Cleaning the U.S.’s house

By Joanna Nathan

Much of the recent focus on “corruption” in Afghanistan seems to naively believe that it occurs despite the best efforts of American paymasters rather than because of the very structure of an intervention emphasizing co-option over accountability.

With the New York Times now highlighting Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s brother’s alleged CIA connections, there will hopefully be greater awareness that many relatives of the Afghan leadership receive backing by a variety of U.S. agencies often working at cross purposes and sending highly mixed messages about their priorities to the Afghan people.

Much of the conduct in the early years of this war was essentially outsourced to the CIA, with little demanded of Afghan allies beyond mouthing allegiance to Kabul and professing hatred of the Taliban. The military has also been to the fore in choosing who to engage, often with little regard for how the population is treated and a blind eye turned to involvement in illegal activities. The head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has despaired at the fact that “tacit acceptance of opium trafficking by foreign military forces as a way to extract intelligence information and occasional military support in operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda undermines stabilization efforts.”

The ineffective hypocrisy of the U.S. government demanding anti-corruption action even as elements of it pay and protect some of the same figures demonstrates a lack of seriousness and fuels discontent. The United States has had an enormous hand in picking the post-2001 economic winners and embedding them at the heart of the state amidst a climate of impunity.

If a militia that works with U.S. personnel in Kandahar can kill the province’s police chief in the center of town (as happened in June 2009) and face no apparent consequences what does this say to the local population about the U.S.’s commitment to rule of law? About their personal safety?

If gaudy new mansions built in the local “narco-tecture” style are rented for thousands a month by U.S. contractors, UN agencies, foreign embassies and even rule of law projects, what does that say of the Western commitment to accountability?

Back in 2003 the International Crisis Group highlighted that then-governor Gul Agha Sherzai of Kandahar was the beneficiary of large military contracts, providing supplies to a southern Afghan base — including translators, meaning other communities could not even ensure a fair hearing by foreign forces.

For it is important to recognize that when Afghans speak of “corruption,” they may mean perfectly legal actions under the direct auspices of foreign donors. When they hear of billions of dollars being spent in Afghanistan via private contractors only to often see much of the money lost in layer after layer of subcontracting and little real effect on the ground, that is labeled corruption whatever signed contracts there may be.

If they see relatives of government ministers growing wealthy off foreign contracts, even as the vast majority of the population’s living standards remain amongst the worst in the world, they get angry. An excellent recent report into private security contracting in Afghanistan highlights the high level ties of such companies, largely hired to guard foreign organizations and development projects.

The recent focus on tackling various individuals in the name of anti-corruption with calls for the dismissal of this or that minister — almost invariably the ones who don’t wear suits and don’t speak English — misses the point. Getting rid of Marshall Fahim and General Dostum would be no bad thing in itself, but does not correctly frame the problem.

In placing demands on the Afghan administration, the international community’s focus must be on systems. For instance, the top tier of police leadership was vetted by a reform board in 2006 only for this body — which was backed by knowledgeable foreign observers — that has faded away. Several of the figures the reform board deemed unacceptable are now back in public life. A senior appointments board which was the very first commitment in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact — an agreement supposed to clearly set out mutual commitments between the Afghan administration and the international community — was announced to great fanfare but has never been taken seriously in vetting appointees to top government positions. There has been no united insistence from the international community that the Afghan government ensure appointments follow agreed systems.

But before the U.S. administration is in any real position to make demands of the Afghan government, it needs to get its own act together. Over-reliance on expensive private contractors needs to be severely curtailed with the focus put on injecting money through Afghan government systems in a way that strengths local institutions rather than subverts them. The measure of effectiveness needs to be on impact on the ground rather than the sheer amounts poured in. Overarching this must be a cohesive approach across U.S. government agencies as to who is being engaged and ensuring that that no one has impunity.

Joanna Nathan is currently undertaking a mid-career masters at Princeton University. She lived in Kabul from 2003 to 2009 first for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting then as senior analyst for the International Crisis Group. Views expressed are her own.

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