Tough times for the Awakenings — crisis or opportunity?
Like most people who follow Iraq, I’ve been watching the mounting tensions surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence with some concern. I don’t think that we’re seeing the "great unravelling" quite yet, nor that we’re yet seeing a return to higher levels of violence, insurgency and civil war. But the increased violence and ...
Like most people who follow Iraq, I’ve been watching the mounting tensions surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence with some concern. I don’t think that we’re seeing the "great unravelling" quite yet, nor that we’re yet seeing a return to higher levels of violence, insurgency and civil war. But the increased violence and the growing chorus of complaints about the failures of political accommodation should be a cautionary note to the Iraqi government and to the major political players that time is running out to make the crucial political power-sharing agreements necessary before American troop withdrawals pick up their pace.
The arrest of a leading Awakenings figure by Iraqi Security Forces which led to a highly-publicized military standoff a few weeks ago is only one instance of a wider pattern. Tensions surrounding that arrest were exacerbated by an inflammatory blizzard of statements by Maliki and others warning that the Awakenings had been infilitrated by Baathists and al-Qaeda. A series of attacks by unknown groups have added to the tension. It all adds up to a general sense of apprehension, with members of the Awakenings worried about their future and many others worried that the security situation may be on the brink.
The situation is extremely murky, and it’s hard to really know anything with confidence. What I’ve been seeing in the Iraqi and Arab media, and hearing from the people I’ve spoken with, is a wide range of competing interpretations and arguments over everything from the identity of the attackers (al-Qaeda? rival Awakenings groups? Shi’a militias looking to stir things up?) to the intentions of the Iraqi government (eliminate the Awakenings? weed out the ‘bad elements’ within them? force the U.S. to take sides, and test the U.S. implementation of the SOFA?). The high level of uncertainty and confusion is itself a significant point — the impact of fear and uncertainty on strategic calculations should never be underestimated.
Given all that uncertainty, it would be unwise to offer a confident assessment of what’s really going on. But the emerging crisis surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence do both seem to be primarily driven by the continuing refusal of Maliki and the Iraqi government to make meaningful political accommodations and their decision to move against at least some of the Awakenings groups at a convenient moment.
The official moves against the Awakenings look like salami tactics, divide and rule rather than a full-scale assault. Maliki, as in the past, seems quite happy to work with parts of the Anbar Awakenings (talk of a political deal with Ahmed Abu Risha is in the air again) even as he moves against Awakenings elsewhere. Maliki’s government sees very clearly how fragmented, mutually mistrustful and competitive the Awakenings are. They are likely gambling that this fragmentation creates such intense coordination problems that they can take out a few of their most dangerous potential enemies here and there without triggering a widespread Sunni uprising. Watching the reaction of the various Awakenings thus far — as some protested angrily but others cheered — suggests that they are right. It’s a dangerous game, though. The question would be whether there is some tipping point, at which a large number of uncoordinated and self-interested small groups suddenly switch sides (as arguably happened in the other direction in the spring of 2007).
It would not take a revolt en masse for a change in the status of the Awakenings to have an effect on security. In a recent interview with al-Arabiya, Salah al-Mutlaq warned that the government’s failure to deliver on its promises of security and civil jobs to the Awakenings and the arrest of a number of Awakenings leaders were spreading fear and uncertainty through their ranks. Members who aren’t getting paid, see their leaders targeted, and see diminishing prospects of future payoffs could begin to fade away. They could stop performing their local security functions, allowing violent groups easier access to areas which had been off-limits for the last year or two. Or some could return to violent action in an individual capacity — and even if only 10% went that route, that could put 10,000 hardened fighters back into play (in addition to people recently released from the prisons, another issue which factors in here).