Rive Gauche Rivalry

Matignon, rive gauche, 1997–2001 (Matignon, Left Bank, 1997–2001)
By Olivier Schrameck 191 pages, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2001 (in French)

In preparation for the two-round presidential elections in April and May, French politicians have taken to their publishers with a spate of insider books. Olivier Schrameck’s Matignon, rive gauche, 1997–2001 has emerged as one of the strongest sellers amidst a field that includes a chatty volume by Bernadette Chirac (wife of Conservative President Jacques Chirac) and an entry by the punchy agricultural minister Jean Glavany. Schrameck, chief of staff to Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, reports from the trenches on the political warfare that ensues when the president, directly elected by the people, and the prime minister, the majority leader of the National Assembly, hail from opposing parties.

The constitution inherited from Charles de Gaulle obliges them to share executive power — or endure "cohabitation," as it is called in France — and it has been Schrameck’s job, as the closest advisor of Jospin in his office at the Hôtel Matignon, to help the odd couple function. At a time when voters in many Western democracies are displaying their preference for split-party government, Schrameck questions the assumption that such "checks and balances" are a panacea.

French civil servants never publicly comment on political issues. Upset by the deleterious effects of cohabitation and eager to promote Jospin in the race for the presidency, Schrameck broke that rule and stirred a double controversy. News of the book’s imminent release leaked three days before its launch in October 2001 and resulted in the right rushing to condemn Schrameck for publishing a kiss-and-tell book. Their loud calls for his resignation and overzealous anticipatory apology of Chirac’s policies looked all the more foolish when a poll four days later revealed that a majority of the French public approved of Schrameck’s decision to publish.

Indeed, although French politicians dislike cohabitation, the French themselves clearly endorse it: They voted for it in three of the last five national elections as a means to counterbalance the president’s extensive powers. Three cohabitations since 1986 have had the desirable balancing effect of allowing the prime minister to reclaim prerogatives that the de Gaulle constitution had granted him but which presidential practice had been gradually eroding. Even Schrameck acknowledges, "We have to admit that … none of our presidents has resisted the temptation of monarchical presidency." Nonetheless, says Schrameck, "there is no worse situation for our country than an executive power divided against itself."

Given that the French might vote again in 2002 for another five-year-long cohabitation, with Chirac reelected as president, Schrameck strongly argues against the dualism of the executive, and cohabitation in particular, for three reasons. First, cohabitation obscures political responsibilities and thus weakens accountability. Because it involves both political coalitions, it deprives voters of a clear political alternative. Second, there is a permanent risk of major clashes between the two sides, which in times of crisis could have serious consequences and could get in the way of a coherent foreign policy. Finally, instead of focusing on the common good, the executive spends enormous time and energy on infighting. He calls it a threat to the republic: "If power has to be checked," Schrameck argues, "it cannot be through a perpetual self-contradiction."

Nonetheless, Schrameck’s object of study is larger than the issue of cohabitation. He explores the uniquely French problem of having two equally powerful men sharing the executive office. Schrameck underscores the significant disadvantages of this arrangement and concludes that a twin-headed executive impedes rather than enhances the democratic process. It is surprising, therefore, that when the prime minister’s chief of staff delivers a major blow to the country’s sacred constitution, the right should focus its indignation on the appropriateness of the author’s having written the book and not on his audacious constitutional criticisms.

By also making Matignon, Left Bank a promotional vehicle for Jospin’s presidential campaign, Schrameck undermines the more noble goal of informing citizens that the forthcoming presidential elections are about more than electing a Conservative or Socialist government; they are about confronting an institutional impasse. Written with the blessing of Jospin, if not on his direct orders, Schrameck’s book has an obvious partisan objective that, ironically, illustrates the ugly features of the cohabitation he condemns.

In a naturally laudatory fashion, Schrameck underlines Jospin’s social initiatives: creating a marriagelike status for homosexuals, devolving legislative power to Corsica, creating universal health insurance, implementing the 35-hour work week, reinforcing judiciary independence, and introducing a law that requires 50 percent of all candidates in national elections to be female.

A political analyst would have spent more time on the consequences of the move toward decentralization and openness that these policies represent. But Schrameck instead focuses on Chirac, whom he accuses of systematically trying to impede Jospin’s reform agenda. Though his political position prevents him from telling serious tales, Schrameck does reveal that Chirac used cabinet meeting minutes to criticize government inaction and as a platform to defend his political decisions and judicial nominations. He also blames Chirac for failing to keep distinct his position as head of state and protector of the constitution from that of leader of the opposition. After dismissing the competition (which includes ally-turned-competitor in the presidential race, Jean-Pierre Chevènement), Schrameck introduces Jospin as "the best qualified to confirm the credibility, authenticity, and legacy of the values of the left."

Schrameck also concentrates on domestic issues at the expense of insight into international affairs, despite noting that "European politics is no longer a matter of foreign policy." He fails to address the impact of European integration on the French polity and never turns his gaze on other countries for possible solutions to the institutional problem he identifies. Moreover, it is a little too convenient that Schrameck’s criticism of the current cohabitation also serves as a defense of the Jospin administration’s shortcomings. Jospin is thus absolved from failure to reform the pension system and the state administration.

Schrameck’s testimony on cohabitation is crucial information for voters. But ultimately, his point comes down to simply begging the French not to make the wrong choice — that is, to vote for cohabitation yet again. Yet what if Chirac were elected? To avoid divided government, would the left concede in the legislative elections? While it is full of acute observations, Schrameck’s book disappoints by offering little in the way of prescriptive advice. But as a man of the state and not a statesman, he undoubtedly intended to leave that to the presidential candidate he so masterfully introduces.