued in favor of installing U.N. peacekeepers in the occupied territories; similarly, the head of the ACLU would get published if s/he argued in favor of re-upping the USA Patriot Act in perpetuity. Second, cracking these publications is only one dimension of influence. Whelan got at this in her post on think tanks when she wrote: "there are three forms of currency in the think tank world that make you a valuable player: bringing in money, getting press, and getting called to testify." One could make a similar argument for the foreign policy community. I'd posit that there are three sources of influence: a) The ability to independently mobilize significant resources (either money or activists); b) The ability to publish in key venues (and I'd expand Farrell's list to include the op-ed pages of the Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times); c) The ability to persuade others that you possess a sufficient amount of expertise on an issue (this is -- obviously -- strongly correlated with possessing actual expertise, but the correlation is not perfect). It is possible for individuals to possess all three attributes -- Fred Bergsten comes to mind -- but it is more likely that individals possess varying amounts (thinking about myself as an example, I'm strongest on (b), decent on (c), and have close to zero levels of (a)). Here's the thing, though -- Farrell is right to ask the question, and this is a golden opportunity for a foreign affairs magazine to attempt to answer the question. Forbes has their 400, Time has their Top 100 list, Entertainment Weekly has their Power List, Parade has their Top 10 worst dictators (really, I'm not kidding) -- why not generate a similar exercise for the foreign policy community? This is a splashy cover story just waiting for the editors at Foreign Policy, The National Interest, or The American Interest to exploit to the hilt. [Why not Foreign Affairs?--ed. Not a chance in hell.] Just think of the effort that various insecure egomaniacs foreign policy experts would exert to ensure that their name was included. Readers are encouraged to proffer their metrics for determining who should belong on such a list and who should not.

Spencer Ackerman and Henry Farrell are having some fun at Michael O’Hanlon’s expense, in response to the latter’s Wall Street Journal op-ed this past week. The O’Hanlon jihad in and of itself I find uninteresting — O’Hanlon distorted his “hook,” but, frankly, I’ve read a lot worse on major op-ed pages. To go meta, however, I do find two things interesting about the flare-up. First, as Moira Whelan reports in Democracy Arsenal, “O?Hanlon has by now gotten the message that he?s burned his bridges with his Democratic friends. Those that like him personally even agree that he?s radioactive right now thanks to his avid support of Bush?s war strategy.” Going back to a debate I had with Glenn Greenwald six months ago, O’Hanlon’s op-ed and Whelan’s observation means that we were both right. Greenwald was correct to say that, “[O’Hanlon] can still walk onto the Op-Ed pages of the NYT, WP and cable news shows at will, will still be treated as ‘serious experts.'” On the other hand, I was right to propose the following wager: “I’ll bet Greenwald that neither Pollack nor O’Hanlon will be given a Senate-confirmable position in any Democratic administration.” Second, Farrell asks and answers an interesting question:

Part of the problem with saying that the foreign-policy establishment, or the foreign policy community should exclude someone is that there isn?t any good definition of what that establishment or community is, let alone a central membership committee…. Given the vagueness of boundaries, the best definition I?ve been able to come up with is the following. Anyone who has a credible chance of being able to publish a single authored article in one of a small number of key journals qualifies as a member of the foreign policy community. The list of journals would certainly include Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy; I think that there is a strong case to be made too for The National Interest and The American Interest. There may be one or two others, depending on how expansively you want to define it. These journals provide, in a sense, a sort of rough and ready credentialling mechanism…. Disagreements, qualifications and alternative definitions welcomed, of course.

Hmmmm…. much as I would love for this to be the proper definition, it doesn’t work for a variety of reasons. First, operationalizing “a credible chance of being able to publish” is next to impossible — I suppose one could survey the editors at these publications, but even that’s a bit suspect. The odds of publication depend on the person making the argument, but they also depend crucially on the argument being made. I guarantee that the head of AIPAC would get published in Foreign Affairs if s/he argued in favor of installing U.N. peacekeepers in the occupied territories; similarly, the head of the ACLU would get published if s/he argued in favor of re-upping the USA Patriot Act in perpetuity. Second, cracking these publications is only one dimension of influence. Whelan got at this in her post on think tanks when she wrote: “there are three forms of currency in the think tank world that make you a valuable player: bringing in money, getting press, and getting called to testify.” One could make a similar argument for the foreign policy community. I’d posit that there are three sources of influence:

a) The ability to independently mobilize significant resources (either money or activists); b) The ability to publish in key venues (and I’d expand Farrell’s list to include the op-ed pages of the Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times); c) The ability to persuade others that you possess a sufficient amount of expertise on an issue (this is — obviously — strongly correlated with possessing actual expertise, but the correlation is not perfect).

It is possible for individuals to possess all three attributes — Fred Bergsten comes to mind — but it is more likely that individals possess varying amounts (thinking about myself as an example, I’m strongest on (b), decent on (c), and have close to zero levels of (a)). Here’s the thing, though — Farrell is right to ask the question, and this is a golden opportunity for a foreign affairs magazine to attempt to answer the question. Forbes has their 400, Time has their Top 100 list, Entertainment Weekly has their Power List, Parade has their Top 10 worst dictators (really, I’m not kidding) — why not generate a similar exercise for the foreign policy community? This is a splashy cover story just waiting for the editors at Foreign Policy, The National Interest, or The American Interest to exploit to the hilt. [Why not Foreign Affairs?–ed. Not a chance in hell.] Just think of the effort that various insecure egomaniacs foreign policy experts would exert to ensure that their name was included. Readers are encouraged to proffer their metrics for determining who should belong on such a list and who should not.

Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner

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