Grading Obama’s first 100 days: Dan Twining
Pass I went to graduate school in Britain where we were on a pass-fail system. A mark below 60 was a Fail; a mark of 70 or above was a Distinction. I give President Obama’s foreign policy record to date a low pass — with a warning of the risk of underperforming, but in the ...
Pass
Pass
I went to graduate school in Britain where we were on a pass-fail system. A mark below 60 was a Fail; a mark of 70 or above was a Distinction. I give President Obama’s foreign policy record to date a low pass — with a warning of the risk of underperforming, but in the hope that an administration containing the best talent in the Democratic Party (almost) can rally our people and our partners to build a world that is more secure, free, and prosperous.
The president enjoyed a natural bounce in world public opinion after taking office. He also took many of the same popular initiatives John McCain would have done: announcing the goal of closing the prison at Guantanamo, committing America to pursue an international agreement on climate change, recommitting to victory in Afghanistan. Obama also benefited enormously from President Bush’s decision, made possible by the early and lonely advocacy of John McCain and not many others, to surge U.S. forces in Iraq in a way that snatched victory there from the jaws of defeat. Luckily for Americans and Iraqis, and unluckily for Republicans, Obama has been among the primary beneficiaries of the policy he opposed.
What Obama has not yet done, but which he will soon need to do, is make hard calls. These include:
1) pushing Congress to ratify pending free trade agreements with close U.S. allies South Korea and Colombia as part of a broader recommitment to leadership on international trade, which means taking on his own party (as President Clinton did);
2) standing up to Russian efforts to reconstruct a sphere of privileged influence in Central Europe and the Caucasus, which means not backing away from missile defense in Europe and more vigorous support for the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine to join the West — on the principle that sovereign countries have the right to choose freely their international associations (as Clinton said in advocating NATO enlargement in the 1990s);
3) avoiding the temptations for condominium with Beijing in favor of an Asia policy that puts allies like Japan and partners like India first, as part of a broader "shaping strategy" to encourage China’s responsible rise;
4) putting in place policies toward Iran and North Korea that combine sticks with carrots — not only to deter these countries’ nuclear weaponization but to reassure nervous U.S. allies in East Asia and the Gulf that are uncertain of America’s commitment to their security, which if not corrected could lead to a proliferation cascade with unsettling implications for both regions;
5) working with the Pakistani government, people, and military to reverse that country’s creeping Talibanization — which will require doing more than blaming the Bush administration for past failings, including rallying Americans for a generational commitment to state-building in South Asia.
It is too early to define (or expect) an Obama Doctrine. But I would propose one that:
1) puts friends and allies first, rather than leading with efforts to normalize relations with bad actors — whether in Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang, or Caracas — in ways that perversely reassure our adversaries and alienate our partners;
2) maintains America’s historic and bipartisan commitment to promoting political and economic liberty abroad as a foundational source of security and prosperity at home;
3) works systematically within a fluid international order to sustain American preeminence (which remains in high demand: look at how many countries seek closer relations with Washington and depend on the global public goods provided by U.S. power), rather than prematurely ceding leadership in expectation of a "post-American world" (remember when Soviet Communism was the wave of the future, or when Japan was going to be the next superpower?);
4) strengthens the domestic sources of America’s global leadership by sustaining economic openness, fiercely resisting protectionism in all its forms, welcoming to our shores the world’s best and brightest minds by liberalizing admission of highly skilled immigrants, investing in human capital through market-based health and education reforms, reforming legacy programs like Medicare and Social Security to make them fiscally sustainable in the long term, and investing additional resources in research & development to strengthen America’s technological leadership in a more competitive and financially multipolar world.
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