Bibi’s Separate Peace

As recently as October 2008, moderate Kadima Party leader Tzipi Livni seemed the front-runner in Israeli parliamentary elections scheduled for Feb. 10. Several months and a Gaza incursion later, the tables have turned. National security is issue No. 1, and former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, the right-leaning head of the Likud Party, looks tipped to win. He has promised not to compromise on settlements and has criticized the current government for stopping its Gaza bombardment too soon. As Hamas rockets again struck Israel, Netanyahu hinted that there remains military work to be done. The Middle East peace process looks unfit for its name. So if the winner is to be Netanyahu, one burning question remains: Can a hawkish Netanyahu surprise the world and sprout dovish wings?

In 1996, one Arab leader made a bet that, yes, Netanyahu could keep up the momentum toward peace left in the wake of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination. King Hussein of Jordan worked hard to cultivate Netanyahu, the young, articulate, and ambitious leader of Likud’s opposition in the mid-1990s. Remarkably, in the Israeli election of May 1996, Hussein even worked behind the scenes to promote Netanyahu’s cause and, when he scraped to a narrow victory over Shimon Peres, pressed other Arab leaders to give him the benefit of the doubt.

Years since then, Netanyahu has made, broken, fostered, and reformed relationships with neighboring Arab leaders and negotiators from the United States. Coming from one of the former prime minister’s early advocates, Hussein’s private papers, to which I was afforded unique access in 2007, give us much to ponder about the likely effect of a second Netanyahu government on the peace process. If Netanyahu again leads Israel, security and domestic politics, not negotiations with the Palestinians, might well dominate his agenda. That is, unless the leader who so frustrated Hussein with his obstinacy turns the same tough love toward his own country to make a peace deal work.

Much of Netanyahu’s political career has been predicated on maintaining a strong Israeli state that does not compromise where national security is concerned. His stance in upcoming elections has included a push to link Hamas and Iran, a promise to go after both, and a vow to keep Jerusalem undivided in any peace process. We did not return to Jerusalem after praying for it to be rebuilt for 2,000 years in order to give it up, he said Feb. 2.

In 1996, much as looks likely today, Netanyahu assembled a right-wing coalition with a foreign-policy program opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state and the dismantling of Jewish settlements. So perhaps Hussein should not have been surprised when his gamble on Netanyahu backfired just four months after the prime minister took office. In the dead of a September night, Netanyahu sent Israeli soldiers to open a tunnel near Haram al-Sharif, one of Islam’s holiest sites, in Jerusalem. Arab sentiment was incensed, and Hussein felt betrayed. Then, in 1997, Israel decided to build a settlement at Har Homa overlooking East Jerusalem, and Netanyahu suggested a further redeployment of Israeli forces in the West Bank, a move that Hussein found derisory.

In all cases, it was not only his actions — but Netanyahu’s communication to Arab leaders — that incensed Hussein. In the case of Haram al-Sharif, Hussein had not been alerted beforehand. Nonetheless, he tried to broker a compromise to quell the crisis, only to have Netanyahu rebuff him. Likewise, in 1997, Hussein wrote to Netanyahu, expressing his dismay at the unexpected action in Har Homa and the West Bank, in what must be one of the most remarkable letters from one leader to another in recent times: My distress is genuine and deep over the accumulating tragic actions which you have initiated as the head of the government of Israel. … The saddest reality that has been dawning on me is that I do not find you by my side in working to fulfill God’s will for the final reconciliation of all the descendants of the children of Abraham.

Although Netanyahu did not admit it, the reasons for many of his moves were overwhelmingly domestic. He wanted to prove his credentials to his right-wing constituents and coalition partners. As he wrote back to Hussein the next day: I hold you in the highest esteem and I value your friendship and understanding. That is why I must confess that I am baffled by the personal level of the attacks against me. In a telling comment that applies as much to the current election as to that of 1996, he noted, I was chosen to lead Israel because of the bitter dissatisfaction of the Israeli people with the way the peace process was progressing.

In all this, Hussein was surprised because, in private, Netanyahu had adopted a more conciliatory tone. As U.S. President Bill Clinton recounted it, in July 1996 [Netanyahu] told me he had not been elected to preside over a stalemate in the peace process. Extraordinarily, Netanyahu even confided to Clinton his respect for Arafat and desire not to marginalize the Palestinian leader. In view of his public depiction of the PLO chairman as an unreformed terrorist, these were remarkable words.

Perhaps he was — in his own way — committed to peace, but on his own terms. During a summit hastily convened by Clinton, Hussein bitterly accused Netanyahu of dashing the hopes of Israelis and Arabs alike. Netanyahu replied, I am determined to surprise you. Privately, he may have calculated that his hard-line actions would give him more room to maneuver in the peace process thereafter, though this was not how it looked to friendly Arab leaders such as Hussein.

The problem, Netanyahu argued, was not Israeli actions but Palestinian inaction in rounding up and clamping down on terrorists. Although Hussein had some sympathy with this point, having repeatedly criticized Arafat’s failure to honor his obligations, he had no doubt who deserved the most blame for the crisis in the peace process: Netanyahu.

Netanyahu’s authorization of a botched assassination attempt against Hamas leader Khaled Meshal in Amman, Jordan, in September 1997 only made matters worse. And though there was some recovery in relations in the final year of Hussein’s life, the king’s mind was made up. Netanyahu’s preoccupation with holding together his right-wing coalition and pleasing his constituents had come at the expense of the peace process. For Hussein, Netanyahu had shown himself to be more of a politician than a statesman.

Despite his disillusionment with Netanyahu, Hussein still believed in the peace process. And he believed that a military man with a record of tough action in defense of Israel’s security was ultimately best placed to lead it to peace. Such an individual could convince the Israeli public that its security would be guaranteed even as they made painful concessions.

Hussein held just such faith in Ehud Barak, now defense minister and Netanyahu’s successor as prime minister in 1999. Mutual respect was the hallmark of private correspondence between Hussein and Barak, the latter of whom wrote in glowing terms that I have no doubt that the potential for a warm and true peace between our two countries can be measured by the warm personal relationship we share. Barak’s continuing respect for the Jordanian monarchy and emphasis on close relations between Jordan and Israel in furthering the peace process is evident from his subsequent correspondence with Hussein’s son and successor, King Abdullah II. The Jordanians were kept closely informed as Barak made his ultimately unsuccessful push for peace in the final months of the Clinton presidency.

If Netanyahu returns to office this month, he will have to work hard to convince Abdullah that his father’s judgment of the then prime minister was wrong. Still, Netanyahu could play a positive role. In his previous term, domestic politics helped make it impossible for him to push peace without losing his right-wing coalition. Today, domestic concern for security still predominates, but international pressure on both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to get an agreement on track is also increasingly powerful. If Netanyahu can convince Israelis that they are safe and Arab allies that he is serious, opportunities in the peace process may yet open up.

King Hussein’s experience does offer us one last glimmer of hope. The Rabin-Hussein partnership that was the foundation of the peace process in the 1990s had also gotten off to a rocky start when Rabin had first been Israel’s prime minister in the 1970s. Then, Hussein had found him inflexible and almost impossible to work with. Times changed and so did the man. If he were still alive today, Hussein would no doubt fervently hope that Netanyahu might yet surprise him the second time around.