Going Ballistic

Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie
(Independent Military Observer),
Vol. 08, Issue No. 514, March 16, 2007, Moscow

When the United States announced plans this spring to install missile interceptors in Poland and tracking radar in the Czech Republic, the reaction from Moscow was downright hysterical. Portraying the proposed missile defense as a sneaky American attempt to neutralize Russia’s nuclear arsenal, President Vladimir Putin decried foreign "interference" in Russian affairs. Never mind that, as U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pointed out, it is "ludicrous" to think 10 interceptors in Poland could counter the thousands of missiles in Russia’s arsenal; the Russians were having none of it. In late April, Putin announced a moratorium on Moscow’s participation in a key defense pact. The Russian press added to the uproar, running stories with headlines such as "American Defense Attacks" and "An Invitation to the Arms Race."

But the latest Russian histrionics have little to do with U.S. plans for a missile defense in Europe. From top Kremlin officials to the average man on the street, Russians have become increasingly defensive — some would say combative — about their country’s place in the world. The Russian reaction has more to do with a national nostalgia, a desire to regain past greatness, than any strategic initiative emanating out of Washington.

Despite their defeat in the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the economic implosion of the 1990s, Russians never stopped viewing themselves as a great power. Now, with windfall oil revenues in state coffers and strongman former KGB and military officers at the helm, Russia is reasserting itself. The country’s quasi-state mega companies are buying up everything from diamond mines in Angola to steel mills in Michigan. The Kremlin is stepping up its role as a power broker in the Middle East. And Moscow is increasingly using its role as a gas provider to Europe for both economic and strategic ends. The Russian Bear, it seems, is roaring again.

The centerpiece of Russia’s efforts to retake the mantle of a global power, though, is its military. This effort was addressed in a sober-minded article in the March 16 issue of the newspaper Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Observer). The Observer is a weekly supplement of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a respected independent daily founded during the era of former President Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and aimed at Russia’s intellectual elite. The Observer, launched in 1995 as something akin to Jane’s Defence Weekly, publishes news and analysis related to Russian and international military issues. Because prominent experts frequently contribute to the paper and because articles are sometimes critical of the Russian military, it has become an important and widely read forum for discussions of Russian security among policymakers. In a country with an ever shrinking number of independent media outlets, the Observer stands out as one of the few venues for open debate — and one of the even fewer that deal with military matters.

In the article, titled "Hence, Tactics without Strategy," retired Gen. Pavel Zolotarev of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, an influential Russian think tank, acknowledges that the prevailing attitude in Russian defense circles today is hostility toward the West, especially the United States. But Zolotarev warns that this anger is misplaced. Instead of thinking in purely military terms, he writes, Russia requires a broader strategic vision. In today’s globalized world, Russia should concentrate its efforts on the development of its economy, and education and training for its population.

It may seem odd for a Russian general to be calling for these types of social reforms. But Zolotarev has been a leading advocate — both publicly and behind the scenes — of reforming the Russian military for more than a decade. He is that relatively rare figure who, because he occupies a place in the country’s foreign-policy establishment, is able to criticize its views and assumptions.

Nearly all areas of policymaking have been in flux since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Defense strategy, as Zolotarev explains, is no exception. For example, in 1992 then President Boris Yeltsin created a special government agency, the Russian Security Council, to help formulate the country’s national security strategy. It was supposed to be a group with a broad vision, charged with considering everything from the country’s defense priorities to citizens’ civil liberties. But its influence was short-lived, and the task of formulating security and defense policy quickly shifted to the Ministry of Defense, which is populated by an old guard. Instead of balancing multiple interests, Russia returned to the Soviet notion that the priorities of the state trump everything else. Both the old establishment and the new political elite could agree on one thing: they were unhappy about Russia’s loss of superpower status and the fact that Western powers were penetrating the space that "legitimately belongs" to Russia — the former Soviet republics. If early post-Soviet defense doctrines stressed threats of domestic terrorism or breakaway provinces, then more recent versions stress an external threat. And that external threat is the United States.

Zolotarev notes that, for the entrenched elites in Moscow, such an emphasis is not only a guiding principle but also a tool to serve their personal interests by facilitating high federal spending on defense and greater government control of the economy and society. By spending heavily on defense, they believe that Russia can relaunch its own high-tech industry and thereby regain superpower status. But Zolotarev upends this argument as another example of outdated thinking. In his view, a bureaucracy cannot compel innovation. Indeed, the failure of the Soviet experiment may be all the proof we need on this score. At the same time, he argues, such heavy defense-related expenditures are draining funds from education, healthcare, and other human development efforts just as they are needed most.

Zolotarev’s article is a sober assessment of the present thinking in Moscow, and it goes a long way toward explaining the fiery Russian reaction over the U.S. missile defense plans in Europe. There is no doubt that Russia’s policies, particularly its combative stance on defense issues, are more than reminiscent of the Soviet days. To some degree, Russia has also picked up the old Communist Party habit of making decisions in an echo chamber. But senior Russian officials deserve some credit. Putin’s government is an impressive one. Liberal? No. Democratic? Hardly. But Putin and his team had a plan to restore Russia’s great-power status and they have executed it consistently and conscientiously — like the good spies and military men that they are. For Putin, Zolotarev, and most Russians, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the seminal political event of their lives, and it was a tragedy. They won’t let their country collapse of its own weight and contradictions again. But the crucial question remains, What will they create instead?