Obama gets the who, what, and how of Af-Pak — but not the why

By Will Inboden

The Obama administration’s new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategic plan merits the praise and support it has received from a broad range of the political spectrum — and not just because it so closely resembles the course recommended by the Bush administration’s strategic review. Burdened by the oxygen-sucking crush of the economic crisis, and a clamor to abandon Afghanistan from many voices in the left-wing of his political base, President Obama still chose to follow the responsible but costly course of a sustained engagement in what he calls the world’s most dangerous region.

Any effective strategy must answer a range of questions. On the matters of what is to be done, how it is to be done, and who will do it, the new plan is generally sound. The "what" is a comprehensive surge in political-military-development resources and personnel; the "how" is through improved security, bolstered governance capacity, and economic development; the "who" is a combination of U.S. military and diplomatic personnel, Afghan and Pakistani civilian and security forces, a (hoped for, as Kori Schake and Peter Feaver remind us) strengthened posture by NATO forces, and (also hoped for) a more helpful posture by other regional powers such as India, Iran, and Russia.

Yet the new plan is anemic at best on the fundamental "why" questions — specifically, why do the Taliban and al Qaeda still pose a threat, and why do we seek to defeat them? Or perhaps another angle might be that the new strategy is oddly silent on one of the key "who" questions — specifically, just who is the enemy, and what motivates them?

One searches in vain in Obama’s announcement, in the accompanying White Paper, or in any other presidential statement for a description of the enemy’s ideology and the battle of ideas that shapes many of the literal battle lines in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The White Paper refers once to "jihadist terrorists" and multiple times to "extremists." Obama’s speech makes repeated references to "al Qaeda," "violent extremists," and "terrorists," and describes the fact of their threat without the reasons why. This paragraph is representative:

The terrorists within Pakistan’s borders are not simply enemies of America or Afghanistan – they are a grave and urgent danger to the people of Pakistan. Al Qaeda and other violent extremists have killed several thousand Pakistanis since 9/11. They have killed many Pakistani soldiers and police. They assassinated Benazir Bhutto. They have blown up buildings, derailed foreign investment, and threatened the stability of the state. Make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within.

All true. But why does al Qaeda do it? Neither this speech nor the White Paper says anything about why the "terrorists" commit such barbarism, what their end goals are, how the "extremists" define themselves, how we understand them and their worldview (as opposed to just labelling it), and how those definitions relate to the means and ends of our strategy?

These are not questions without answers. As has been described countless times and in countless places before, the enemy is the jihadists and their violent Islamist ideology. As bloodthirsty and even nihilistic as their tactics are, they have a perversely coherent grand vision of bringing their region and eventually the world under their version of Islamist rule. The most immediate geographic battleground in this war is Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the most menacing exponent of jihadism is al Qaeda, but the conflict implicates many areas of the globe, and will be won or lost within the broader Islamic community itself.

These points are not raised as rhetorical trifles. They bear directly on the ultimate success or failure of the Obama administration’s new Af-Pak strategy. First, understanding the worldview of the enemy shapes many strategic and tactical questions. These include:

• determining which neo-Taliban members are just garden-variety thugs who can be negotiated into a stable bargain, and which ones are incorrigibly committed to jihadism;  

• ascertaining which residents of Pakistan’s tribal regions are aiding al Qaeda as an uncompromising act of religious devotion and which ones are just trying to cut deals and survive in a rough neighborhood;

• navigating the complexities of Afghanistan-Pakistan border issues, especially since jihadists do not recognize national borders in their agenda of Islamist rule;

• determining which members of Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI) are unapologetic supporters of jihadism, which ones are committed opponents of it, and which ones are just crass operators playing all sides;

• securing deeper and broader population support by addressing religious values and concerns;

• countering jihadist propaganda efforts not only through radio jamming but also through refuting jihadist claims and highlighting peaceful and pluralist versions of Islam;

• helping to determine the parameters of success, which will include not just the defeat of al Qaeda but also the growth of effective governments that do not support extremist Islamism (for negative examples, see Pakistan under General Zia ul-Haq or Sudan under Hassan al Turabi).

Second, clear and straight talk on the ideological stakes in the conflicts will be necessary to sustain the support of the American people. If the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre engagement drags on and becomes perceived as only a frivolous nation-building quagmire "over there," or if stabilization and strengthened governance also brings Islamist rule, then already tenuous popular support in the United States (and other NATO nations) will dissipate.

On the former, explaining the global aspirations of jihadist ideology also draws an immediate link between the conflict in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and its relation to the security of the United States. On the latter, we experienced a small taste of this potential firsthand at the White House in 2006, when Afghan citizen Abdul Rahman revealed that he had converted from Islam to Christianity and consequently faced a death sentence under Afghan law. The public uproar in the United States and Europe was intense, immediate, and justified. Fortunately, Abdul Rahman soon found asylum in Italy, but every day that he was imperilled in Afghanistan, public support eroded for the mission there. The American and European people will not spend blood and treasure in a faraway land to support the imposition of shari’a law.

The good news is that jihadist ideology is embraced only by a small, perhaps tiny minority in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This means the vast majority of the populations are open to rejecting jihadism, provided that their needs for security, order, the basic necessities of life, and respect for their religious faith are met. But the battle of ideas is real, and the jihadists will continue to advance their vision among the population through a combination of argument, enticement, fear, and coercion.

I do not doubt that senior officials in the Obama administration are familiar with jihadist ideology. But if their laudable new strategy will have a chance to succeed, they need to incorporate this understanding of jihadism into both their private strategic planning and their public comments.