Is Abu Mazen Finished?

As the Israeli military was hitting the Hamas-led Gaza Strip with unprecedented shock and awe-style airstrikes two days after Christmas, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was flying to private meetings with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.

He has been largely relegated to the sidelines ever since. With Israel and Hamas locked in a decisive military showdown, Abbas has basically been shunted aside while the battle deepens in Gaza. But the unfolding war is unlikely to change the fundamental dynamic that has stymied the latest efforts to broker a promising Israeli-Palestinian peace deal: Abbass political fortunes are inextricably tied to Hamas.

Abbas is in a bind. He cant realistically negotiate a long-term deal with Israel without regaining control of the Gaza Strip. But he cant regain control of Gaza unless Hamas capitulates to Israeli pressure.

Even if Hamas ceded control of Gaza, however, the hard-line Islamist movement is unlikely to abandon its long-standing commitment to destroying Israel. And, unless Hamas does so, Israel and the United States are certain to rebuff any reformulated Palestinian unity government that includes what they say is a terrorist organization.

And that leaves the 73-year-old Abbas in a surreal kind of diplomatic stasis. When he succeeded Yasir Arafat four years ago as president of the Palestinian Authority, Abbas was viewed in the West as a potential game-changer. He had criticized the senseless violence of the second Palestinian intifada as counterproductive. As prime minister, Abbas repeatedly bumped heads with Arafat over the Palestinian presidents dictatorial style and eventually resigned in 2003 after just seven months in the post.

So when Arafat died in 2005, Israel and the United States looked to Abbas to transform the Palestinian Authority into a corruption-free, compromising new partner in the peace process. But Abbas was understandably reluctant to succeed Arafat. Abu Mazen (as he is commonly known in the Arab world) has always been more diplomat than strongman, something that endeared him to the West, but cost him credibility with the rival Palestinian militant factions.

Abbas was never able to successfully mediate between the discredited Arafat loyalists (such as Jibril Rajoub, the veteran Arafat security advisor) who had led the secular Fatah party leaders back from exile, and the younger Palestinian reformists, who saw the older generation as corrupt and power-hungry. Those internal divisions doomed Fatahs chances of retaining control of the Palestinian Authority when Hamas jumped into the political ring to challenge Abbas for political power in 2006.

Abbas has been presiding over an ever shrinking quasi government ever since. A broad international boycott of the new Hamas government gave way to a shaky Hamas-Fatah coalition in March 2007. The unity government failed to assuage Israel or the United States, which refused to accept a cabinet filled with Hamas members committed to destroying Israel.

Then, U.S-backed efforts to arm and train Palestinian forces loyal to Abbas backfired in June 2007 when Hamas militants seized control of the Gaza Strip in another humiliating setback for the Palestinian president. Left with two thirds of a country, Abbas created a questionable caretaker government dominated by pro-Western politicians who have been running the Palestinian Authority by executive decree.

Ironically, the decisive fissure proved to be something of a boon for Abu Mazen. The rift prompted Israel and the United States to set aside their reticence to provide significant support for Abbas, who was still viewed as a weak leader. Israel jumped into new peace talks with Abbas while the United States led renewed efforts to rebuild the fractured Palestinian security services.

Although peace talks have been hung up on the same sticking points that have prevented a stable breakthrough for years, the West Bank first strategy began to pay some dividends. Palestinian police brought surprising stability to some of the West Banks largest cities, and the frail economy began to show new signs of life. Abbas oversaw a crackdown on Hamas charities in the West Bank, while Israel continued to arrest and imprison scores of Hamas leaders who might have tried to challenge the Palestinian president on his home turf. The comparative calm in the West Bank might help explain why Palestinians there have been slow to rise up in massive numbers to protest the devastating Israeli military campaign in Gaza.

While Abbass popularity rebounded, Gaza always loomed in the background. Hamass refusal to abandon its stated pledge to destroy Israel made it impossible for Abbas to create a new unity government because that would have led to another breakdown in peace talks with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s government.

But efforts to compel Hamas into moderating its stand by isolating the Gaza Strip failed to dislodge the Islamists from power. Hamas established an elaborate network of smuggler tunnels between Gaza and Egypt that allowed the group to circumvent Israels economic blockade.

Then came Operation Cast Lead, Israels ongoing military campaign to destabilize, if not topple, Hamas in Gaza. Abbass contempt for Hamas became clear when he first spoke out and blamed the Islamist hard-liners for bringing the Israeli assault upon the Gaza Strip by not agreeing to extend a shaky six-month cease-fire with Israel that expired in mid-December.

Last week was supposed to mark the end of Abbass four-year term. In some alternative universe, Abbas might have followed through with his long-forgotten pledge not to run for a second term. Instead, Abbas and his legal team have crafted a creative and questionable interpretation of ill-defined Palestinian laws to argue that the Palestinian presidents term does not end for another year.

Hamas challenged that decision and warned that Abbas could no longer be considered the legitimate Palestinian president as of Jan. 10, when his four-year term should have come to an end. But Hamas is a little busy these days trying to retain its hold on Gaza, so the political dispute has been pushed to the side for the foreseeable future.

That leaves Abbas in nominal charge of a caretaker West Bank government with a defunct parliament and a stagnating peace process. Abbas benefits from the fact that there is no obvious heir apparent willing and able to take over. Thats why the most recent polls showed that half the Palestinian public was unhappy with Abbass presidential term, but just about the same number say they would vote for him again instead of choosing Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

The younger generation sees Marwan Barghouti, the Palestinian-uprising leader currently sentenced to serve the rest of his life in an Israeli prison, as the most promising Abbas successor. But Israel has refused to free Barghouti, whose release could undercut the already shaky popular support for Abbas.

Salam Fayyad, the independent economist tapped by Abbas to serve as prime minister in the post-Hamas caretaker government, has many fans in the West. But he lacks significant support from the Palestinian population, which gave Fayyads independent Third Way party just 2 percent of the vote in the 2006 legislative elections. With no heir apparent and no prospects for new elections any time soon, Abbas remains the Palestinians best hope for trying to lead the Palestinian hopes for statehood out of the rubble of Gaza.

After making progress in bolstering Abbas in the West Bank, Israel is taking a shot at weakening Hamas in the Gaza Strip. If Israel succeeds in cowing Hamas into accepting a return of Abbass forces to Gaza, it might set the stage for politically reuniting the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Here, too, Abbas faces a Catch-22: Abbas needs to reunite the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but his credibility among Palestinians will be severely undermined if he is seen as essentially returning to Gaza behind a phalanx of Israeli soldiers.

And, despite the relentless blows it is taking from Israel, Hamas has shown no signs that it is ready to accede to international pressure and change its position on Israel.

That could leave Abbas right where he is now: Dependent on Israel and the incoming Obama administration to shore him up in the West Bank in the hope that, by doing so, Palestinians will back Abbas and his allies in new elections.

Once the Israeli military operation ends, Abbas faces a daunting challenge in explaining to the 1.5 million residents of Gaza what he did to prevent the devastating attack, repairing severe internal ideological Palestinian divisions, salvaging peace talks with Israel, rebuilding Gaza, and reassuring world leaders that he has an ability he has not yet shown in transcending the familiar Middle East morass.

Even with international backing, the odds are against him.