Realism, the defense budget, and domestic politics

Matt Yglesias says some nice things about my post on the defense budget, but points out that its odd for a realist to emphasize the role of domestic politics in sustaining inflated defense spending. I appreciate the kind words, but it’s actually not that odd. Whenever realists like me criticize some aspect of U.S. foreign and defense policy — and especially when we claim it is being adversely affected by domestic political factors of one sort or another — somebody is bound to claim we are being inconsistent (and they usually do it a lot less gently than Matt did). After all, realists are supposed to believe that the balance of power is the driving force in shaping foreign policy, and that states always pursue their national interests. So if the United States is doing something that realists think is misguided, doesn’t the very act of voicing criticism invalidate the realists’ own core beliefs?

Nice try, but nope. First, most theories of international relations (or foreign policy) are pretty crude instruments, and none of them explains everything that states do. I think realism tells you a lot about how states behave but it hardly explains everything. Second, the "national interest" is itself a contentious concept, which is why we have journals and blogs and talk shows where we can argue about it ad infinitum. Third, realism does tell you that really powerful countries have a larger margin for error and have the luxury of being able to indulge their ideological predilections. Really powerful countries — e.g., the United States — can also afford to waste vast resources on excessive military spending, and they can allow assorted special interest groups to wield disproportionate influence even when that imposes costs on the rest of society Just look at the farm bill, or our policy towards Cuba. This problem got worse when we won the Cold War, because the absence of a serious rival made Americans think they could do pretty much whatever they wanted without facing serious costs. Result: Iraq.

Realism also warns that even really powerful states will still pay a price if they lose sight of the national interest and start acting in foolish ways. GM could make crummy cars for a long time and stay in business, but eventually even they had to come begging for a handout. Similarly, the United States can make a lot of mistakes in foreign policy and squander a lot of blood and treasure on ill-considered escapades without jeopardizing its great power status overnight, but that doesn’t mean that doing so is a good idea.   

The partial antidote to such follies is a more serious and sustained debate about our role in the world and the best way to protect our vital interests and way of life. Matt has already made his own contribution to that conversation; here are some other places where you can find some fresh ideas:

Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power.

Eugene Jarecki, The American Way of War.

Jeff Legro and Melvin Leffler, eds., To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine.

Project on Defense Alternatives, Forceful Engagement: Rethinking the Role of Military Power in American Global Policy.

John Hulsman and Anatol Lieven, Ethical Realism.