Memo to Dan Nexon
Duck of Minerva has been doing an excellent job of blogging about the Russia-Georgia dispute (see Charli Carpenter’s post on Human Rights Watch, for example). Dan Nexon has a post that’s worth commenting on, however. He argues that Jack Snyder’s Myths of Empire argument can partly explain the neoconservative response in the United States (as ...
Duck of Minerva has been doing an excellent job of blogging about the Russia-Georgia dispute (see Charli Carpenter's post on Human Rights Watch, for example). Dan Nexon has a post that's worth commenting on, however. He argues that Jack Snyder's Myths of Empire argument can partly explain the neoconservative response in the United States (as Dan points out in comments, it can explain some of the incongruities within the threat perception of neoconservatives): The "myth of the paper tiger," as Snyder explains in his National Interest article "Imperial Temptations," holds that enemies are: capable of becoming fiercely threatening if appeased, but easily crumpled by a resolute attack. These images are often not only wrong, but self-contradictory. For example, Japanese militarists saw the United States as so strong and insatiably aggressive that Japan would have to conquer a huge, self-sufficient empire to get the resources to defend itself; yet at the same time, the Japanese regime saw the United States as so vulnerable and irresolute that a sharp rap against Pearl Harbor would discourage it from fighting back. Snyder goes on to discuss the "Bush Administration's argument for preventive war against Iraq" as an example of this line of reasoning, but it clearly remains a mainstay in foreign-policy arguments of all types. Here's the thing -- Snyder's argument, paradoxically, can help to substantiate the neoconservative argument and weaken the realist argument about how regime type explains Russian behavior. Why? In his original book, Snyder argued that the "myths of empire" were less likely to appear in either democratic or totalitarian states. He argued that they were most likely to plague mixed, oligarchic regimes -- because imperial myths were the best way to sustain domestic support. "Mixed, oligarchic regime" pretty much fits Russia perfectly. This leads to two interesting questions. Does Russia actually suffer from a "myth of empire"? Just cause Snyder says it's more likely does not mean it is true; If it is true -- again, a big if -- how does one successfully and peaceably counter such a state?
Duck of Minerva has been doing an excellent job of blogging about the Russia-Georgia dispute (see Charli Carpenter’s post on Human Rights Watch, for example). Dan Nexon has a post that’s worth commenting on, however. He argues that Jack Snyder’s Myths of Empire argument can partly explain the neoconservative response in the United States (as Dan points out in comments, it can explain some of the incongruities within the threat perception of neoconservatives):
The “myth of the paper tiger,” as Snyder explains in his National Interest article “Imperial Temptations,” holds that enemies are:
capable of becoming fiercely threatening if appeased, but easily crumpled by a resolute attack. These images are often not only wrong, but self-contradictory. For example, Japanese militarists saw the United States as so strong and insatiably aggressive that Japan would have to conquer a huge, self-sufficient empire to get the resources to defend itself; yet at the same time, the Japanese regime saw the United States as so vulnerable and irresolute that a sharp rap against Pearl Harbor would discourage it from fighting back.
Snyder goes on to discuss the “Bush Administration’s argument for preventive war against Iraq” as an example of this line of reasoning, but it clearly remains a mainstay in foreign-policy arguments of all types.
Here’s the thing — Snyder’s argument, paradoxically, can help to substantiate the neoconservative argument and weaken the realist argument about how regime type explains Russian behavior. Why? In his original book, Snyder argued that the “myths of empire” were less likely to appear in either democratic or totalitarian states. He argued that they were most likely to plague mixed, oligarchic regimes — because imperial myths were the best way to sustain domestic support. “Mixed, oligarchic regime” pretty much fits Russia perfectly. This leads to two interesting questions.
- Does Russia actually suffer from a “myth of empire”? Just cause Snyder says it’s more likely does not mean it is true;
- If it is true — again, a big if — how does one successfully and peaceably counter such a state?
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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