The realist tradition in American public opinion — published

A few years ago, I responded to a Patrick Belton post at OxBlog thusly: [There is] a thesis that I’ve been cogitating on for the past few months: despite claims by international relations theorists — including most realists — that the overwhelming majority of Americans hold liberal policy preferences, it just ain’t so. Even if ...

By , a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast.

A few years ago, I responded to a Patrick Belton post at OxBlog thusly: [There is] a thesis that I've been cogitating on for the past few months: despite claims by international relations theorists -- including most realists -- that the overwhelming majority of Americans hold liberal policy preferences, it just ain't so. Even if those beliefs are extolled in the abstract, when asked to prioritize among different foreign policy tasks, the realist position wins. From this germ of an idea, a conference paper emerged. And, a short three-and-a-half years after the original idea, "The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion" is out at Perspectives on Politics. The abstract: For more than half a century, realist scholars of international relations have maintained that their world view is inimical to the American public. For a variety of reasons?inchoate attitudes, national history, American exceptionalism?realists assert that the U.S. government pursues realist policies in spite and not because of public opinion. Indeed, most IR scholars share this ?anti-realist assumption.? To determine the empirical validity of the anti-realist assumption, this paper re-examines survey and experimental data on the mass public's attitudes towards foreign policy priorities and world views, the use of force, and foreign economic policy over the past three decades. The results suggest that, far from disliking realism, Americans are at least as comfortable with the logic of realpolitik as they are with liberal internationalism. The persistence of the anti-realist assumption might be due to an ironic fact: American elites are more predisposed towards liberal internationalism than the rest of the American public.The article -- in fact, the entire issue -- is available for free online. Go check it out. I doubt I will publish many other articles in which I say that George Kennan is 100% wrong.

A few years ago, I responded to a Patrick Belton post at OxBlog thusly:

[There is] a thesis that I’ve been cogitating on for the past few months: despite claims by international relations theorists — including most realists — that the overwhelming majority of Americans hold liberal policy preferences, it just ain’t so. Even if those beliefs are extolled in the abstract, when asked to prioritize among different foreign policy tasks, the realist position wins.

From this germ of an idea, a conference paper emerged. And, a short three-and-a-half years after the original idea, “The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion” is out at Perspectives on Politics. The abstract:

For more than half a century, realist scholars of international relations have maintained that their world view is inimical to the American public. For a variety of reasons?inchoate attitudes, national history, American exceptionalism?realists assert that the U.S. government pursues realist policies in spite and not because of public opinion. Indeed, most IR scholars share this ?anti-realist assumption.? To determine the empirical validity of the anti-realist assumption, this paper re-examines survey and experimental data on the mass public’s attitudes towards foreign policy priorities and world views, the use of force, and foreign economic policy over the past three decades. The results suggest that, far from disliking realism, Americans are at least as comfortable with the logic of realpolitik as they are with liberal internationalism. The persistence of the anti-realist assumption might be due to an ironic fact: American elites are more predisposed towards liberal internationalism than the rest of the American public.

The article — in fact, the entire issue — is available for free online. Go check it out. I doubt I will publish many other articles in which I say that George Kennan is 100% wrong.

Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner

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