Iraq’s Unheralded Political Progress

Mahmoud Raouf Mahmoud-Pool/Getty Images Family feud: The Shiite-Kurdish alliance that has dominated Iraqi politics may be breaking downand thats good news for Iraq.

Five years into the Iraq war, the original goal of standing up a stable liberal democracy in the Arab world seems as distant as ever. Theres no question U.S. troop deaths are down and Iraqi civilian casualties have dropped precipitously. Yet, as many observers have noted, its hard to find measures of success that dont have Petraeus written all over them. The violence may have lessened, but what about national reconciliation?

Amid the recriminations for the lack of political progress, few seem to have noticed what may have been a watershed moment for Iraqi democracy. Indeed, February 13, 2008, might someday be remembered as the day Iraqs political class finally showed itself capable of compromise and accommodation.

On February 13 the Iraqi parliament simultaneously passed three new laws: one that sets the relationship between the central and provincial governments, a second giving amnesty to thousands of detainees, and a third setting the 2008 national budget. Each piece of legislation is important in its own right, but how the overall compromise came about may prove even more significant than the laws themselves.

First, Iraqi lawmakers deployed a technique familiar to anyone who lives in a developed democracy: logrolling, the essence of political compromise. Iraqis bundled together three laws that each constituencyShia, Sunnis, and Kurdsprioritized differently. By treating the three issues as one legislative package, each group could make trade-offs to get what it wanted most. Kurds supported the amnesty and provincial-powers laws in exchange for a budget law that included a 17 percent allocation for the Kurdistan region. Arab lawmakers had been arguing for 13 percent, but Sunnis supported the higher figure in exchange for the amnesty and provincial-powers laws. And most of the major Shiite playersthe Sadrist, Fadhila, and Dawa partiessupported the 17 percent figure in exchange for Kurdish support for their top priority, the provincial-powers law. Everyone, in short, could return to their constituents declaring victory.

For Iraq, this was a radical departure from the issue-by-issue approach that failed so spectacularly in 2007. Last year, Iraqis failed to achieve consensus over such critical, contentious matters as the hydrocarbon legislation, the constitutional review, and resolution of the disputed territories. Like the laws passed on February 13, these issues are connected in a way that could lead to a larger compromise. For example, Iraqi Arabs might find the Kurds annexation of Kirkuk more palatable if the Kurds agree to let the central government manage natural resources and give it more leeway to coordinate national legislation. In this way, the February 13 compromise could serve as a road map for resolving other deadlocked disputes and moving forward on national reconciliation.

Second, the maneuvering of the participants themselves is also encouraging. Iraqis are beginning to sort themselves based on ideas and interests rather than on simply their ethnic or sectarian identities. A year ago, Moqtada al-Sadrs Mahdi Army was being accused of sectarian cleansing of Sunnis. But on February 13, the Sunni coalition and Sadrist party stood side-by-side to push for a stronger amnesty law. In the debate over provincial powers, Sunni, secularist, and Shiite parties (including the Sadrists) came together to form a powerful centrist political bloc advocating greater centralized control over the provinces. The largest Shiite party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and the Kurds maintained a federalist coalition calling for greater provincial autonomy. Iraqi politics to date have been dominated by a Shiite-Kurdish alliance that has been accused of marginalizing Sunni interests and ignoring their concerns. But the fact that several Shiite parties defected away from the Supreme Council, choosing ideology over sect, suggests that new intersectarian political coalitions may be emerging that could make national reconciliation easier.

Finally, the process that led to the February 13 compromise suggests a growing respect for the rule of law, and not just the rule of men. Throughout the debate, centrists and federalists alike went to great lengths to frame their positions on the basis of popularly agreed-upon constitutional principles. When a constitutional dispute stalled the provincial-powers bill in the summer of 2007, for instance, lawmakers looked to the Federal Supreme Court for guidance. The Supreme Council framed its objections to the law in terms of contradiction[s] with the Constitution, while its proposed amendments were designed to ensure the constitutionality of the law. Of course these positions were based on political agendas, and one should therefore be cautious not to draw too far-reaching a conclusion from one parliamentary debate. But in a nation with scant experience with liberal democratic governance, Iraqs newfound reliance on the Constitution and independent judicial institutions should provide some hope that a new political culture is beginning to take root.

Its too early to tell just how much, if at all, the February 13 compromise will transform Iraqi politics. Anything could happen on the security front. One well-timed bomb could easily undermine whatever political progress has been made. Formidable economic challenges remain as well. But something very encouraging just took place, and if Iraqis can build upon the February 13 compromise, someone other than General Petraeus may claim a success.