A not-so-random thought about the distribution of power

Since the Russian-Georgian war, there's been a lot of loose chatter about how the world has changed.  Russia's recent articulation of its new "sphere of influence" policy, combined with alleged European Union fecklessness, would seem to buttress this observation.  With that context in mind, here's an interesting comparison for those who believe that Russia's invasion of Georgia has fundamentally shifted the global distribution of power: In February of this year, the Republic of Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence.  According to Wikipedia,* seventeen countries, including France, Turkey, Australia, Italy, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom, recognized the country within its first week of independence.  As of this writing, 46 countries recognize Kosovo, including Japan, Canada, South Korea, and Sweden.  That's not a huge number, but when you're recognized by all G-7 members, it does count for something.  It's been more than a week since Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.  The number of other countries that have followed Russia's lead is.... well, maybe one (Nicaragua), as near as I can tell.  Belarus keeps promising that they'll get around to it, and Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko has defended Russia's recognition decision; since that initial promise, however, Belarus appears to have decided to sit on their hands.  In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez has expressed similar support of Russia's recognition decision -- but I haven't seen any actual recognition from Caracas either.  We'll know this Friday if any other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization will sign up for recognition, but Vedomosti reports that, "It appears that the Russian government has reconciled itself to the fact that no other country has recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said yesterday the reluctance of other states to recognize the independence of the breakaway Georgian territories was not critical."  I strongly encourage readers to fact-check me here.  [UPDATE:  The Moscow Times' Nasi Abdullaev reports that, "Russia last week attempted -- and failed -- to win support from its Central Asian allies on Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence at Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Tajikistan."  He also reports that as of yet the CSTO ain't budging.] There's more.  Despite its stated intent to protect the interests of ethnic Russians, Moscow has taken a less belligerent posture towards other breakaway provinces, like Transdniestr.  Despite hopes in Tiraspol that they too would receive Russian recognition, it appears that the Medvedev/Putin government is leery to extend this recognition principle beyond the Caucasus.  In the Christian Science Monitor, ICG's Paul Quinn-Judge points out that key members of the Russian elite think that Moscow has overplayed its hand:  The euphoria that followed the destruction of Georgian's $2 billion Army and the humiliation of President Saakashvili has dissolved. And for the first time since Vladimir Putin – and his muscled, uncompromising, and vindictive world view – came to power in 1999, serious voices are expressing doubts about his judgment. They clearly feel that Russia has not emerged onto the world stage quite so authoritatively as Mr. Putin may have thought; the country has instead stumbled into a dangerous and debilitating trap. A number of prominent Russian foreign policy analysts saw the recognition of the disputed territories coming and warned urgently against it. They include a highly experienced diplomat and former government minister, Alexei Adamishin. "Russia has every moral right to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," he wrote in an opinion piece beforehand. But the consequences will be "catastrophic." A couple of weeks earlier, Sergei Karaganov, of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia's equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations, urged the Kremlin to think carefully before recognizing the two secessionist states. Equally grim analyses have followed the announcement, and there are indirect signs of concern in the business community....  [Putin] trusts very few people. Aides say he makes policy on key issues – Georgia, Ukraine, NATO – himself, along with a small circle, and tends to improvise. He shows little interest in the Russian stock market, which has taken a battering since the outbreak of the Georgia crisis, while most of the mega-rich, many of them close associates, have attained their fortune by obeying one rule: Do exactly what Putin says. In the past, everybody obeyed this rule, and many in the ruling elite were genuinely convinced that he was the right leader for these times. Now, doubts are creeping in, and people are bracing themselves for tense years. The strong man has started to show his weaknesses.  Clearly, Russia will pose significant regional headaches for the United States and other countries for some time to come.  There's a big difference, however, between "regional headache" and "major shift in the distribution of power."   *Let's stipulate that while I'm not 100% confident that everything on the Wikipedia page is correct, I am over 90% confident about the relevant information.