Put Down the Popcorn

 I just wanted to point readers to an essay I’ve published in this week’s issue of the Review section of the UAE’s The National, under the title "Don’t just watch."  It basically argues that the leaders of the so-called moderate Arab states might be feeling pretty good about things right now — what with Obama reaching out to the Muslim world from Cairo and battling with the Israeli government over settlements, Iran imploding over its contested electoral outcome, and Hezbollah failing to unseat the March 14 coalition in Lebanon.  But they shouldn’t get too comfortable, because they are about to face a slew of serious political demands for which they seem quite unprepared:

Obama’s new approach to the Middle East will place far heavier demands on its allies. One of the prices of being consulted is that more is expected. These Arab governments have lost the “Bush excuse”, which previously gave them free license. They will soon be called upon by the Obama administration to deliver on the Israeli-Palestinian front, on Iraq and on Iran – and they are far from off the hook on questions of democracy and human rights. Like Wile E Coyote running past the ledge of his cliff, these leaders may not yet realize that they risk being set up as the scapegoat for any policy failures which come.

The most obvious example has to do with Israel. The Obama administration’s decision to forcefully advocate for a two-state solution and to pick a very public fight with the Israeli government over settlements can be seen as a response to frequently stated Arab demands. But most Arab leaders have taken it as a rare opportunity to sit back on the metaphorical couch, eating popcorn and watching the show. Arab leaders feel that they have already made major concessions to Israel by reaffirming the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, but this will not suffice for long.

Having pressured Israel over settlements, the US has already begun to turn to Arabs and demand some gestures in exchange. They will most likely be unreceptive, and are unlikely to offer major new overtures to Israel in the absence of a wider push towards a final status agreement or demonstrable progress on the issue of settlements well beyond what is currently on offer. But if they respond negatively, they will have given the Netanyahu government – and its supporters in the United States – the excuse they need to refuse further concessions.

This does not mean that Arab governments need to make premature offerings on the core issues of normalisation with Israel – opening embassies, extending recognition, and so forth. Such a transformed relationship should come at the end of the peace process, not the beginning. But they should be prepared to enter into a revived round of multilateral negotiations over regional issues with Israel. They should respond to requests to offer increased financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. And it would serve them well to do the Americans an unasked-for favour by combining increased funding with redoubled efforts to achieve a Palestinian national unity government – instead of using Hamas and Fatah as proxies for their own political battles.

A second area where the Arab response has been lacking is Iraq. The Obama administration’s Iraq strategy placed a heavy emphasis on regional diplomacy and on an increased role for Iraq’s neighbours in creating a more secure environment. But thus far American efforts have produced little tangible progress. Indeed, the last few months have seen several nasty spats between the Iraqi government led by Nouri al Maliki and assorted Gulf states. Al Maliki dramatically announced that he was abandoning efforts to reach out to Saudi Arabia, while the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Parliaments exchanged angry resolutions about compensation claims dating back to the Saddam era.

Arabs should recognise that the impending – and very real – US drawdown will place greater demands on them. They were long able to ignore the Bush administration’s entreaties to step up in Iraq because they never believed that the US would actually leave. As the sincerity of Obama’s commitment becomes clear, they must urgently rethink that assumption. At a minimum, they should be moving quickly to remove Iraq from its Chapter Seven status at the United Nations – which still designates the country as a threat to international peace – and forgiving the enormous outstanding Saddam-era debt. They should also be actively working to help the Iraqi Sunni community get its stake in Iraq’s government, before their disillusionment leads to the return of the Sunni insurgency. And they should be taking a proactive role in dealing with the refugee crisis.

 I talk about Iran, al-Qaeda, and democracy issues, and then conclude:

Rather than sitting back and enjoying their momentary reprieve, Arab leaders should be taking advantage of the current calm to work aggressively to overcome their paralysing internal disagreement and revitalise collective Arab action. They should be preparing responses to Obama on Iraq and Iran, and forming a comprehensive strategy for the coming Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations. The current calm isn’t going to last for long – and this isn’t the time to be sitting back, eating popcorn and enjoying the show.

 Read the whole thing at the Review.