Will Obama renew the transatlantic patnership?
Alex Massie throws some cold water on the idea that the mere act of electing Barack Obama will lead to more cooperation with Europe on key trouble spots like Afghanistan or Iran: Perhaps Obama really can persuade European public opinion. But since, as matters stand, no-one thinks there’s a military solution to the Afghan problem ...
Alex Massie throws some cold water on the idea that the mere act of electing Barack Obama will lead to more cooperation with Europe on key trouble spots like Afghanistan or Iran: Perhaps Obama really can persuade European public opinion. But since, as matters stand, no-one thinks there's a military solution to the Afghan problem I'm not quite sure what Obama can offer to make the mission any more appealling. Put yourself in Danish or Portuguese or Italian shoes: what's in it for you? Why would you join a mission no-one thinks is winnable? (Maybe a new strategy can change that, but that too is something that remains to be seen.) It isn't simply Iraq; it's the growing perception that many people feel they have little to know idea why, nearly seven years later, we're still in Afghanistan. What are we actually doing there? What can we actually realistically hope to achieve?.... It would be lovely to think that Obama can bring a new period of transatlantic harmony. But it just isn't the case that American interests are necessarily the same as European interests. The Security Card trumped everything during the Cold War but these are changed times. And there were, in any case, always more differences than seemed the case then too, these days they're much clearer to see. A new President may find it difficult to change that. Or, to put it another way, he may need to give something up himself to advance American interests in other areas. Alex is right to point out the centrality of common security interests to transatlantic security cooperation. I don't think the divergence of interests is as great as he thinks, however, in part because Obama's strategy allows his to display credible commitments that Bush could not. On Afghanistan, for example, the problem the Bush administration always had with getting more allied support was the perception among many allies that the U.S. wanted NATO help in that theatre so they could focus on Iraq. If Obama pursues his graduated withdrawal strategy and expanded soft power capabilities, however, he's going to be able to ask for European help while simultaneously augmenting U.S. forces and resources in the Afghan theater. States are much more willing to cooperate when they sense a serious commitment by the lead actor. Contra Alex, I think a lot of European foreign policy elites do see the security and foreign policy benefits of doubling down in Afghanistan -- if anything, events in Mumbai merely reinforce that belief. Their concern has always been with the lack of U.S. focus and resources in the region. By committing greater resources -- which has been Obama's message for some time now -- I think he can square the circle with the Europeans. [Of course, note that this is all highly dependent on the stability of Iraq. Either Iraq maintains its current level of stability, or Obama must be willing to reallocate troops away from Iraq despite a worsening security situation there.] I tried to make some of these points last night in a discussion of this topic on TVO's The Agenda with Steve Paikin, but I was blinded by Jeff Kopstein's hearty California glow. Nevertheless, true groupies can watch it below:
Alex Massie throws some cold water on the idea that the mere act of electing Barack Obama will lead to more cooperation with Europe on key trouble spots like Afghanistan or Iran:
Perhaps Obama really can persuade European public opinion. But since, as matters stand, no-one thinks there’s a military solution to the Afghan problem I’m not quite sure what Obama can offer to make the mission any more appealling. Put yourself in Danish or Portuguese or Italian shoes: what’s in it for you? Why would you join a mission no-one thinks is winnable? (Maybe a new strategy can change that, but that too is something that remains to be seen.) It isn’t simply Iraq; it’s the growing perception that many people feel they have little to know idea why, nearly seven years later, we’re still in Afghanistan. What are we actually doing there? What can we actually realistically hope to achieve?…. It would be lovely to think that Obama can bring a new period of transatlantic harmony. But it just isn’t the case that American interests are necessarily the same as European interests. The Security Card trumped everything during the Cold War but these are changed times. And there were, in any case, always more differences than seemed the case then too, these days they’re much clearer to see. A new President may find it difficult to change that. Or, to put it another way, he may need to give something up himself to advance American interests in other areas.
Alex is right to point out the centrality of common security interests to transatlantic security cooperation. I don’t think the divergence of interests is as great as he thinks, however, in part because Obama’s strategy allows his to display credible commitments that Bush could not. On Afghanistan, for example, the problem the Bush administration always had with getting more allied support was the perception among many allies that the U.S. wanted NATO help in that theatre so they could focus on Iraq. If Obama pursues his graduated withdrawal strategy and expanded soft power capabilities, however, he’s going to be able to ask for European help while simultaneously augmenting U.S. forces and resources in the Afghan theater. States are much more willing to cooperate when they sense a serious commitment by the lead actor. Contra Alex, I think a lot of European foreign policy elites do see the security and foreign policy benefits of doubling down in Afghanistan — if anything, events in Mumbai merely reinforce that belief. Their concern has always been with the lack of U.S. focus and resources in the region. By committing greater resources — which has been Obama’s message for some time now — I think he can square the circle with the Europeans. [Of course, note that this is all highly dependent on the stability of Iraq. Either Iraq maintains its current level of stability, or Obama must be willing to reallocate troops away from Iraq despite a worsening security situation there.] I tried to make some of these points last night in a discussion of this topic on TVO’s The Agenda with Steve Paikin, but I was blinded by Jeff Kopstein’s hearty California glow. Nevertheless, true groupies can watch it below:
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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