Force Divider

When critics fault the United States for its tendency to launch unilateral military actions, they usually blame cultural and historical factors or simple power politics. But increasingly, another factor lies behind this independent streak: technology. Especially in the realms of air and space, the United States so outstrips its allies that technology actually inhibits effective military cooperation with allies and friends, exposing the United States to more strident global criticism and leading to an increasingly unhealthy division of labor. The conduct of the campaign in Afghanistan promises to make that problem worse, not better.

The United States bears an increasing share of every coalition-based air campaign. In the nato air war over Kosovo, for example, the United States flew over 60 percent of the strike sorties and dropped 83 percent of the munitions.

Driving this disparity is the superiority of U.S. air power: The U.S. armed forces have more planes (more than 16,000 aircraft) and far greater capabilities than that of even its closest allies. Most U.S. strike aircraft can deliver precision weapons, but only 10 percent of European nato strike planes are so equipped. Only Britain has long-range cruise missiles, and no European country can jam enemy communications and missile radars at a safe distance. Only the United States has sizable airlift and tanker fleets: In order to deploy to southeast Europe during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, Britain had to charter cargo planes from Ukraine. In addition, the United States has the world’s only stealth aircraft. No one has close to the number and sophistication of U.S. satellites — nearly one third of all those in orbit — or the infrastructure to control and exploit them. And perhaps most important, only the United States has the secure command and control network to manage these air and space assets in near–real time.

When the United States works with non-European allies, the problems are even greater. During the Gulf War, for example, coalition partners Egypt and Syria stayed completely out of the combat zone for fear that their MiGs would be mistaken for Iraqi aircraft and shot down. Even countries flying similar equipment face significant challenges. The Saudi and Thai air forces use U.S. planes, but their levels of training and procedures do not reflect the 50 years of joint training and operations that have enabled nato and the United States to work together. In a Bright Star exercise in Egypt last October involving the militaries of eight nations from nato and the Middle East, a flight of host country aircraft roared unannounced through the exercise area, causing severe disruption. When the commander of the offending flight was asked for an explanation, he responded that there was nothing to worry about; they weren’t part of the exercise. His reply led the U.S. air commander to wonder if that meant the laws of physics regarding colliding objects had been miraculously suspended during exercises.

When working effectively, efficiently, and safely with allied air arms becomes too hard, the United States will be tempted to go it alone. This mind-set is already creating what Peter Rodman, now the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, called "a vicious circle in defense planning: U.S. military planning now tends to take it for granted that the allies cannot provide significant forces for a major conflict outside Europe; the Europeans sense they are off the hook, losing their incentive to invest in advanced technologies that would give the Americans more of an incentive to include them." Allies will be asked to lend political support, bases, intelligence information, or perhaps money, but they’ll be advised to leave their planes on the ground.

But there are significant political costs when the United States is the only nation doing the shooting. Not only does bombing solo reinforce America’s image as a hegemonic bully in places like Pakistan and Iran, but it undermines public support in countries that generally endorse U.S. goals and interests. As instances of collateral damage inevitably mount, restive public opinion in allied countries creates new political pressures on the United States — never mind the reality that the militaries of, say, Italy, France, or the Netherlands are technologically incapable of waging the relatively bloodless war that their populations demand.

The opening phase of the war on terrorism has only exacerbated these problems. Despite the public talk of nato support, the United States has supplied, as of this writing, nearly 100 percent of the lethal force. And as a result of its dominant role, the United States is further sharpening its technological edge: Predator unmanned air vehicles have been fitted with precision-guided missiles and used against targets in Afghanistan. The new Link-16 tactical data system that will greatly decrease the time needed to locate and strike mobile targets has been added to U.S. aircraft hitting Afghanistan. And venerable B-52s have been fitted with super-precise, satellite-guided bombs for use against Taliban forces in the front lines.

Working with allies is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy. The United States cannot be expected to carry the full load, but it is even less acceptable for the United States to provide the air and space assets, which are seen as virtually impervious to enemy action, while U.S. allies supply the vulnerable ground troops. If the United States seems unwilling to incur significant risk, then its allies — if they elect to participate at all — will rightfully insist on a major role in strategy-making and planning. That has traditionally been hard for U.S. policymakers and politicians to swallow.

The solution to the technology gap problem is not for the United States to slow down so that its friends can catch up — enemies might do so as well. America’s allies need to modernize their air forces, make more of their aircraft precision capable, and expand their stocks of precision weapons. They also need to acquire the communications and data link equipment necessary to ensure connectivity with the United States. While America can’t force its nato allies to strengthen their defense outlays (the United States spends more on military research and development than Germany’s entire defense budget), the United States can at least make it easier for them to acquire U.S. technology by loosening export controls. More fundamentally, the United States must be willing to sacrifice some of its control and decision-making dominance, trading a degree of military efficiency for political inclusion. Working with allies may be difficult, but working without them is impossible.