An ‘A’ for Effort

Revista de la CEPAL (CEPAL Review),
No. 73, April 2001, Santiago

In a Washington Post op-ed in May 2001, former U.S. presidential candidates George McGovern and Bob Dole proposed a $3 billion program that would use agricultural surpluses from advanced economies to provide school lunches for hundreds of millions of hungry young students around the world, thus boosting classroom attendance. "A hot meal to a poor student," they argued, "is key to helping him or her become a literate, self-reliant adult tomorrow."

If McGovern and Dole need a case study to support their cause, they should look no further than Brazil. Not only have Brazilian policymakers introduced a successful school-lunch program, but they also have launched a series of reforms aimed at improving access to education. Brazil’s efforts reflect a renewed commitment among Latin American governments to reforming education. In a recent issue of Revista de la CEPAL, the journal of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazilian Education Minister Paulo Renato Souza and former Chilean Education Minister José Pablo Arellano detail their experiences tackling education reform in their countries during the 1990s.

Relative to Chile, Brazil faces formidable educational challenges. As one of the most populous countries in the world, Brazil requires massive education infrastructure, whereas Chile has a much smaller school-age population. Also, the Chilean government had already implemented important reforms during the 1980s — including an impressive nationwide voucher system usable in private schools — under the auspices of an authoritarian regime that was generating rapid economic growth. By contrast, Brazilian policymakers have faced the challenge of reform under weak democratic governments constantly strapped for cash.

Despite these constraints, Brazil’s Souza can boast impressive accomplishments: Between 1994 and 1999, the proportion of 7- to 14-year-old children enrolled in Brazilian schools increased from 89 to 96 percent; meanwhile, the number of illiterate citizens declined from 19.2 million in 1991 to 15.2 million by 1998. Such improvements resulted in significant degree from increased government investments in education and greater decentralization, including granting schools autonomy in spending decisions. But undoubtedly the policy that achieved the most impact was the fairly cheap, technically straightforward, and politically appealing food program. Beginning in 1995, the government nearly doubled its investment in school lunches. This policy, more than anything else, increased the incentive for parents to send their children to school — and keep them there.

In Chile, Arellano also focused on bread-and-butter issues, not so much for students but for teachers instead. Salaries for Chilean schoolteachers declined continuously during the 1980s, making teacher morale an acute problem for the democratic regime that took power in 1990 after General Augusto Pinochet stepped down. When Arellano joined the cabinet in 1996, he did not just increase salaries (as an old-fashioned populist might) but rather used perks to extract key concessions. For instance, while increasing wages for teachers, he also pushed them to accept longer school days. Arellano’s efforts helped cement ongoing improvements in Chilean schools: From 1990 to 1999, grade repetition rates declined from 12 percent to 8 percent at the secondary level and from 7.8 percent to 3.5 percent among primary-school students.

The growing popularity of education reform in Latin America reflects the unique appeal this issue holds for leaders across the political spectrum. Conservative policymakers steeped in the region’s orthodox economic reforms of the 1990s support education reforms that rely on market-friendly principles and tools, such as decentralization and vouchers; they also believe that higher spending without more accountability is a waste of money. Meanwhile, left-leaning politicians endorse education reform as a way to equalize opportunities; they regard the failure to invest in schools as regressive and shortsighted. While obviously favored by voters, education reform owes its success to an ideological convergence among politicians who might otherwise find themselves on opposing sides in most policy arenas.

Finally, although the authors fail to address the issue explicitly, their ability to remain in office for long periods was crucial to their achievements. In 2001, Souza began his seventh year as Brazil’s education minister, while Arellano served for four years (1996-2000) — exceptional records in a region where the average tenure in that position is around two and a half years. Souza and Arellano’s longevity not only speaks to their considerable political skills but also indicates that reform has a better chance of moving forward with greater continuity in the leadership ranks.