How to Win

Six years into the war, the United States still doesn't recognize the enemy.

By John Arquilla

October 12, 2009, 8:55 PM

"Network" is the word most often used to describe terrorist organizations since 9/11. Yet, nearly six years into the first great armed conflict between nations and networks, the nations are still fighting the last war. There has been hardly a hint that the pursuit of al Qaeda and its allies is guided by any serious thinking about the new types of problems posed by adversaries who operate in small, interconnected bands, with minimal central control. Nations still think primarily in terms of massing ponderous field forces and striking with "overwhelming force," as the U.S. military has tried to do in Iraq. But the networks there have deflected the punches easily, pursuing their nettlesome insurgency with ever greater savagery. In this new type of conflict -- call it "netwar" -- the basic dynamic is one of "hiders" and "seekers." Gone are the days of mutually massed forces clashing on a darkling plain. Now, if you can't find, you can't fight.

"Network" is the word most often used to describe terrorist organizations since 9/11. Yet, nearly six years into the first great armed conflict between nations and networks, the nations are still fighting the last war. There has been hardly a hint that the pursuit of al Qaeda and its allies is guided by any serious thinking about the new types of problems posed by adversaries who operate in small, interconnected bands, with minimal central control. Nations still think primarily in terms of massing ponderous field forces and striking with "overwhelming force," as the U.S. military has tried to do in Iraq. But the networks there have deflected the punches easily, pursuing their nettlesome insurgency with ever greater savagery. In this new type of conflict — call it "netwar" — the basic dynamic is one of "hiders" and "seekers." Gone are the days of mutually massed forces clashing on a darkling plain. Now, if you can’t find, you can’t fight.

If nations are to have any hope of ultimately defeating terrorism, they must understand networks as a distinct organizational form, not just a handy labeling device. In practical terms, that means targeting network nodes, not simply trying to thwart them by invading or bombarding nations suspected of supporting them.

You can’t attack a network with a field army. Instead, it takes a willingness to field a nimble, networked force of your own. Ironically, the U.S. military actually started the war on terror in a networked way when just 11 Special Forces "A teams" — fewer than 200 troops overall — toppled the Taliban and put al Qaeda on the run. Each team was interconnected to the other, and to attack aircraft above them. They proved unstoppable.

But since late in 2001, senior U.S. generals have reasserted their traditional preference for big, balky units, first in Afghanistan, later in Iraq. And so today we have two quagmires, in large part because of an unwillingness to fight networks with networks.

Some 40 years ago, the Pentagon shifted from a highly networked special operations approach to a conventional "big unit" strategy in Vietnam — with disastrous results. So far, we have made the same mistake in the war on terror. The only difference is that there is still time to reverse course.

John Arquilla earned his degrees in international relations from Rosary College (BA 1975) and Stanford University (MA 1989, PhD 1991). He has been teaching in the special operations program at the United States Naval Postgraduate School since 1993. He also serves as chairman of the Defense Analysis department.

Dr. Arquilla’s teaching interests revolve around the history of irregular warfare, terrorism, and the implications of the information age for society and security.

His books include: Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat and the International System (1992); From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient & Modern Times (1996), which was a featured alternate of the Military Book Club; In Athena’s Camp (1997); Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (2001), named a notable book of the year by the American Library Association; The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of Communism to the War on Terror (2006); Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (2008), which is about defense reform; Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World (2011); and Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s Longest War (2012).

Dr. Arquilla is also the author of more than one hundred articles dealing with a wide range of topics in military and security affairs. His work has appeared in the leading academic journals and in general publications like The New York Times, Forbes, Foreign Policy Magazine, The Atlantic Monthly, Wired and The New Republic. He is best known for his concept of “netwar” (i.e., the distinct manner in which those organized into networks fight). His vision of “swarm tactics” was selected by The New York Times as one of the “big ideas” of 2001; and in recent years Foreign Policy Magazine has listed him among the world’s “top 100 thinkers.”

In terms of policy experience, Dr. Arquilla worked as a consultant to General Norman Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm, as part of a group of RAND analysts assigned to him. During the Kosovo War, he assisted deputy secretary of defense John Hamre on a range of issues in international information strategy. Since the onset of the war on terror, Dr. Arquilla has focused on assisting special operations forces and other units on practical “field problems.” Most recently, he worked for the White House as a member of a small, nonpartisan team of outsiders asked to articulate new directions for American defense policy.